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ABSTRACT 
 
 
SUB-NATIONAL BORROWING, IS IT REALLY A DANGER? 
 
By 
 
VIOLETA VULOVIC 
 
December 2011 
 
 
 
 
Committee Chair:   Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez 
 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 
Sub-national borrowing has become an increasingly important source of sub-national finance, 
thanks to widespread decentralization of spending responsibilities, increasing revenue power and 
borrowing capacity of sub-national governments,. While there are arguments for and against 
giving sub-national authorities room for raising their own financial resources, appropriate sub-
national borrowing regulatory framework can reduce chances of defaults and fiscal crises.  
This dissertation investigates the effectiveness of sub-national borrowing regulations in 
maintaining fiscal sustainability. More precisely, it tests the hypothesis that if sub-national 
borrowing is restricted to financing capital investments (the “golden rule”), and if the sub-
national governments are provided with some measure of revenue autonomy, then the sub-
national borrowing should not endanger fiscal sustainability. Based on the sub-national 
government panel data for 57 countries between 1990 and 2008 and applying the system GMM 
estimator and the survival analysis, this dissertation provides support for this hypothesis.  
 xii 
 
The results suggest that the “golden rule” is effective in maintaining fiscal sustainability 
at both general and sub-national government level. Sub-national tax autonomy, however, seems 
to have positive but very small marginal effect on fiscal sustainability. The obtained results also 
emphasize the risk of the soft budget constraint and the moral hazard. Significant central 
government financing may give encouraging signs to the sub-national governments to over-
borrow and to expect being bailed out by the central government. The results obtained in this 
dissertation imply following policy recommendations. First, sub-national government borrowing 
does not have to endanger fiscal sustainability if the borrowing regulation framework is well 
designed and according to specific country circumstances. Second, reducing fiscal dependence 
on central government financing reduces the risk of moral hazard and improves the effectiveness 
of borrowing control in maintaining fiscal balance at the sustainable level. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Decentralization of borrowing authority to the sub-national governments and fiscal sustainability 
at the national level are two issues in public financial management that have been continuously 
debated. On the one side of the argument, it is encouraged to empower the sub-national 
authorities to raise their own financial resources for financing capital investments and other types 
of needed public spending.  On the other hand, often limited institutional capacity at the sub-
national level, the history of sub-national government defaults in certain fiscally decentralized 
countries, and the potential lack of effective controls give central governments strong arguments 
to limit sub-national borrowing autonomy. Thus, the challenge is whether it is possible to 
simultaneously achieve the goals of providing borrowing autonomy and at the same time 
maintain fiscal discipline1 that would prevent the insolvency of sub-national governments and 
would not endanger national fiscal sustainability.  
Sub-national governments have less incentive than central governments to be concerned 
with the macroeconomic impact of their policies, as they do not bear the full cost of their actions 
(i.e. the “moral hazard” problem). Therefore, to the sub-national governments, national fiscal 
sustainability2 has characteristics of a public good. Some authors contend that fiscal 
decentralization can enhance fiscal sustainability (Fukasaku & De Mello, 1998) while others 
argue that ensuring fiscal sustainability in a decentralized system requires carefully regulated 
sub-national borrowing (Ter-Minassian, 1997b). However, the empirical literature on this issue is 
                                                          
1 Fiscal discipline refers to imposing and enforcing constraints on revenues, fiscal balance, and public debt. It is 
commonly advised to impose constraints on all the three aggregates at the same time to limit the space for going 
around it (Fölscher, 2007). 
2 Macroeconomic crises involving public debt such as those in Russia, Argentina, Brazil, and East Asia, emphasize 
fiscal sustainability as an important component of macroeconomic stability. There is an empirical evidence of a 
direct relationship between the fiscal policy and the macroeconomic performance, offering evidence that fiscal 
policy may induce output volatility (Fatás & Mihov, 2003, 2006). 
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inconclusive. Thus, it is important to investigate the effect of fiscal decentralization on fiscal 
sustainability in the presence of the sub-national borrowing autonomy and regulation.  
Those in favor of fiscal decentralization argue that it could promote economic efficiency. 
Oates  (1993: p.240) states that, “the provision of local outputs that are differentiated according 
to local tastes and circumstances results in higher levels of social welfare than centrally 
determined and more uniform levels of outputs across all jurisdictions.” Stansel (2005) explains 
that there are two basic reasons for this. The first one is related to Hayek’s (1945) knowledge 
problem, according to which centralized systems fail in responding to diverse local demands 
because of wide dispersion of knowledge.3 The second problem relates to the idea of the 
government as a monopolist, as “the potential for fiscal exploitation varies inversely with the 
number of competing governmental units in the inclusive territory” (Brennan & Buchanan, 1980: 
p.180). Therefore, Stansel (2005) concludes that increasing competition between governments 
could help in limiting their space for extracting monopoly rents, and with enhancing economic 
efficiency and economic growth.  
Importance of infrastructure for economic growth, quality of life and poverty reduction 
has been widely acknowledged in the development literature, as better infrastructure has shown 
to lower the costs of production, increase investments and raise productivity (OECD, 2006; 
                                                          
3 “The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem how to allocate “given” resources . . . It is rather a 
problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society … it is a problem of the 
utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality. . . . This is not a dispute about whether planning is to be 
done or not. It is a dispute as to whether planning is to be done centrally, by one authority for the whole economic 
system, or to be divided among many individuals” (Hayek, 1945: pp. 519–521). “If we can agree that the economic 
problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, it 
would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these 
circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them. 
We cannot expect that this problem will be solved by first communicating all this knowledge to a central board 
which, after integrating all knowledge, issues its orders. We must solve it by some form of decentralization. But this 
solves only part of the problem.. We need decentralization because only thus can we ensure that the knowledge of 
the particular circumstances of time and place will be promptly used” (Hayek, 1945: p. 524). 
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World Bank, 1994). According to the principle of subsidiarity, spending responsibility should be 
assigned to the level of government closest to the people that would be able to provide it 
efficiently (Council of Europe, 1995). Consequently, as a result of decentralization trends 
throughout the world and the importance of infrastructure for economic development, there has 
been increasing importance of the sub-national borrowing for financing infrastructure. This has 
resulted in many countries in shifting the responsibility of providing infrastructure services such 
as water, electricity, roads, etc. from the central to the sub-national governments.  
Borrowing has become an increasingly important source of the sub-national finance, due 
to widespread decentralization of spending responsibilities, increasing revenue power and 
borrowing capacity of the sub-national governments. Proponents of sub-national borrowing 
emphasize its four potential benefits: (i) expansion of the sub-national fiscal space for the 
infrastructure financing; (ii) efficient and inter-generationally equitable outcomes from 
infrastructure financing through borrowing; (iii) increased fiscal transparency of the sub-national 
governments; and (iv) a deepening of financial markets. Academic literature provides an 
evidence of a positive effect of sub-national borrowing on the provision of infrastructure service 
(Freire & Petersen, 2004; Leigland, 1997; Peterson & Hammam, 1998).  
Sub-national borrowing may affect infrastructure service delivery directly and indirectly. 
A direct effect results from the subsidiarity principle and conjecture that the sub-national 
infrastructure projects are implemented more efficiently when they are financed and 
implemented by the sub-national governments. An indirect effect results from the sub-national 
borrowing impacting the quality of sub-national governance (Jackson, 2007). Without the 
possibility of borrowing, the sub-national governments have fewer options for financing their 
infrastructure projects, which in the short run, may impair the level and quality of infrastructure 
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service delivery, while in the long run it may negatively affect sub-national economic 
competitiveness, future revenues and maintenance costs.  
However, while there is a considerable consensus on its potential benefits, there is also 
wide agreement that without an effective regulatory framework, sub-national borrowing may 
lead to fiscal and debt crises and significantly contribute to an unstable fiscal and 
macroeconomic environment. Despite the acknowledgement of its benefits for finance 
infrastructure spending, it can create long-term problems for fiscal sustainability if the sub-
national governments borrow to finance operating spending. Moreover, the sub-national 
borrowing may be in conflict with the national macroeconomic policy (Mikesell, 2007). Dafflon 
(2002b) points out that borrowing for financing the operating deficit would lead to an 
unmanageable debt burden and growth of the public sector beyond its optimal size.  
Due to the potential long-term consequences of sub-national borrowing on fiscal 
sustainability and macroeconomic stability, most countries manage and supervise sub-national 
borrowing and debt by implementing ex-ante and/or ex-post borrowing regulations. The ex-ante 
regulations can consist of more or less direct control by the central government, of fiscal rules 
predetermined in the constitution or organic laws, or of a reliance on the financial markets and its 
mechanism to control borrowing. On the other hand, ex-post regulations consist of sanctions for 
non-compliance to the rules and for imprudent behavior. Webb (2004) contends that both ex-ante 
and ex-post regulations should be used simultaneously, and should consider both the borrowers 
and the lenders. Reliance on only the ex-ante regulations gives both the borrowers and the 
lenders an incentive for irresponsible behavior since they bear no consequences. On the other 
hand, reliance on only the ex-post regulations may give space to sub-national governments to 
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over-borrow and build up very large debts for which the central government could not enforce 
them to bear the consequences and would nevertheless be forced to bail them out. 
Some may argue that for regulating sub-national borrowing it should be enough to rely on 
financial markets and its rules imposed on debtors and creditors. In this case, imposing any other 
legal rules would be unnecessary because market conditions already impose effective sanctions 
through higher interest rates. Moreover, creditors would not be willing to lend to those sub-
national governments that borrow more than they can repay. In the case of issuing bonds, credit 
ratings would be low for those sub-national governments that are not creditworthy, because of 
which the investors may not be willing to buy unless they were offered a high premium. 
However, the history of sub-national borrowing in some decentralizing countries suggests that 
exclusive reliance on the financial markets in maintaining sub-national fiscal discipline may not 
be enough (Ter-Minassian & Craig, 1997). Many conditions, including developed financial 
markets, availability of financial information, and no expectation of bailouts by the central 
government, have to be satisfied for the financial markets to be an effective control mechanism 
for sub-national borrowing. Given that very few countries satisfy these conditions, market-based 
regulation is very often supported by fiscal rules or by more or less direct central government 
control (Ter-Minassian & Craig, 1997). 
It is certain that the appropriate regulatory framework, where borrowing is only allowed 
for financing capital investments (the so called “golden rule”), accompanied by limits on the debt 
level and servicing capacity can reduce the chances of default and debt crises. Limits on the level 
of debt and debt servicing capacity are important because even if borrowing is issued only for 
financing capital investments, fiscal sustainability could still be endangered by too high of a debt 
burden imposed on current expenditures, having long-term consequences on the sub-national 
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credit ratings. For example, in the 1840s, eight American states defaulted on their debts and they 
still continued paying a premium on their debt in the 1990s (English, 1996). 
However, the “golden rule” and debt limits may not be enough for enforcing sub-national 
fiscal discipline and maintaining fiscal sustainability. Other institutional factors must be present, 
as discussed below. For example, implicit or explicit federal government guarantee to the sub-
national debtor increases the risk of sub-national borrowing endangering fiscal sustainability and 
macroeconomic stability. A commitment to reject bailouts to those sub-national governments is 
even more difficult when the financing of the sub-national government spending is heavily 
dependent on the intergovernmental transfers. On the other hand, when the sub-national 
government spending is financed mainly through their own sources of revenues, the central 
government has more ability to commit to a no bailout policy, thus giving stronger incentives to 
investors and to voters to “punish” the sub-national officials for uncontrolled spending and 
borrowing (Rodden & Wibbels, 2002). Hence, the sub-national governments must have access to 
significant tax bases, because otherwise, even if borrowing is put to productive use, it may still 
cause fiscal crises.  
There are various definitions of fiscal sustainability that could be found in the literature. 
In their survey on fiscal sustainability, Balassone and Franco (2000) conclude that definitions 
depend on the sustainability requirements. The standard definition of fiscal sustainability is that 
the fiscal balance and the underlying trends are such that, in a steady state, the ratio of 
outstanding debt and debt servicing to GDP is not increasing over time (World Bank, 2010b). 
The IMF (2001) defines a set of fiscal policies as sustainable if a borrower is able to continue 
servicing its debt without an unrealistically large future correction to its income and expenditure. 
Finally, one purpose of fiscal sustainability analysis is to investigate whether or not certain sets 
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of policies lead to a default on sub-national government debt in the future (Burnside, 2005). 
Based on that, this study employs the definition based on which fiscal policy is sustainable when 
the present value of future primary surpluses is equal to the current level of debt. If this condition 
is met then, regardless of the current level of outstanding debt, as long as it equals the present 
value of all future primary balances until the debt’s maturity, it is considered to be sustainable.  
Therefore, the questions this dissertation tries to answer are: 
 What is the impact of regulated sub-national borrowing for financing capital investments, 
accompanied with revenue autonomy on fiscal sustainability?; 
 Does any particular borrowing regulatory framework perform in a superior manner in 
maintaining fiscal sustainability?  
 Is there a difference between the effects of sub-national borrowing regulations on the 
general and sub-national fiscal performance?  
 What factors are important in choosing particular type of the sub-national borrowing 
regulations?  
These issues are of particular importance because rapidly rising sub-national debt has 
played a crucial role in several countries during the recent financial crisis and those experiences 
hold important lessons for other countries undergoing the process of fiscal decentralization.  
By answering the questions above, this dissertation provides the framework for testing 
the main hypothesis that is the focus of this study: 
ℋ: If sub-national borrowing is numerically limited and restricted to financing capital 
investments and the sub-national governments are provided with some measure of revenue 
autonomy, then sub-national borrowing should not endanger fiscal sustainability.  
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Despite the importance of these issues, little systematic empirical work has been done so 
far on the effect of sub-national borrowing on fiscal sustainability.  The existing literature does 
not offer a definitive answer on whether borrowing at the sub-national level should be allowed, 
and if so, how it should be regulated. The few cross-country empirical studies that evaluate this 
effect use either only some aggregate measure of borrowing autonomy that does not take into 
account different types of regulations, monitoring and enforcement, or focus only on the effect of 
the fiscal rules. Moreover, most of these studies suffer from the econometric issues, such as not 
addressing potential reverse causality problem between fiscal sustainability and chosen types of 
borrowing regulations, not assuming dynamics in fiscal sustainability, or focusing on the sub-
national rather than the general government fiscal performance. Finally, qualitative indicators of 
fiscal decentralization, such as ability of the sub-national governments to make autonomous 
decisions regarding the tax base and/or the tax rates, different forms of borrowing powers and 
regulation and enforcement, must be considered to avoid obtaining biased and misleading 
empirical results on the effects of sub-national borrowing on fiscal performance.  
The primary contributions of this dissertation include building a theoretical framework of 
the relationship between sub-national borrowing and fiscal sustainability and the empirical 
estimation of this relationship using panel data for a large number of countries. The theoretical 
model builds on a general model of fiscal sustainability commonly used in the literature. This 
model is expanded by incorporating the components of fiscal decentralization to show that 
giving more expenditure, revenue, and borrowing autonomy to sub-national governments can be 
achieved without endangering fiscal sustainability. Showing under which conditions this holds 
true provides basic framework for testing the main hypothesis that is the focus of this study.  
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This study contributes to the empirical literature by investigating the relationship between 
sub-national debt and fiscal sustainability in the presence of the alternative types of both the ex-
ante and ex-post sub-national borrowing regulations, rather than focusing on only one particular 
type. Moreover, different types of regulations are observed individually, rather than integrated in 
a type of index, allowing comparisons of their effectiveness in maintaining fiscal sustainability. 
Furthermore, the effect of sub-national debt and its regulation on fiscal sustainability is estimated 
while controlling for sub-national ability to set and/or change rates on important tax sources in 
their budgets. In addition, unlike previous studies on this issue, this dissertation investigates the 
determinants of choosing a particular type of sub-national borrowing regulations.  
For testing the main hypothesis indicated above, this study uses an unbalanced panel data 
for 57 industrialized, developing, and transition countries between 1990 and 2008. Two 
alternative dependent variables are used; namely, the primary balance4 at the general 
government5 level and at the sub-national6 level. The main variables of interest are four broad 
types of sub-national borrowing regulations, first classified by Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997); 
namely, market-based, rule-based,7 cooperative, and administrative regulation. These types of 
sub-national borrowing regulations are compared with prohibiting borrowing at the sub-national 
level altogether.  
                                                          
4 That is, Revenues – (Expenditures - Interest Payments) 
5 The general government sector consists of entities that fulfill the functions of government as their primary activity 
and can be divided into central, state, and local government subsectors, depending on a country. In the Government 
Finance System (GFS) of the IMF, statistics for the general government sector and each of its subsectors are 
presented on a consolidated basis, to avoid the double counting of transactions. Consolidation involves the 
elimination of all transactions “that occur among the units being consolidated. In other words, a transaction of one 
unit is paired with the same transaction as recorded for the second unit and both transactions are eliminated … For 
example … consolidated  interest revenue and expense exclude the interest  paid by the debtor general government 
unit to the  creditor. Similarly, sales of goods and services between consolidated units are also eliminated.” 
(International Monetary Fund, 2001: p.33). 
6 The sub-national government represents all levels of government below the central government level. 
7 With a distinction made between centrally-imposed and self-imposed rules. 
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To evaluate the relationship between sub-national borrowing regulations and fiscal 
performance at the general and the sub-national government levels, this study applies two 
methodologies. First, it uses the “system” GMM estimator to evaluate how the primary balance 
changes as a result of changes in the level of sub-national outstanding debt, sub-national 
borrowing regulations, revenue and expenditure autonomy, and in control variables. Second, the 
duration analysis is employed to investigate the effect of the main and control variables on fiscal 
sustainability, when alternative levels of the primary balance are defined as fiscally sustainable. 
Finally, potential reverse causality problem between the primary balance and the types of sub-
national borrowing regulations is addressed by applying the multinomial logit approach in the 
first state to estimate the predicted probabilities of choosing each type of regulations. This 
methodology allows the investigation of potential determinants of choosing each of the sub-
national regulation types at the same time.  
The theoretical results of this study can be summarized as follows: 
 If sub-national borrowing is allowed only for financing capital investments, the fiscally 
sustainable debt limit increases with more revenue autonomy given to the sub-national 
governments if the transfer structure gives more incentive to an increase in revenue 
efforts and creditworthiness; and 
 If sub-national borrowing is allowed only for financing capital investments, the fiscally 
sustainable debt limit increases with borrowing regulations that target fiscal performance 
and borrowing costs. 
These theoretical results suggest that giving more revenue autonomy to the sub-national 
governments and allocating intergovernmental transfers in a way which would reward the sub-
national revenue efforts should give the sub-national governments more ability to borrow 
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without endangering fiscal sustainability. In addition, the results suggest that, besides allowing 
sub-national borrowing for financing only capital investments, sub-national borrowing 
regulations based on fiscal rules and market discipline would be effective in maintaining the sub-
national debt within a sustainable limit.  
  The empirical results suggest that, in general, the empirical support for the obtained 
theoretical results depends on the government level at which they are tested, and can be 
summarized as follows: 
 Depth of the financial market is particularly important when choosing cooperative 
regulations and regulations based on centrally and self-imposed rules. Furthermore, 
countries with higher primary balances (both general and sub-national) are more likely to 
choose self-imposed rules and market-based regulations over the other types. Finally, 
countries with higher sub-national outstanding debt seem to be more likely to choose 
self-imposed fiscal rules to regulate the sub-national borrowing; 
 Cooperative type of sub-national borrowing regulations seems to have positive effect on 
improving general government fiscal performance even in the case of high level sub-
national debt and high dependence on intergovernmental transfers. However, none of the 
broad types of sub-national borrowing regulations seem to have a significant effect on 
fiscal sustainability at the sub-national level. These results are not consistent with the 
expectations that the policies focused on regulating sub-national behavior should be the 
effectiveness at the sub-national level. On the contrary, our results suggest that they have 
no effect at the sub-national level and provide support to the conjecture that sub-national 
fiscal behavior primarily affects the overall fiscal balance of the country; 
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 When a particular level of the primary balance is predetermined as sustainable, then self-
imposed rules seem to be the only effective method in maintaining the primary balance 
above that threshold, for all government levels;  
 The “golden rule” and limits on debt and borrowing positively affect the primary balance 
at all levels of government. However, their effectiveness in maintaining the primary 
balance above a predetermined threshold for a sustainable primary balance depends on 
the level of the threshold, being more efficient in the case of the lower threshold; 
 More centralized types of regulations (administrative and cooperative) seem to be more 
effective with a higher threshold for fiscally sustainable primary balance, while more 
decentralized regulations (self-imposed rules) seem to show better performance with 
lower thresholds; 
 Sub-national tax autonomy contributes to an increase in the general government primary 
balance but only when the sub-national governments do not depend on intergovernmental 
transfers. This effect is not found to be significant at the sub-national level, suggesting 
that the effect of sub-national tax autonomy is actually, on the margin, not significantly 
high; 
 In those countries with a history of bailouts at the sub-national government level, the 
primary balance is, on average, lower at both the sub-national and the general 
government levels than in other countries, suggesting the importance of the absence of 
moral hazard for fiscal responsibility. 
The obtained results suggest that sub-national borrowing should not endanger fiscal 
sustainability if it is allowed only for financing capital investments, regardless of how centralized 
decisions on the borrowing issuances are. The limit on borrowing and debt is also proven to play 
 13 
 
an important role in maintaining fiscal discipline. The importance of sub-national tax autonomy 
does not seem to be as important as it was expected given its low marginal effect. However, the 
results highlight the risk of a soft budget constraint and moral hazard, as significant dependence 
on financing through the intergovernmental transfers may give encouraging signs to the sub-
national governments to over-borrow and to expect to be bailed out by the central government. 
This causes the general government budget to deteriorate directly, through an unplanned bailout 
from the central government, and indirectly, through spillover effect on other sub-national 
governments which are highly fiscally dependent on central government transfers.  
When choosing sub-national borrowing regulations, central government authorities 
should be guided, among other requirements, by their preferences towards fiscal sustainability. 
Depending on how the central government defines a sustainable fiscal balance, it may choose 
more or less centralized types of sub-national borrowing regulations. More centralized 
regulations of sub-national borrowing (e.g., administrative and cooperative) seem to be more 
appropriate when the central government’s definition of fiscal sustainability is more strict, while 
for a more relaxed definition of fiscal sustainability, the more decentralized options for 
regulating the sub-national borrowing seem to be more suitable. Finally, none of the broad types 
of regulations shows a dominant effect on fiscal behavior at both the sub-national and the general 
government level.  
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II discusses potential dangers on sub-
national borrowing and how it can play major role in debt and fiscal crises by providing an 
overview of crises in Argentina and in Brazil since the early 1980s. Chapter III reviews the 
literature on the effect of sub-national borrowing and regulations on fiscal sustainability and 
finds no consistent results and policy recommendations. Chapter IV discusses the ex-ante and ex-
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post sub-national borrowing regulations and concludes that for enforcing sub-national fiscal 
discipline, both regulations have to be implemented. Moreover, countries choose types of ex-ante 
and ex-post regulations depending on political, economic and social characteristics. Changes in 
these characteristics over time may cause changes in the preferred type of regulation. . Chapter V 
develops a theoretical model which provides the basic framework for testing the main hypothesis 
of this study. Chapter VI explains the applied methodology and discuses the results supporting 
the tested hypothesis of this dissertation. Finally, chapter VII concludes this study and discusses 
potential areas for future research. 
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II. SUB-NATIONAL BORROWING AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY: SELECTED 
COUNTRY EXPERIENCE 
As those who disagree with fiscal decentralization emphasize, giving more responsibilities to 
sub-national governments may endanger macroeconomic stability, suggesting that its 
maintenance requires imposing borrowing controls at the sub-national level. The literature on the 
sub-national borrowing emphasizes the provision of implicit guarantees to the sub-national 
government debt as one of the main problems with borrowing at the sub-national level, causing a 
classical moral hazard situation.  
Argentina and Brazil represent two of the most decentralized developing countries and 
their past experiences with sub-national borrowing are still being used in the literature and by 
policy-makers to demonstrate the potential danger of fiscal decentralization for macroeconomic 
stability. For mostly political reasons, imposing a hard budget constraint has proved impossible 
in both countries in past periods, resulting in a large debt burden accumulated at the federal 
government level to cover the sub-national operating deficits. To add to the motivation of this 
study, this chapter describes the history of debt crises in Argentina and Brazil since the early 
1980s. 
ARGENTINA 
Argentina provides a very good example of how the sub-national credit market may be a 
significant contributor to financial crises. Even though Argentinian government system has been 
historically highly decentralized, with provinces enjoying significant autonomy, they did not 
have revenue power but were rather largely depended on the intergovernmental transfers. All 
levels of government were permitted to borrow, including the financing of the operating deficits. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, most of the financing went through the provincial banks, resulting 
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in large and unsustainable debt levels. Sub-national government borrowing played a major role 
in Argentine financial crises due to a loose federal government structure, high deficit financing, 
and significant government ownership of banks (Freire & Petersen, 2004).  
 Argentina started having debt problems during the 1976-1982 period when, after the oil 
shocks, many banks were eager to land billions of dollars. In such circumstances, the 
government decided to liberalize the financial markets and to introduce a fixed exchange rate 
regime. This, however, caused a significant increase in public debt, which, by the end of 1982, 
reached almost 40 percent of GDP (Braun, 2006). 
 In August 1982 Mexico announced default on its financial obligations. Within a few 
weeks, the problem spread all throughout Latin America and to other countries, including 
Argentina which also defaulted. Period between 1983 and 1989 was characterized by 
deteriorated fiscal and debt conditions in Argentina. The government accumulated arrears, 
unpaid interests, and unregistered debts, resulting in an increase in debt to 60 percent of GDP in 
1988.  
 In 1989, Carlos Menem, just elected President, enacted a structural adjustment program 
whose centerpiece was the Convertibility Law, which took effect on April 1, 1991. The 
Convertibility Plan fixed the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar and reduced inflation. 
Furthermore, tax revenues, especially from shared taxes, increased significantly due to stronger 
collection efforts, the presence of reverse-Oliveira-Tanzi effects,8 and economic growth. 
Provincial real revenues increased by over 25 percent, and over a percentage point in GDP 
between 1991 and 1992 (Dillinger & Webb, 1999).  
                                                          
8 The Oliveira-Tanzi effect is a phenomenon, named based on the work of Oliveira (1967) and Tanzi (1978), which 
relates to a decrease in real government revenues in a period of high inflation. The Oliveira-Tanzi effect also works 
in reverse, when following a sudden reduction in inflation, especially if inflation was high, there is a significant 
increase in revenues. This increase in revenue collection, however, is not a result of increased fiscal effort.  
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Prior to 1991, Argentine provinces borrowed excessively. A significant part of these 
loans was from their own provincial banks. As some provincial banks had a very poor loan 
recovery and were to collapse, the central bank lent them significant amounts of rediscounts to 
prevent that. However, with the 1991 Convertibility Plan the provincial banks were no more able 
to rely on the central government to save them. The central bank was no longer able to discount 
any provincial bank loans, and the deposit insurance was limited and fully funded by the banks 
themselves.9 
With the 1991 Convertibility Plan, the federal government also renegotiated its 
outstanding debts with the provinces. Both provincial governments and the federal government 
had mutual obligations whose value was subject to dispute, especially because the 1989 
hyperinflation distorted their real value. The negotiations ended with the federal government as a 
net debtor and provincial governments without owing any debt to the federal government 
(Dillinger and Webb, 1999).  
During the 1990s, the central government bailed out the sub-national governments by 
replacing sub-national debt with national debt. Moreover, provincial banks were no longer 
allowed to lend to the provincial governments. Nevertheless, provinces continued to borrow from 
private banks using intergovernmental transfers as the collateral. The central government was not 
able to control sub-national borrowing behavior, especially using the borrowing issuance to 
finance the current deficits, due to the significant degree of sub-national independence provided 
in the Constitution. 
There were no effective national regulations on the sub-national governments’ ability to 
raise debt in Argentina. The Constitution allowed each province to regulate its own borrowing, 
                                                          
9 Since 1996, each provincial bank has been required to issue subordinated debt which other provincial banks would 
hold, which enables banks to monitor each other (Freire & Petersen, 2004). 
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resulting in varying procedures among provinces. Most provinces, however, required that each 
borrowing issuance receives approval from the institution in charge of controlling provincial 
borrowing. Furthermore, the provincial borrowing issuance could not finance current 
expenditures, while foreign borrowing required approval of the Ministry of Economy (Freire & 
Petersen, 2004). In addition, municipalities were required to be authorized by the municipal 
councils or by the provincial financial authorities to be able to borrow.  
However, the authorities did not tightly exercise their role in controlling provincial 
borrowing. Some argued that, even though this seemed like a violation of the sub-national 
government hard budget constraint, it, in fact, was useful in preventing the expectation that the 
federal government would take responsibility and provide an eventual bailout (Dillinger & Webb, 
1999).  The 1991 Convertibility Law prevented rolling over existing debts from the provincial 
banks. Moreover, starting 1993, the Ministry of Economy explicitly prohibited any federal 
agency to pay a creditor on behalf of a province. Furthermore, if intergovernmental transfers 
were used as collateral for provincial borrowing, the federal government would deduct any debt 
service from future transfers.  
The post-convertibility revenue boom ended in December 1994 with the Mexican Tequila 
crisis, as real GDP fell by 4 percent and provincial revenues fell by 8 percent in 1995. Moreover, 
as provinces could not rely anymore on the Central Bank as a savior, they were forced to use 
their own resources to prevent the endangered provincial banks from failing.  
Provinces reacted to the fall in revenues with more borrowing and requesting additional 
funding from the federal government, which resulted in a dramatic increase in the provincial 
debt. By mid-1996 debt increased to $17.2 billion or 6.3 percent of GDP (Figure 1 and Figure 2). 
Provincial governments mainly borrowed by running arrears, paying staff and suppliers with 
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bonds, and from private banks using intergovernmental transfers as a guarantee. In the case of 
the latter, the debt servicing used to be deducted by the National Bank (Banco de la Nación) 
from the shared revenues with the federal government, so the provinces used to receive only the 
remainder of the transfer. As a result, provinces with high levels of debt ended up receiving 
significantly reduced net transfers, reaching up to one-third of the full transfers. 
Different provinces had a different amount of fiscal adjustment, with Buenos Aires 
province receiving the least adjustment among the major ones. In 1991, Buenos Aires province 
had an overall deficit to revenues ratio of 10 percent. Between 1991 and 1994, real revenues 
increased by 83 percent, non-interest expenditures by 50 percent, capital spending increased four 
times, and interest costs more than five times. The final result was an increase in total spending 
of 71 percent between 1991 and 1994 and the budget deficit decreased to 4 percent in 1994, due 
to a higher increase in revenues than spending. As the 1994 Tequila crisis caused a real 3 percent 
decline in Buenos Aires’ 1995 revenues, the province had to respond with a reduction in 
expenditures in order to sustain the 1994 level of deficit. However, between 1995 and 1997, real 
revenues increased by 23 percent and expenditures by 36 percent, which resulted in increased 
overall deficit, average annual new borrowing issuance of around $400 million over the period 
1995-1997, and total debt of 32 percent of GDP by 1997.  
In 1991, the province of Córdoba had a budget deficit of 16 percent to GDP - higher than 
Buenos Aires - which further increased by 1994 due to a higher increase in expenditures (83 
percent) than in revenues (75 percent). To finance its deficit, Córdoba borrowed from its 
provincial bank - $436 million in 1993, and $725 million 1994. However, the 1994 Tequila crisis 
caused Córdoba’s real revenues to fall by 5 percent and the provincial bank was not able to give 
more loans to the province. Because of this, the province was forced to repay some of its own 
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debt and to borrow externally, instead, to finance the deficit. Following that, Córdoba’s overall 
budget deficit improved in the next two years, reaching 3 percent in 1996, and turning into a 2 
percent surplus in 1997. In addition, much of its short-term debt was converted into longer-term 
obligations, mostly to private banks, and debt to the provincial bank of Córdoba declined to $181 
million by the end of 1996, and to $100 million in 1997. 
Figure 1. Argentina, Provincial Revenues, Expenditures and Debt (billions of pesos) 
 
In an attempt to deal with the increased budget deficits and debt payments, in September 
1999, the Congress approved the Fiscal Solvency Law, which meant to significantly reduce 
government spending. Out of 23 provinces, 14 followed the national example and between 1999 
and 2001 they introduced their own fiscal solvency rules, whose characteristics varied across 
provinces.  As a result, 12 provinces imposed a hard budget constraint, 10 imposed limits on 
debt, 9 provinces limited current expenditures (Braun & Tommasi, 2002). In addition, 16 
provinces had constitutional limit on the debt servicing ratio, ranging from 20 to 25 percent of 
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debt service to total revenues. However, by 2000, only 6 provinces fulfilled their hard-budget 
constraint commitment, 6 complied with their expenditure limits, and only 10 out of 16 
provinces complied with their debt servicing ratio rules. 
Figure 2. Argentina, Provincial Revenues, Expenditures and Debt (percentage of GDP) 
 
The following two years in Argentina were characterized by a financial, debt and 
currency crisis, which resulted in a further economic slowdown and debt default by the federal 
government and most provinces defaulted. Also, the federal government renegotiated the debt of 
many of the provinces (Artana, 2007). Following the 2001-2002 crisis Argentina enjoyed a 
strong fiscal recovery. However, government spending was increasing rapidly, deteriorating the 
fiscal balance, and most of the jurisdictions still found it difficult to deal with servicing their 
debts, causing substantial increases in discretionary transfers to provinces (IMF, 2006a).  
In 2004 the Congress approved a new Fiscal Responsibility Law which kept several 
measures from the 1999 Law, such as the multi-year budgeting. The most important novelty in 
0
5
10
15
20
25
Revenues Expenditures Debt
Source:  For revenues and expenditures: Secretaria de Hacienda; For debt: Rezk (2000) for 1991-1999, Secretaria de Hacienda for 
2000-2006; For GDP: WDI 
 22 
 
the new Law was the introduction of the numerical expenditure limits and a 15 percent limit of 
sub-national debt service to its current revenues. In addition, the Federal Council of Fiscal 
Responsibility was created to enforce sanctions on violations of the Law. The Council could 
initiate financing programs with those provinces which complied with the Law (21 of 24 
provinces, by 2006) (Braun, 2006). 
In 2010, the national government restructured almost all provincial debt with the 
Fiduciary Fund for Provincial Development (FFDP – Fondo Fiduciario para el Desarrollo 
Provincial). Financing through the Ordered Financing Program (PFO) and the Financial 
Assistance Program (PAF)10 had to be negotiated annually, which limited discretion and allowed 
provinces to do a better fiscal management. In overall, the 2010 bailout reduced present value of 
debt by 53 percent. Similarity between the 2010 bailout and one in 2002 was in that same 
provinces benefited from both bailouts and had their payments postponed. However, the 2010 
bailout differed from the 2002 one in the elimination of the CER (inflation) adjustment.  
BRAZIL 
After 21 years of military rule, the 1988 Constitution established a federal government structure 
in Brazil, and gave significant authority and resources to the sub-national governments. 
However, between 1988 and 1998, Brazil had three major sub-national debt crises. The first one 
originated in the international debt crisis of the 1980s, when both state and federal governments 
discontinued servicing their debts to foreign creditors. The second crisis happened at the 
beginning of the 1990s and was caused by the states’ debt to the federal financial institutions. 
Finally, the third and the largest debt crisis happened in 1997 and, in fact, resulted from the 
government’s stabilization plan (Dillinger, 2002). 
                                                          
10 Both PFO and PAF were both implemented by FFDP 
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In the late 1960s, international capital markets opened to developing countries, including 
Brazil. Due to a need for financing external current account deficits, the Brazilian government 
encouraged states to resort to external funding, which, however, resulted in a fast and significant 
increase in the state governments’ debt in the 1970s. The period between 1985 and the 
introduction of the Plano Real11 in mid-1994 was characterized by greater fiscal and political 
autonomy for the sub-national governments, but as well as recurrent states’ debt crises 
(Bevilaqua, 2002).  
With the 1967 Constitution, the Senate started regulating all government borrowing in the 
country, including setting the guidelines for approving the sub-national borrowing issuances. 
However, the sub-national foreign borrowing issuances were subject to these regulations only in 
cases when a guarantee from the central government was required (Braun & Tommasi, 2002).  
During the 1970s and 1980s, the sub-national governments borrowed from the 
international organizations, foreign commercial banks, and from the federal government. The 
states were the largest debtors in the country, reaching 42 percent of total public sector debt in 
1997. Their indebtedness originated in the 1966 reform and the federal policy to issue new 
borrowings to finance the old ones, which encouraged the state governments to borrow 
excessively.  
The federal government made several attempts to resolve the states’ indebtedness by 
signing agreements with the states. However, knowing that the federal government would 
eventually bail them out, the states evaded these agreements. Finally, between 1997 and 1999, 
                                                          
11 The Plano Real was a set of measures adopted in an attempt to stabilize the Brazilian economy in early 1994. It 
enacted a series of contractionary fiscal and monetary policies, restricting its expenses and raising interest rates. As a 
result, high inflation was kept under control for several years and high interest rates attracted foreign capital to 
finance the current account deficit and increased the country’s international reserves.  
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the federal government changed the terms of the agreements, introducing mechanisms under 
which it retains a share of the states’ revenues whenever they do not fulfill their obligations 
(Bevilaqua, 2002).  
Due to the international debt crisis in the early 1980s, the Brazilian federal government 
had to liming the access of the states to borrowing. However, this did not contribute to the 
improvement of fiscal outcomes of the states, so they were forced to continue depending on 
irregular federal transfers to finance the spending. Under the IMF supported program that 
required a reduction in domestic credit, the Central Bank introduced formal limits to the credit 
supply from private financial institutions to the state governments in 1983 (Bevilaqua, 2002). 12 
As a result, by 1985, sub-national debt was reduced to 6.9 percent of GDP (Figure 3).  
Figure 3. Brazil, Sub-national Revenues, Expenditures and Total Debt (percent of GDP) 
 
                                                          
12 However, these limits applied only on new debt issuances, while the old debt was rolled-over, especially with the 
state-owned banks. 
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Furthermore, as the 1986 Cruzado Plan significantly reduced inflation, the states started 
experiencing a lot of budgetary pressure, as they could no longer depend on high inflation to 
limit the growth in real expenditures. Following the municipal elections in 1985 and the 
parliamentary elections in 1986, the 1988 Constitution was adopted and gave greater budgetary 
autonomy to the states. At the same time, their debts were revised and they received financial aid 
from the federal government. However, as the 1988 Constitution increased states’ spending 
responsibilities while keeping revenues relatively constant, high inflation and strong control over 
state borrowing were necessary for maintaining their budgets in good health. However, 
continued loose restrictions on borrowing caused the share of the sub-national debt to GDP to 
significantly increase in the early 1990s. Trying to address the state debt problem, the federal 
government signed a law which gave the state government debt relief` in December 1989, 
refinancing around R$10.5 billion of debt, which was equivalent to around 20 percent of the 
1989 states’ revenues.  
Period between the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 was characterized by intense 
macroeconomic instability in Brazil, reaching monthly inflation of 80 percent in February 1990. 
This led to the implementation of a stabilization program which sharply contracted economic 
activity and reduced inflation. Due to the lowered inflation, states again faced difficulties with 
controlling their real expenditures, but as well faced lower revenue collection due to the 
stagnation in economic activity. This forced them to demand another debt renegotiation with the 
federal government. However, since the stabilization program soon failed and inflation 
accelerated again, the debt renegotiations were not implemented. Moreover, during 1991 the 
additional policy measures helped the states with their finances, such as allowing a roll-over of 
state debt in the domestic financial markets, or creating mutual funds including sub-national 
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bonds in their portfolios. However, while bonds significantly supported financing of the state 
budgets, they also majorly (more than 70 percent) contributed to the increase in sub-national debt 
(Figure 4). 
Between 1991 and 1993, sub-national debt increased from 7.5 to 9.3 percent of GDP. As 
it became concerning that majority of this increase was due to the bonded debt, it motivated an 
amendment on the 1988 Constitution, which forbade new issuance of state bonds until December 
1999. This created more financing difficulties for the state governments, because of which they 
requested another debt renegotiation, leading to the 1993 bailout that refinanced around R$39.4 
billion of the state debt, but without including the bonds (Bevilaqua, 2002).  
Figure 4. Brazil, Sub-national Total and Bonded Debt (percentage of GDP) 
 
 
As it became challenging for the states to place their bonds in the financial market, the 
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liquidity problems. To prevent potential financial crisis, the federal government temporarily 
allowed the exchange of the unmarketable state bank bonds for central bank bonds. However, 
despite this bond exchange, two largest states, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, defaulted on loans 
to their state banks (Bevilaqua, 2002).  
On July 1, 1984, Brazil introduced the Plano Real – a set of measures aiming to stabilize 
the economy, including the introduction of a new currency called the Real, and a series of 
contractionary fiscal and monetary policy measures. As a result, in the second half of 1994, the 
Brazilian economy stabilized and the inflation rate was under control, which, however, again 
imposed a challenge to the states to manage their budget financing. 
The negative effect of the Plano Real on the states’ finances was aggravated by a large 
increase in the interest rates, which was introduced as necessary for putting under control the rise 
in demand for borrowing. Moreover, as the interest rates became much higher than those at 
which the debts were contracted, capitalized interest on the state debts that was not renegotiated 
at the end of 1994 caused an explosive increase in outstanding debt contracted.13 This resulted in 
the liquidity problems for the states, because of which they throughout 1995 resorted to short-
term anticipations loans (AROs) and arrears, leading to a fiscal crisis by the end of the year 
(Bevilaqua, 2002). 
Brazil passed the Fiscal Responsibility Law in 2000, which declared that state debt to the 
federal government would be deducted from the fiscal transfers. Furthermore, all sub-national 
debt issuances above a certain ceiling set by the Senate would need to be paid off in full and 
without including interest, to penalize both the borrowers and the lenders (Fölscher, 2007). In 
addition, there would be no provision of discretionary guarantees from the federal to the sub-
                                                          
13 Between 1994 and 1996, the sub-national debt increased from 9.5 to 11.9 percent of GDP, with a large proportion 
representing state bonds (Figure 4). 
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national governments, and sub-national governments would not be able to issue any new debts 
until they repaid any existing debt above the allowed ceiling. Additionally, the law specified the 
penalties for non-compliance with the Fiscal Responsibility Law (Bevilaqua, 2002).   
The IMF (2009) reported that over a decade after passing the 2000 Fiscal Responsibility 
Law, Brazil had built a strong macroeconomic framework. Through a sustained fiscal discipline 
and implementation of the inflation targeting regime, Brazil reduced fiscal and external 
vulnerabilities and lowered public debt to GDP. Even though the economy was significantly 
affected by the latest global crisis, the authorities were able to adopt countercyclical measures 
due to the credible policy framework.  
CONCLUSION 
Argentina and Brazil traditionally had high levels of sub-national autonomy. For mostly political 
reasons, imposing a hard budget constraint was impossible in both countries, resulting in a very 
large debt burden shifted from the sub-national to the federal government.  
During the 1980 and 1990s, Brazil was, even more than Argentina, characterized by the 
lending from the federal to the sub-national governments, contributing to all three major debt 
crisis. In Argentina, on the other hand, most of the provincial debt was held by the financial 
sector, including the state banks, which allowed losses to be allocated between the states and 
creditors based on the contracts. Hence, Argentina used federal lending less than Brazil, and 
tended to liquidate “bad” provincial debts rather than refinancing them.  
Brazil and Argentina also had different approaches in regulating new borrowing. While 
Brazil relied on ex-ante approaches in controlling sub-national borrowing issuances, this type of 
regulation proved not to be credible and effective, due to the involvement of the federal 
government. On the other hand, Argentina used more indirect controls on sub-national 
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borrowing. For example, domestic borrowing was not controlled but debt service was enforced 
through its deduction from the intergovernmental transfers, providing the sub-national 
governments more incentive not to borrow excessively.  
The cases of Argentina and Brazil illustrate both the challenges and offer some possible 
solutions in setting up fiscal control in decentralized systems, particularly those with a history of 
ignoring the controls. They show that the quality of the sub-national macroeconomic and fiscal 
management depends on both the revenues and expenditures assigned to the sub-national 
governments and sub-national representation in the national political system.  
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Those who advocate fiscal decentralization argue that, by increasing economic efficiency in 
public service provision, it contributes to the improvement in government’s economic 
performance (Oates, 1972, 1993; Samuelson, 1954). In addition, it improves transparency of 
public service delivery and accountability in the decision-making (De Mello, 2004).  
On the other hand, those against fiscal decentralization contend that due to often limited 
institutional and administrative capacity of sub-national governments, they may have 
coordination problems, which could negatively impact the implementation of fiscal reforms and 
the macroeconomic adjustment. Furthermore, in absence of accountability of sub-national 
governments, fiscal decentralization could increase corruption,14 but also competition among 
sub-national governments.15 Finally, due to political reasons, fiscal decentralization may impact 
central government’s credibility in committing to a hard-budget constraint (Goodspeed, 2002).   
There is a large literature investigating the economic benefits of fiscal decentralization. A 
majority of these studies focus on the effects of either revenue or expenditure decentralization on 
economic performance, with just few exemptions considering the relationship between sub-
national borrowing autonomy and macroeconomic and fiscal sustainability (De Mello, 2001; 
Martell, 2008; Martinez-Vazquez & Boex, 2001; Rodden, 2002; Rodden & Wibbels, 2010).  
                                                          
14 Corruption may be more common and widespread in sub-national than in central governments. Because of less 
developed institutions, sub-national government staff tends to have lower salaries and advancement opportunities, as 
well as are subject to often less sophisticated accountability mechanisms (Tanzi, 2002).  
15 Brennan and Buchanan (1980: p.184) contend that competition among governments in the context of the “inter-
jurisdictional mobility of persons in pursuit of fiscal gains can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes for 
explicit fiscal constraints on the taxing power”. 
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FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY AND 
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 
A large part of the recent literature on fiscal decentralization focuses on the macroeconomic 
problems arising from governments giving greater responsibilities to the sub-national 
governments. Results obtained by Prud'homme (1995), Hunter and Shah (1996), and Ter-
Minassian (1997a, 1997b) suggest that fiscal decentralization may lead to sub-national fiscal 
indiscipline and may intensify fiscal problems at the central government level.  Moreover, 
Conyers (1990) and Prud'homme (1995) argue that fiscal decentralization can also undermine 
economic efficiency because sub-national government officials often do not or cannot meet the 
needs and expectations of their voters. 
The literature on the effects of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic stability is, 
however, not conclusive. For example, Fornasari et al. (2000) find that an increase in sub-
national spending leads to increases in national spending and deficits. On the other hand, Stein 
(1999) shows that, in Latin America, decentralization is not associated with higher deficits. 
Similarly, using a cross-section of 40 countries, Shah (2005) provides evidence that fiscal 
decentralization is associated with improved fiscal performance. Similar results can be found in 
Shome (2002) in the case of India16 and Schaltegger and Feld (2009) and Freitag and Vatter 
(2008) for Switzerland. Freitag and Vatter (2008) conclude that fiscal decentralization has no 
effect on public debt in periods of prosperous economic development but does influence it in 
periods of economic stagnation, as decentralized cantons implement more contractionary fiscal 
policy than centralized Swiss member states.  
                                                          
16 Except when transfers are excluded. The inability of states to fund their own-expenditure without central 
government transfers results in higher state-level deficits. 
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The literature also suggests that the effect of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic 
stability depends on the level of economic development. Fukasaku and De Mello (1998) and De 
Mello  (2000) find that in developing countries fiscal decentralization has negative impact on 
economic growth.17 On the other hand, in the OECD countries expenditure decentralization can 
significantly reduce public indebtedness, while the impacts of decentralization of revenues and 
vertical fiscal imbalances are insignificant (Baskaran, 2009). Similarly, Neyapti (2010) finds that 
both expenditure and revenue decentralization reduce budget deficits in developed countries, 
while Martinez-Vazquez and McNab’s (2006) findings suggest that fiscal decentralization 
promotes price stability. These findings are consistent with Bahl and Linn’s (1992) and Tanzi’s 
(2002) argument that only at relatively high level of economic developing, benefits of fiscal 
decentralization can be fully exploited.   
However, some authors emphasize that even in the least decentralized systems, 
macroeconomic sustainability could be undermined by poor coordination between different 
levels of government. Tanzi (2000) and Dabla-Norris (2006) find that fiscal responsibility and 
hard-budget constraints can be challenged when (i) local governments have no expenditure and 
revenue autonomy, while highly dependent on transfers; (ii) sub-national borrowing is poorly 
regulated; (iii) roles of each level of government are not clear; and (iv) budget institutions are 
weak. Similarly, Rodden (2002) shows that when sub-national governments are highly 
dependent on transfers, then sub-national borrowing autonomy is associated with a large and 
persistent general government deficit. 
                                                          
17 De Mello (2000) also recommends that for strengthening fiscal discipline, sub-national governments should have 
proper revenue sharing arrangement which would penalize unsustainable policies and reward prudent sub-national 
governments. 
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Increased decentralization of expenditure functions to sub-national governments has led 
in many countries to increased sub-national governments’ responsibilities for delivering 
infrastructure services. In such circumstances, a controversial debate has developed about 
whether sub-national governments should be allowed, and if so, to what extent, to borrow in 
order to finance their infrastructure projects. A common view has been that, even if giving more 
borrowing autonomy to the sub-national governments might be justified, not imposing any limits 
may not be appropriate. When there are no limits on sub-national borrowing, central 
governments face the risk that sub-national governments may try passing the cost of borrowing 
to other sub-national governments or to next generations (Ahmad et al., 2005). 
While some authors highlight the potential negative impact of sub-national borrowing on 
indebtedness and macroeconomic instability (Ter-Minassian, 1997a, 1997b), its proponents 
emphasize potential advantages of sub-national borrowing in capital markets, such as increased 
fiscal space for financing infrastructure spending. 
MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION 
The need for sub-national borrowing controls results from the common pool problem and the 
implied soft budget constraint. The common pool problem arises from the separation of costs and 
benefits from public spending. If a certain capital investment predominantly benefits one 
jurisdiction but it is financed through a common pool, this jurisdiction would pay only a small 
fraction of the cost while enjoying a large fraction of the benefits. This would give incentive to 
other jurisdictions to compete for federal transfers to finance their investments out of a common 
pool (Hillman, 2009).  
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There are two categories of the soft budget problems - firstly, those created by the moral 
hazard (i.e. by hidden actions), and secondly, the problems created by the adverse selection (i.e. 
by hidden information). The problem of moral hazard occurs when “one party to a transaction 
may undertake certain actions that (a) affect the other party’s valuation of the transaction but that 
(b) the second party cannot monitor/enforce perfectly” (Kreps, 1990: p.577). On the other hand, 
the adverse selection problem is a principal-agent problem, where two parties to a transaction 
have different interests and asymmetric information, which could cause the imbalance of power 
between the parties and could alter the market outcome (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
  The moral hazard problem would not exist if central governments could credibly commit 
to no ex-post changes in the allocation of transfers, that is, to a no-bailout policy (Hernández-
Trillo, et al., 2002). However, it is difficult to achieve such a commitment in the short run, 
especially if it involves a reduction in the provision of basic public services. Moreover, due to 
the spill-over effect, when a default by one sub-national government can increase the cost of 
borrowing for all others, then bailing out the defaulting government can be found beneficial 
(Noel, 2000; Wildasin, 1997). 
Regardless of the purpose of borrowing and the type of credit system, credit markets will 
be in equilibrium when the supply for credits equals its demand, sending the price signals which 
affect the investors’ and borrowers’ willingness to participate in an exchange. When deciding 
whom to lend to, the investors primarily care for the borrower’s ability and commitment to repay 
the loan, with the cost of borrowing depending on borrower-specific characteristics affecting the 
risk of default (Martell, 2000). 
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SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR BORROWING 
The Supply Side – Capital Markets 
There are two methods of sub-national borrowing – firstly, through loans from financial and 
other credit institutions; and secondly, through the capital market (by issuing securities and 
bonds). There has been a debate in the literature on whether loans or bonds are more appropriate 
for sub-national borrowing (Peterson, 2003). “Developing nations, however, have no reason a 
priori for one of these end points over the other. Bank lending to municipalities can operate side 
by side with a municipal bond market” (Peterson & Hammam, 1998: p.36).  
Both loans and bonds have different strength and weaknesses that can be evaluated 
according to the price of capital, maturities, and monitoring functions. Firstly, loan issuance is 
usually less costly than bond issuance, because of which larger sub-national government are 
more likely to issue bonds, whereas smaller ones tend to prefer loans (Jackson, 2007). Secondly, 
unlike public banks, commercial banks rarely offer long term maturities, in which case bonds are 
a more likely option (Leigland, 1997; Peterson, 2003). Finally, issuers are monitored differently 
with loans and bonds, as bonds are more transparent, while loan monitoring is based on 
“relationship banking” (Peterson, 2003). 
The Demand Side - Creditworthiness 
Regardless of whether a borrower chooses loans or bonds, their creditworthiness is likely to be 
important criteria for lenders in making investment decisions. Basically, creditworthiness refers 
to the borrower’s ability and willingness to repay the debt, which can, theoretically, be 
influenced by two groups of factors - economic and financial factors, on the one hand, and 
political and institutional factors, on the other (Peterson, 1998; Spahn, 1999).  
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In a market with asymmetric information, signaling of creditworthiness plays a very 
important role. In developed countries, signals of sub-national creditworthiness include 
borrower’s debt, finances, administration, and economy (Cluff & Farnham, 1984; Fabozzi et al., 
1995; Hausker, 1991). However, in developing countries additional factors may affect sub-
national creditworthiness, including intergovernmental transfer structure, history of defaults, 
legal issues, economic conditions, outstanding debt, etc. Often creditworthiness of sub-national 
governments is influenced by factors beyond their control, such as legislatively limited ability of 
sub-national governments to set the tax base or the tax rate. Nevertheless, sub-national entities 
can still influence their creditworthiness by adopting certain behaviors improving fiscal 
discipline, such as financial reporting, disclosure, audit, debt limits, etc. (Peterson, 1998).  
Additional forms of signaling, which the investors can factor into the assessment of the 
borrower’s creditworthiness, are reputation and collateral, which may lower the cost of 
borrowing by reducing information asymmetries (Diamond, 1989; Thakor, 1991). Since a good 
reputation is built by timely debt-repayment behavior, the borrowers interested in building or 
maintaining a good reputation may have an incentive to avoid default (Martell, 2000). Chan and 
Kanatas (1985: p.93) find that with no moral hazard, “collateral can serve as a source of 
additional, indirect information in a rational expectations signaling context”. Higher collateral 
may signal higher creditworthiness, correcting the information asymmetry.18  
 
                                                          
18 However, the literature offers mixed evidence on the relationship between the level of collateral and the 
borrower’s creditworthiness (see Martell (2000) for a summary of the literature). 
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HOW TO REGULATE THE SUB-NATIONAL BORROWING? 
Imposing borrowing controls at the sub-national level may be needed to preserve 
macroeconomic stability as well as to safeguard the sub-national public finances. There are 
different ways in which central governments can contribute to prudent borrowing and these 
alternatives have been much debated issue (Peterson & Hammam, 1998).  
The literature on sub-national borrowing emphasizes the ability of higher levels of 
government to provide an implicit guarantee on the sub-national government debt as one of the 
main problems with borrowing at the sub-national level, being a classical moral hazard situation. 
Therefore, when devolving borrowing responsibility to lower levels of government, the question 
is whether such a risk can be successfully controlled by some kind of rule, or if the credit market 
alone can do the job. A fundamental decision that the central government has to make is whether 
to provide a sovereign guarantee or not, as it implies accepting the responsibility of dealing with 
potential fiscal crises resulting from sub-national over-borrowing. This decision is an important 
part of each country’s legal framework, and federal governments have adopted different 
approaches to dealing with challenges of decentralized decision-making (Liu, 2007).  
Literature on the effects of sub-national borrowing regulations on macroeconomic 
stability can be divided into two categories. On the one side, qualitative reviews base their 
conclusions and recommendations on reviewing and discussing institutional arrangements and 
macroeconomic performance in different countries. On the other hand, empirical studies test 
their hypothesis using appropriate econometric methodology. Empirical studies can be further 
divided into single- and cross-country studies.  
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Qualitative Reviews 
Based on the experience of Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, and South Africa, Martell 
and Guess (2006) find a good legal framework as the most important in limiting the risk of sub-
national over-borrowing and macro-economic instability. They advise that a good framework 
should at least deal with the following three challenges. Firstly, it must not prohibit sub-national 
borrowing. Secondly, it should provide predictability, clarity and confidence in sub-national 
borrowing. Finally, it should prevent over-borrowing and provide guidance on how to deal with 
financial crises.  
Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (2001) discuss some approaches that could bring discipline 
and responsibility to sub-national government borrowing. One way assumes a reliance on the 
self-enforcing mechanism of the financial markets for prudent financial behavior through higher 
borrowing costs charged to irresponsible borrowers. However, important requirement for this 
approach to be effectively implemented is having developed capital markets, and institutions. 
Another way includes reliance on federal government to set and enforce limits on sub-national 
borrowing.  
Based on reviews of several case studies, Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997) classify sub-
national borrowing regulations into four broad categories and conclude that sole reliance on 
market based regulations is not likely to be effective. They suggest that fiscal rules for 
controlling sub-national debt seem to be preferable to administrative controls in terms of 
transparency and certainty. However, a cooperative type of regulation could be a promising way 
to control sub-national borrowing, as it assumes active involvement of sub-national governments 
in formulating and implementing medium-term fiscal adjustment programs, and encouraging 
budgetary responsibility. 
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Based on the experience from five EMU member countries,19 Balassone et al. (2002) 
conclude that the effectiveness of fiscal rules has been weakened due to asymmetry. More 
precisely, while compliance to the rules depends on all levels of government, as they apply to 
general government balances, it is the central government that the EMU institutions hold 
accountable.  This asymmetry weakens the position of the central government relative to the sub-
national governments in terms of responsibility for compliance with the rules.  
Similarly, after reviewing several case studies, Rodden and Eskeland (2003) conclude 
that effective control of sub-national borrowing requires either strong hierarchical oversight or 
strong market mechanisms. On the other hand, Kennedy and Robbins (2003) review several case 
studies from the industrial world and conclude that the evidence is not conclusive. Fiscal rules 
may be helpful in achieving fiscal sustainability and may even be necessary in certain countries, 
but they are clearly not necessary in all countries. 
In overall, the hypothesis that institutional constraints can limit government spending and 
maintain macroeconomic stability has limited and not fully conclusive empirical support. While 
cross-country evidence suggests that the effectiveness of constraints heavily depends on the type 
of control being imposed and the circumstances in the country in question (Plekhanov & Singh, 
2007), the evidence from country-level studies conducted in the United States and Europe is 
mixed. For the case of the United States, Abrams and Dougan (1986) conclude that restrictions 
on borrowing and spending do not influence state budget outcomes, while some other authors 
offer evidence that, on the contrary, institutional restrictions do matter (Alt & Lowry, 1994; 
Poterba, 1994, 1995).  
                                                          
19 Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain 
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Empirical Single Country Studies 
Based on the experience of state borrowing in the United States, Alt and Lowry (1994) point to 
the importance of balanced budget state laws, while Poterba (1994, 1995) provide further 
confirmation of the role of balanced budget laws and constitutional limitations on borrowing and 
indebtedness. In fact, most authors conclude that the U.S. states with stronger rules run smaller 
deficits, receive higher bond ratings, pay lower premiums, and adjust to shocks more quickly 
(Alesina & Bayoumi, 1996; Poterba, 1994; Poterba &  Rueben, 1999; Poterba & Von Hagen, 
1999). Less conclusive results are obtained by Kenyon (1991) on the effects of caps on federal 
and local tax-exempt bond issues in the United States. While caps seem to be effective in 
limiting the volume of borrowing, they do not seem to significantly influence the sub-national 
governments’ decision regarding the use of tax-exempt bonds versus other sources of borrowing. 
Similarly, Clingermayer and Wood (1995) provide weak evidence that tax and expenditure 
limitations may increase state indebtedness, while constitutional debt limitations have no effect 
upon slowing the growth of state debt. However, important deficiency of these studies is their 
applies methodology as they fail to address potential reverse causality between chosen fiscal 
rules and budget deficits, suggesting that the relationship between them may reflect the fact that 
both variables are jointly explained by an omitted variable. 
As in case of the United States, empirical results for European countries are also not 
conclusive. On the one hand, Derycke and Gilbert (1985) provide support for the hypothesis that 
central government macroeconomic policies do affect local government borrowing decisions in 
France. However, Dufrénot et al. (2010) find that French regions have quite heterogeneous 
borrowing behavior despite a common accountability constraint that forces them to balance their 
budgets and borrow only to finance investment expenditure (the “golden rule”). They conclude 
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that the “golden rule” is not effective in regulating French regions’ borrowing because it can be 
seen as a “soft” rule when the regions receive transfers from the central government and may 
thus expect a fiscal rescue to be automatic. On the other hand, Cabasés et al. (2007) provide 
support to the effectiveness of institutional borrowing restrictions in introducing financial 
discipline in the borrowing policies adopted by local governments in Spain. Furthermore, Claeys 
et al. (2008) find quite different sub-national fiscal behavior in the United States and Germany. 
While in the United States, both the federal and state governments try to keep debt under control, 
in Germany, lower government levels do not consolidate at all, with all of the fiscal adjustment 
occurs through the central government debt. Hence, in Germany the application of fiscal rules is 
not strict because of inability of the central government to enforce the debt stabilization on the 
sub-national level. 
Regarding effectiveness of fiscal rules, Martell (2008) finds that in Brazil, while fiscal 
constraints were very effective in controlling government expenditures, long-term discipline is 
maintained through the rule-based, but not the market-based control. Furthermore, current 
institutional arrangements penalize those who violate fiscal discipline, but do not reward good 
performers. Similarly, Braun (2006) finds that fiscal rules, while successful in some other 
countries, have not worked in Argentina in mitigating deficit biases because of a serious 
common pool problem.  
Empirical Cross-Country Studies 
Using cross-country data between 1985 and 1987, Von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) find that 
that the introduction of sub-national borrowing constraints in the European Union increases sub-
national indebtedness. However, this result should be taken with caution given their very simple 
empirical analysis which controls only for GDP and is based on a very small sample of only 36 
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observations. Furthermore, based on a panel of 31 developed and developing countries, 
Fornasari, et al. (2000) find that constraining sub-national borrowing20 does not seem to have any 
consistent effect on sub-national fiscal deficits. On the other hand, Alesina et al. (1999) 
investigate the effect of fiscal rules limiting debt levels and fiscal deficits in Latin American 
countries and find a negative correlation. However, the latter two studies do not account for 
potential reverse causality between the chosen regulation and fiscal outcomes. Moreover, they do 
not manage to compare the effectiveness of different rules/regulations. 
Rodden (2002) uses panel data on 33 countries and concludes that the largest deficits are 
run by sub-national governments that rely heavily on federal transfers and at the same time are 
free to borrow. Hence, the study provides support to the conjecture that the sub-national 
borrowing should be controlled, at least in countries with high vertical fiscal imbalances. Major 
contribution of this study is that it proposes an index summarizing different characteristics of 
sub-national borrowing autonomy. However, this advantage is at the same time a disadvantage – 
by using an index of borrowing autonomy, this methodology is unable to suggest how sub-
national borrowing control should be implemented.  
Moreover, based on a sample of 15 federations, Rodden and Wibbels (2002) find that 
higher expenditure decentralization is associated with smaller overall deficits, especially when 
the states have wide-ranging autonomy over taxation. They conclude that, when states are mostly 
dependent on intergovernmental transfers, fiscal decentralization puts an upward pressure on 
deficits, while when they are dependent on own-source revenues and borrowing, it positively 
impacts fiscal performance. However, even though this study provides support for allowing 
                                                          
20 Measured by a dummy equal to 1 if Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997) indicates that the country either completely 
prohibits sub-national borrowing or imposes a non-discretionary rule to constrain it ex ante. 
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borrowing at the sub-national level, it does not investigate further whether this positive effect is 
conditional on how borrowing is regulated.  
In contrast, in their recent study, Rodden and Wibbels (2010) find that expenditures are 
less income elastic when sub-national governments have more borrowing autonomy than when 
they do not. In most federations, the more restricted an access to credit markets, the more pro-
cyclical fiscal policy is. Counter-cyclical fiscal policy is more likely in systems where sub-
national authorities have unrestricted access to credit markets (e.g., Canada), less likely where 
either budget rules (e.g., USA, Germany) or central authorities (e.g., Australia, India) impose 
constraints to the access to credit markets, and least likely where the access is irregular (e.g., 
Brazil, Argentina). These results are, however, based on a sample of only seven federations.  
Plekhanov and Singh (2007) correct for this disadvantage by observing separately the 
four broad regulations defined by Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997) and their effects on sub-
national fiscal balance. They find that no single framework seems to be superior under all 
circumstances and that appropriateness of any given regulation depends on the vertical fiscal 
imbalance, bailout expectations and the quality of reporting. However, there are two reasons why 
the results of this study should be taken with caution. First, there is potential misspecification 
problem due to the lack of an assumption of dynamics of sub-national budget balance, causing 
the effect of it past value(s) to be included in the error term and potentially resulting in 
endogeneity and autocorrelation. Second, this study restricts the analysis to the effects of 
regulations on only sub-national fiscal balances when actually central and general government 
budget balance may be more affected. This is especially important because in many cases the 
sub-national governments are required to maintain balanced budgets.  
 44 
 
Using a sample of seventeen OECD countries, Thornton and Mati (2008) find that 
changes in fiscal balances of the sub-national and central governments are highly positively 
correlated, especially when fiscal relations are managed by rules. The second best institutional 
framework seems to be administrative controls. The authors find debt levels to be significantly 
positively correlated with changes in the central government’s primary balance as well. 
However, this study as well suffers from serious methodological issues. More precisely, not only 
are the dynamics in the fiscal balance not taken into account, but endogeneity in sub-national 
borrowing regulations does not seem to be addressed. 
In the case of the European Union, Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009) find that the existence 
of general and central government fiscal rules positively contribute to a higher responsiveness of 
primary surpluses to government indebtedness. Interestingly, this effect does not exist in case of 
sub-national fiscal rules. Similarly, Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2007) find a positive relationship 
between numerical fiscal rules and lower deficits. Moreover, Debrun and Kumar (2007), and 
Debrun et al. (2008) report that stricter and broader fiscal rules are associated with higher 
cyclically adjusted primary balances.  
Overall, the literature does not offer a definite answer on whether borrowing at the sub-
national level should be allowed, and if so, how it should be regulated. One issue, however, that 
many point out as very important is the distinction between borrowing for capital investments 
(the “golden rule”) and for covering operating expenses. The most important arguments for sub-
national borrowing are “inter-temporal equity”, optimal allocation of resources, lower operation 
costs, stabilization of required budget resources, relatively higher benefits of enhanced sub-
national economic development than the cost of borrowing, and the high cost of long-term 
projects. Hence, there is a consensus among scholars that the primary objective of sub-national 
 45 
 
borrowing should be to increase infrastructure service delivery (Freire & Petersen, 2004; 
Leigland, 1997; Peterson & Hammam, 1998). Sub-national borrowing is argued to contribute to 
more efficient infrastructure service delivery and improved local governance, in terms of 
transparency, accountability, and financial management (Freire & Petersen, 2004).  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on the effects of fiscal decentralization on 
macroeconomic stability and found the inconclusive results. While some authors find positive 
effects of fiscal decentralization on national spending, deficit and debt, the others find the 
opposite. The literature also suggests that the effect of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic 
stability depends on the level of economic development.  
Similarly, when it comes to sub-national borrowing, the empirical literature is 
inconclusive on whether sub-national governments should be allowed to borrow in the private 
capital markets, and if so, how their borrowing should be regulated. The need for sub-national 
borrowing control results from the common pool problem and the implied soft budget constraint. 
If central governments could credibly commit to a no bailout policy, the moral hazard problem 
would not exist. There is, however, consensus among the authors on the importance of restricting 
sub-national borrowing to financing only capital investments (the “golden rule”).  
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IV. SUB-NATIONAL BORROWING REGULATIONS 
As those who disagree with fiscal decentralization emphasize, giving more responsibilities to 
sub-national governments may endanger their fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic stability, 
suggesting that to maintain sustainability borrowing controls at the sub-national level are 
required. The literature on sub-national borrowing emphasizes higher government levels’ 
provision of an implicit guarantee to sub-national government debt as one of the main problems 
with borrowing at the sub-national level, causing a classical moral hazard situation. There are 
different ways in which a national government can contribute to prudent borrowing and these 
alternatives have been much debated.  
Figure 5. Broad Types of Ex-ante Sub-national Borrowing Regulations (relative frequency in the 
sample) 
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As Figure 5 presents, most of the countries that introduced borrowing at the sub-national 
level after 1990, preferred centrally-imposed rules or direct control by the central government as 
the dominant type of regulation. Furthermore, there has been a relative decrease in sole reliance 
on financial markets in regulating sub-national borrowing, which may be explained by 
experience gained from recent crises in which sub-national borrowing played major role. 
Moreover, in the last two decades, there has been an increased trend of imposing legal sanctions 
for non-compliance, mostly in case when sub-national borrowing is dominantly regulated by 
centrally imposed rules (Figure 6). This trend of imposing legal sanctions for non-compliance is 
mostly due to those countries that have introduced borrowing at the sub-national level during this 
period, rather than to the changes in those that have already been present in the sub-national 
capital market (Figure 7). 
Most countries manage and supervise sub-national borrowing and debt by implementing 
ex-ante and/or ex-post borrowing regulations. Ex-ante regulations can consist of more or less 
direct control by the central government, of fiscal rules determined in the constitution or organic 
laws, or of reliance on the financial markets and their mechanisms. On the other hand, ex-post 
regulations consist of sanctions for non-compliance to the rules or for imprudent behavior. Webb 
(2004) contends that both ex-ante and ex-post regulations should be practiced simultaneously, 
and should consider both the borrowers and the lenders. Reliance on only ex-ante controls gives 
both the borrowers and the lenders incentive for irresponsible behavior since it bears no 
consequences. On the other hand, reliance on only ex-post regulations may give space to large 
sub-national governments to over-borrow and build up debts so large that the central government 
cannot enforce them to bear the consequences, given their importance in the national economy. 
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Figure 6. Sanctions for Non-compliance by Type of Ex-post Sub-national Borrowing 
Regulations (relative frequency in the sub-sample) 
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investments, which is also known as the “golden rule”. The second type of the ex-ante 
regulations set limits on key fiscal variables, such as the primary and/or fiscal deficit, debt 
service ratio, etc. Finally, some frameworks include requirements for the sub-national 
governments to establish a medium-term fiscal framework and a transparent budgetary process. 
To improve fiscal transparency, more and more countries have introduced credit rating systems 
for sub-national governments, as an element of the regulatory framework for sub-national 
borrowing.   
Figure 7. Allowing Borrowing at the Sub-national Level and Imposing Legal Sanctions for Non-
compliance (relative frequency in the sample) 
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lenders’ willingness to invest. Credit agencies, such as Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, 
provide both the lenders and the borrowers in the market with information about the risk of 
default. There are, however, certain conditions that need to be satisfied for the private financial 
markets to be an effective control instrument for sub-national borrowing. These include: (i) 
capital markets must be free and open; (ii) potential lenders must have available information 
about the borrower’s outstanding debt and repayment capacity; (iii) there should be no chance or 
possibility of a bailout of lenders by the central government; and (iv) borrowers must have the 
ability to respond with adequate policies to the signals sent by the market (Lane, 1993). 
In this sort of setting, sub-national governments generally have direct access to the 
financial markets to meet their borrowing requirements. Also, they independently decide how 
much and from whom to borrow, and on what to spend the borrowed money. For example, 
provinces in Canada may borrow for any purpose, whenever, wherever, and however they wish. 
There are neither internal nor external federal controls over provincial borrowing, and they do 
not even need to provide any information on their borrowing to the federal government (Bird & 
Tassonyi, 2001). Unlike provinces, municipalities face a very explicit hard budget constraint. 
Local borrowing requires prior provincial approval and is severely limited. Similarly to Canadian 
Provinces, Finish and Swedish municipalities do not need authorization from higher authorities 
to raise loans and can borrow from both domestic and foreign sources without any special 
conditions (Council of Europe, 1996b, 2009). 
Market discipline is only effective if the capital market is free and open. Restricted access 
to foreign capital markets limits the available options and creates a suboptimal financial sector 
portfolio (Giugale et al., 2000). There has been an increasing trend of allowing sub-national 
borrowing in foreign capital markets over the last two decades, but mostly only with an approval 
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by the central government authority (Figure 8). Furthermore, availability of information and full 
transparency on outstanding debt and capacity to pay are essential to market discipline. 
However, obtaining reliable financial information, especially from the sub-national governments, 
often requires significant effort. Moreover, not all the sub-national governments follow a 
standardized accounting plan, hold uniform registers of their assets and liabilities, or publish 
information on debt and capacity to pay. In addition, hidden extra-budgetary funds weaken 
transparency. Additionally, moral hazard undermines the effectiveness of market discipline in 
checking sub-national governments’ excessive indebtedness. Bailouts encourage the expectation 
of future rescues and moral hazard type behavior of both the borrowers and the lenders. Finally, 
market signals, such as interest rates, can affect borrowers’ financial behavior in choosing more 
solvent fiscal policies. However, the borrowers must be sensitive to the market signals for market 
discipline to be effective, that is, the decisions about borrowing should change depending on the 
interest rate.  
However, in many parts of the world, capital markets at the local level are inadequately 
developed to be able to provide efficient discipline to sub-national governments. In such 
circumstances, credit rating agencies at the sub-national level are becoming increasingly 
important to evaluate the performance of intergovernmental systems.  In this same context, some 
sub-national governments have adopted fiscal responsibility rules (that are self-imposed) trying 
to improve their credit ratings in the market. Examples of these trends are seen in Canada, 
Switzerland, and the United States. Some countries in Latin America, such as Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia and Peru, recently have sought to follow this approach, at least partially, with the 
introduction of Fiscal Responsibility Laws (Webb, 2004).  
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As mentioned above, the Canadian government relies solely on market discipline in 
controlling sub-national indebtedness.  Credit rating companies evaluate sub-national 
creditworthiness. However, even Canada’s fully-developed financial markets have not been fully 
able to control excessive indebtedness of the sub-national governments. In fact, in the mid-
1990s, sub-national debt reached 23 percent of GDP (Bird & Tassonyi, 2001), prompting the 
provinces to adopt fiscal adjustments programs. Brazil and Argentina, without meeting all 
necessary market conditions, did in fact rely on some sort of market discipline approach in the 
1980s, which had very unfortunate consequences. In Brazil, sub-national debt jumped from 1 
percent of GDP in the early 1970s, to 20 percent in the mid-1990s, with five large federal bailout 
interventions (three for states and two for municipalities) (Bevilaqua, 2002).   
Market based sub-national borrowing regulations can take different forms. Dillinger 
(2003) compares the United States’ and the European model for market based mechanism and 
concludes that while the United States’ model relies primarily on municipal bonds, the European 
model relies dominantly on specialized banks to finance sub-national borrowing. However, 
municipal bonds are becoming more and more popular in Europe recently. The largest owners of 
municipal bonds in the United States are individual investors, mutual and money market funds, 
and the commercial banks. After being issued, municipal bonds can be sold in the secondary 
market, and are considered relatively safe from default, despite some opposite examples in the 
recent period. Some of the specialized banks in Europe are owned by the municipalities (e.g., 
Finland and Sweden), while others are founded by the national governments and have later been 
privatized (e.g., Dexia in France).  
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Rule-Based Approach 
Rule-based regulations consist of fiscal rules imposed by the central government and specified in 
the constitution or in the organic laws. Such rules introduce a constraint on fiscal choices by sub-
national governments in order to guarantee that fiscal outcomes will remain predictable and 
robust regardless of the government in charge. Rules may take different forms: ceilings on debt 
or total borrowing, deficit targets, maximum expenditure rules, the “golden rule” (proceeds from 
borrowing must be spent exclusively on capital projects), or rules related to debt repayment 
capacity. 
Borrowing and debt ceilings represent the borrower’s upper legal limits of total 
indebtedness and are generally simple and easy to monitor. A deficit target has the advantage of 
simplicity and of being easily understood by the wider public, but it may be unsuccessful in 
preventing excessive debt accumulation because of the off-budget items. The most frequent 
deficit target rules are those targeting the overall budget deficit (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Spain, 
and most U.S. states) or the operating deficit (e.g., Norway). However, deficit target rules can 
also be met at higher levels of revenues and expenditures, which may have macroeconomic 
implications.  
Expenditure rules set the limits on the expenditure level, and are conceptually simple, 
easy to monitor, and can be most directly controlled. However, an expenditure limit can be more 
difficult to implement at the sub-national level than a deficit target and may not necessarily be 
able to prevent debt accumulation, since spending could be pushed below the line. Furthermore, 
the “golden rule”, limiting the sub-national governments’ borrowing to finance capital 
investment only, mostly satisfies the intergenerational equity justification for borrowing. 
However, borrowing for infrastructure does not guarantee by itself the macroeconomic and debt 
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stability. Typically, infrastructure investments are required to provide “adequate” economic and 
social rates of return to be desirable or be approved. Many countries currently implement some 
form of the “golden rule” (e.g., the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and most states in the 
U.S.). Finally, rules related to the capacity to repay debt attempt to stimulate the workings of the 
market discipline approach by relating the limits on indebtedness to expected debt service on the 
debt (e.g., Colombia and Hungary in the 1990s). These rules, however, might not be as effective 
in controlling debt accumulation if financial conditions are manipulated. 
Figure 8. Allowing Sub-national Borrowing in Foreign Capital Markets (relative frequency in the 
sub-sample) 
 
Fiscal rules have the advantage of being generally transparent, more effective in 
addressing long-term sustainability and intergenerational equity, and relatively easy to monitor. 
They can, however, be counterproductive if poorly designed, or not adequately enforced. Most 
countries using the rule-based approach use a variety of rules, some of which are redundant. 
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Main disadvantage of the rule-based approach is the trade-off between ensuring compliance and 
preserving flexibility. Strict fiscal rules leave little room for adjustments in case of unexpected 
economic downturns, while more flexible fiscal rules lack credibility and may fail to impose 
sufficient discipline. In practice, the efficacy of fiscal rules for sub-national governments 
primarily depends on the ability to monitor the debt. There has been particularly increased trend 
to impose limits on sub-national debt and borrowing during the last two decades (Figure 9). The 
use of the “golden rule” has also increased, but not by as much.  
All but one state in the United States (Vermont) has a balanced budget requirement. 
Budget rules vary significantly across the U.S. states, mostly applying only to the operating 
budget (general fund).  In addition, as of 2008, 30 states also operate under tax or expenditure 
limitations (Waisanen, 2008).  Several studies investigate the effectiveness of sub-national 
government rules in the context of the U.S. states. Most authors conclude that rules do enforce 
some budget discipline on the U.S. states, in terms of lower deficits and quicker reaction to 
negative fiscal shocks (Poterba, 1994; Alesina & Bayoumi, 1996; Poterba & Von Hagen, 1999; 
Poterba & Rueben, 1999). 
In the European Union, within the Stabilization and Growth Pact, limiting the overall 
level of public debt as well as annual total budget deficits, raises the question about whether the 
debt limit should be shared among the levels of government. In most countries it is assumed that 
the central government should be responsible for the overall limit of public debt. Public debt is 
much lower at the sub-national compared to the central government level, being just above 8 
percent of total debt in Germany to around 19 percent in Switzerland (Swianiewicz, 2004). In 
most European Union countries the ratio of the sub-national debt to GDP is pretty low, on 
average around 5 percent. The only “outliers” are the Netherlands and Spain with over 8 percent 
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of the sub-national debt to GDP. In Belgium, only the central government is responsible for 
complying with the European Union fiscal rules, but with the agreements set between the central 
and the sub-central levels of government, the commitments for complying with these constraints 
is shared among all levels of government. 
Figure 9. Imposing Limits on Borrowing and Debt and the “Golden Rule” (relative frequency in 
the sub-sample) 
 
Switzerland’s approach to the sub-national borrowing regulation is an example of self-
imposed fiscal rules. 26 Swiss cantons apply different regulations which are set in each Canton’s 
law. In many cantons, borrowing is allowed only for financing capital expenditures, and if the 
local and/or cantonal government has the financial capacity to pay the interest on debt as well as 
the amortization out of the current budget. Dafflon (2002a) discusses the sub-national borrowing 
regulation practice in the Fribourg canton where for each project that cannot be financed from 
the current revenues, then the borrowing for its financing requires the cantonal approval.   
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Administrative Approach 
The administrative approach is completely the opposite from the market discipline approach, 
giving the central government direct control over sub-national borrowing. It may take different 
forms, such as setting an annual or even more frequent limits on the overall sub-national 
government debt; prohibiting external (foreign) borrowing; reviewing and approving individual 
borrowing operations (including approval of the terms and conditions); or centralizing all 
government borrowing with on-lending to the sub-national governments. The approval of each 
borrowing issuance requires an evaluation of the financial terms and conditions under which 
each operation is contracted. The administrative approach is more frequently used by unitary 
countries and less by (federal type countries.)  
Direct involvement of the federal government in micromanaging each credit operation at 
the sub-national government level represents one of the disadvantages of this approach, since it 
is the opposite of the fiscal decentralization idea. Moreover, this approach may unnecessarily 
increase federal bureaucracy and cause undesirable inefficiencies in the financial system, and 
may even be incompatible with a country’s Constitution if it allows the sub-national government 
free access to the capital market. However, a major disadvantage of this approach is the moral 
hazard resulting from the fact that the central government may find it difficult to refuse to 
financially support the lower levels of the government in the case of impending defaults. On the 
other hand, the administrative approach has several advantages. First, the central government can 
control both the macroeconomic and the external debt policy. Second, the central government’s 
control may increase the sub-national borrower’s credibility, given that the foreign lenders often 
require a central government guarantee, and it may result in better terms and conditions received 
in the foreign financial markets.  
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Countries like Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Mexico, and the United Kingdom practice the 
administrative control approach in regulating sub-national borrowing.  In Mexico, the states and 
municipalities, including their decentralized agencies and public enterprises, can only borrow 
domestically to finance investment outlays up to the ceilings set by their respective legislatures. 
Unlike several other countries in Latin America, Mexico does not have a Fiscal Responsibility 
Law even under consideration. It uses financial sector regulations instead to motivate state-level 
prudence. In the United Kingdom, a local authority may not, without the consent of the Treasury, 
borrow from a lender from abroad or in a currency other than sterling. In Spain, for example, 
foreign debt and bond issuances by the sub-national governments are subject to the approval of 
the Ministry of Finance. During the 1980s, Australia centralized regulation of sub-national 
borrowing through the Loan Council, but this direct control system did not turn out to be 
effective, and now the sub-national governments are free to access the capital markets directly. 
The functions of the Loan Council were restructured in the mid-1990s, and excessive 
indebtedness is now cooperatively controlled (Craig, 1997; Dillinger, 2003; 
Koutsogeorgopoulou, 2007).  
Denmark provides an interesting example of the administrative approach to sub-national 
borrowing regulation. In general, sub-national borrowing in Denmark is prohibited, but in some 
cases this rule is waived. Permission for borrowing issuance, for which the municipalities apply 
individually, is granted if the overall borrowing ceiling has not been exceeded and if the 
municipality’s debt does not exceed 30% of total municipality’s expenditures. The borrowing 
and debt ceilings are negotiated annually with local government associations. Furthermore, the 
general rule is that, if borrowing is permitted, both current and capital budgets need to be 
balanced. Nevertheless, during the 1990s between 40% and 80% of Danish municipalities’ 
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deficits) were financed through borrowing, resulting in local debt of 4.5% of GDP in 1998 
(Jorgen & Pedersen, 2002). Similarly, the United Kingdom applies an administrative approach to 
sub-national borrowing regulations, but in the British case the borrowing limits differ among 
sub-national governments (Watts, 2002). Limits are allocated to the local governments 
depending on their specific needs for housing, education, etc. Allocations are increased or 
decreased based on the efficiency and effectiveness of the local governments and can be adjusted 
for special needs (Dafflon, 2002b).  
Cooperative Approach 
Under this approach, the sub-national borrowing controls are designed through a negotiation 
process between the federal/central and the lower levels of government. The sub-national 
governments are actively involved in reaching an agreement on overall general government 
deficit targets, on the main revenue and expenditure items, as well as on the limits on financing 
of the individual sub-national jurisdictions. This approach is in practice in some European 
countries and in Australia.  
In Austria, for example, the “Consultation mechanism” between different levels of 
government and the Stability and Growth Pact were implemented in 1999 (Thöni, Garbislander, 
& Haas, 2002) to ensure lowering and maintaining the overall deficit below 3 percent of GDP. 
Similar arrangements exist in Spain (Laborda et al., 2006). In Belgium, sub-national borrowing 
is supervised by a High Finance Council (HFC), which is comprised of members nominated by 
the federal, regional, and community levels, and the Belgian National Bank. In Australia, a fiscal 
institution called the Loan Council coordinates the fiscal policies and borrowing decisions of the 
Australian states.  
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The cooperative approach combines many individual advantages of the other three 
approaches, which is both its main strength and its main weakness. A clear advantage lies in 
promoting dialogue and the exchange of information across various government levels, as well 
as in raising awareness of the macroeconomic implications of their budgetary choices. However, 
in order to be effective, this approach requires the central government to be strong and able to 
effectively guide the intergovernmental negotiations, which in many emerging markets may not 
be the case (Joumard & Kongsrud, 2003). The main weakness of this approach is that, because it 
combines components of other three approaches, when it is poorly implemented it reproduces the 
flaws of other approaches, instead of their advantages (Ahmad, et al., 2005).  
As already mentioned above, since the Loan Council’s functions were restructured in the 
mid-1990s, sub-national borrowing in Australia has been cooperatively controlled. Jurisdictions 
are required to submit their total financial requirements for the upcoming year to the Loan 
Council with no requirement for submitting specific project details. Then the Loan Council 
evaluates these nominations with regard to the jurisdictions’ fiscal position, the infrastructure 
needs and the macroeconomic implications of borrowing. In the event when the Loan Council 
has concerns about certain nominations, it has the right to request the jurisdiction to justify the 
nomination, and if needed, it can amend its fiscal strategy. So far, the restructured Loan Council, 
complemented by the financial markets and rating agencies, has been successful in controlling 
sub-national fiscal behavior (Craig, 1997; Koutsogeorgopoulou, 2007; Webb, 2002).  
A key role in managing sub-national borrowing in Belgium is played by the “Public 
Sector Borrowing requirements” in the High Finance Council (HFC). The HFC is composed of 
academics, members of the National Bank of Belgium and the representatives of all levels of 
governments. The committee monitors and analyzes the borrowing requirements of all levels of 
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government at regular intervals and, based on a concept of sustainability, formulates 
recommendations about the medium and long-term budgetary targets for the different 
government levels. Based on the HFC’s recommendations, the agreements between the central 
government and the regions and the communities are formulated, covering a period of five to six 
years and committing the sub-national governments to meeting specific annual budgetary targets 
in terms of their borrowing requirements. In order to ensure that public finances are consistent 
with the budgetary targets, municipalities are subject to the “golden rule” under which deficits 
are only allowed for investment. On the recommendation of the HFC, the central government can 
limit the borrowing capacity of a non-compliant region or community to prevent endangering 
economic stability or the external balance. So far, however, the HFC has not considered it 
necessary to use this sanction on any of the regions or communities (OECD, 2007). 
According to Liebig, et al. (2008), the sub-national borrowing regulation in South Africa 
is a combination of the cooperative and the marked based approach. The cooperative component 
originates in the South African Constitution where Article 3 requires a “co-operative 
government”. Furthermore, different spheres of the government control each other in terms of 
who borrows how much. On the other hand, the South African legal setting for sub-national 
borrowing is also partly market-based, since the sub-national entities can generally borrow as 
much as they want. The municipal councils authorize borrowing issuances and there are no 
country-wide debt limits.  
EX-POST REGULATION 
As already pointed out, the effectiveness of ex-ante regulations is limited without an ex-post 
mechanism for dealing with sub-national insolvency. Even though ex-ante regulations are very 
important for minimizing the risk of defaults, they cannot prevent them in all cases. Sub-national 
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insolvency may occur because of sub-national fiscal and debt mismanagement but also because 
of external shocks.  
Ex-post control mechanisms consist of a set of predetermined rules for allocating the 
default risk. They provide a basis for both borrowers’ and lenders’ expectation that in case of 
insolvency, they both would share the burden. Properly designed ex-post regulations enforce the 
hard budget constraint on sub-national governments. 
Countries generally apply two main approaches in ex-post regulation of the sub-national 
borrowing, namely the judicial and the administrative approach. The judicial approach involves 
the courts which make key decisions and give guidance on the restructuring process. The 
advantage of the judicial approach is that it neutralizes political pressure. However, the ability of 
courts to impose fiscal adjustments on sub-national governments is very limited. The 
administrative approach, however, often allows political intervention of the higher levels of 
government in resolving the sub-national insolvency. 
Depending on the factors, such as history, political and economic structure, etc. countries 
apply various approaches for ex-post regulation of the sub-national borrowing. For example, 
Hungary and Brazil apply the administrative approach, while South Africa and the United States 
prefer a combination of the judicial and the administrative approaches. Moreover, there is a 
uniform approach across states in the United States for dealing with municipal distress.  
Any ex-post control mechanism consists of three central elements. The first is the 
definition of insolvency that acts as a procedural trigger. Different countries define insolvency. 
While Hungary and the United States define insolvency as inability to pay debt, South Africa 
uses one definition for serious financial problems and another for persistent violation of financial 
commitments. The second element is the debtor’s fiscal adjustment to bring in line spending with 
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revenues as well as borrowing with capacity to service debt. Even when the sub-national 
governments have significant autonomy in controlling expenditures and raising revenues, fiscal 
adjustment often requires difficult political choices of reducing spending and raising revenues. 
Finally, the third one includes negotiations between the debtor and creditor to restructure debt 
obligations. In case of the administrative approach, the higher government level tends to 
restructure sub-national debt into longer-term debt instruments, which was the case in Brazil in 
1997. However, the debt discharge is typically limited to the judicial approach (Liu, 2008).   
CONCLUSION 
As shown in this chapter, there is a wide variety of both ex-ante and ex-post sub-national 
borrowing regulations that countries implement. The regulations reflect the level of development 
of the financial markets, the political power of different levels of government, and 
macroeconomic and fiscal conditions. Each type of sub-national borrowing regulation has both 
advantages and disadvantages, which determine how suitable each is for a particular country’s 
circumstances. Reliance on only ex-ante controls gives both borrowers and lenders the incentive 
for irresponsible behavior since they bear none of the consequences. On the other hand, reliance 
on only ex-post regulation may give space to large sub-national governments to over-borrow and 
build up such large debts that the central government cannot enforce them to bear the 
consequences given their importance in the national economy. Finally, as a county’s 
circumstances change over time, the country may change its preferred mechanism to control sub-
national behavior in financial markets.  
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V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
The fundamental research question this study investigates is: how does sub-national borrowing 
affect fiscal sustainability? The analytical framework developed in this chapter builds on a 
general model traditionally used in the literature on fiscal sustainability. This chapter is 
organized as follows. First, a general model of fiscal sustainability is described and the 
hypothesis of this study is developed. Next, assumptions on fundamental sub-national budget 
components and on the institutional framework are set and discussed. Finally, the effects of more 
revenue autonomy and borrowing regulations on fiscal sustainability are analyzed.  
SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET CONSTRAINT 
The basic assumption used in the traditional methodology on debt sustainability: the sub-national 
government is committed to the goal of repaying its debt. Sub-national government tries to 
smooth its expenditures because it has aversion towards outcomes that could force it into very 
low levels of expenditures. In this case, sustainable debt has to be consistent with the 
government’s goal not to experience sudden, excessive fall in expenditures. Hence, if a sub-
national government wants to rule out any excessively low levels of expenditures, the budget 
constraint implies that debt must not exceed the level that can be serviced if revenues remain at 
their lowest level for a long period of time. This means that the sub-national government has to 
be credibly committed to be able to repay its debt in “any situation.” Therefore, credible 
commitment refers not only to government’s “willingness to pay”, but much more importantly, 
its “ability to pay” its debt.  
Credible commitment to repay debt requires the sub-national government to impose on 
itself a debt limit by which it cannot borrow more than the amount of debt it could service in the 
worst-case scenario (fiscal crisis). In determining this upper limit for borrowing, the government 
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has to take into account all the policy variables that determine the dynamics of the primary 
balance, as well as borrowing costs and economic growth.  On the first day of fiscal year 𝑡, sub-
national government 𝑗 faces projected revenues R𝑡, expected non-interest expenditures Ε𝑡, and 
interest expenditures i𝑡B𝑡, where 𝑖𝑡 is net real interest rate in year 𝑡, and B𝑡 is the level of 
outstanding debt at the beginning of fiscal year 𝑡. Since sub-national government 𝑗 is allowed to 
borrow in the capital market, it plans to finance projected fiscal deficit in fiscal year 𝑡 by issuing 
debt. Hence, the budget balance21 in year 𝑡 is expressed as 
B𝑡+1 − B𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡B𝑡 − (R𝑡 − Ε𝑡)                                                                                                (5.1) 
where B𝑡+1 is stock of debt at the beginning of fiscal year 𝑡 + 1, and (B𝑡+1 − B𝑡) represents net 
debt issuance during fiscal year 𝑡. (R𝑡 − Ε𝑡) represents the primary balance and includes all 
flows that affect the debt level including those that are officially accounted for “bellow the line” 
(e.g., privatization revenues). Sub-national government 𝑗 is allowed to issue debt only to finance 
capital investments, implying that the primary balance cannot be negative. Equation (5.1) says 
that the sub-national government’s net debt issuance during fiscal year 𝑡 is used to finance its 
fiscal deficit in that year.  
Incorporating gross regional domestic product in equation (5.1) allows presenting it in 
terms of ratios to gross regional domestic product. After rearranging, it can be written as 
𝛾𝑡+1ℬ𝑡+1 = 𝓇𝑡ℬ𝑡 − (ℛ𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡)                                                                                                 (5.2) 
                                                          
21 The model as well can include a seigniorage revenue component (𝑀𝑡 −𝑀𝑡−1) to implicitly include the central 
bank into public sector, but for the purpose of this study, concerned with sub-national finance, this element is not 
relevant. 
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where 𝛾𝑡+1 is the gross regional domestic product growth rate
22 in year 𝑡 + 1. ℬ𝑡 is stock of debt 
at the beginning of year 𝑡 as a share of gross regional domestic product in that year, while ℬ𝑡+1 
is stock of debt at the beginning of year 𝑡 + 1 as a share of year 𝑡 + 1 gross regional domestic 
product. Furthermore, 𝓇𝑡 = (1 + 𝑖𝑡) is gross real interest rate in year 𝑡, ℛ𝑡 is the ratio of total 
sub-national government revenue to gross regional domestic product, and 𝐸𝑡 is the ratio of non-
interest expenditures to gross regional domestic product.  
Equation (5.2) says that all the changes in the sub-national government debt during 
year 𝑡, including new issuance and paid installments during the year, must relate to all flows of 
government receipts and payments in the same year.  
The budget constraint inflows from year to year, expressed in equation(5.2), can be used 
to derive the lifetime budget constraint, which plays a key role in assessing fiscal sustainability. 
The following assumptions are useful for deriving the lifetime budget constraint:  
1. Time is discrete; 
2. Debt matures in one year; 
3. Debt is expressed in real terms; 
4. Debt issued at year 𝑡 − 1 pays a real interest rate 𝑟𝑡−1; and  
5. “no-Ponzi-game” condition applies, lim
𝑗→∞
∏
𝛾𝑡+𝑘ℬ𝑡+𝑗
𝓇𝑡+𝑘
𝑗
𝑘=0 = 0.  
The “no-Ponzi-game” condition states that the debt-output (debt to output or 
debt/output?) ratio cannot grow faster than growth-adjusted gross interest rate in the long run, 
that is 
                                                          
22 𝛾𝑡+𝑘 =
𝑌𝑡+𝑘
𝑌𝑡+𝑘−1
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lim
𝑗→∞
∏
𝛾𝑡+𝑘ℬ𝑡+𝑗
𝓇𝑡+𝑘
𝑗
𝑘=0
= 0                                                                                                                (5.3) 
Basically, this condition states that at any date 𝑡 the discounted value of the stock of 
public debt 𝑡 + 𝑗 periods into the future should vanish as 𝑗 goes to infinity, or, in other words, at 
the end of time, total debt must be repaid. 
After rearranging, (5.2) can be written as 
ℬ𝑡 =
𝛾𝑡+1ℬ𝑡+1
𝓇𝑡
+
ℛ𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡
𝓇𝑡
                                                                                                         (5.4) 
Updating (5.4) to year 𝑡 + 1 and substituting out 𝐵𝑡+1 in the right hand side of (5.4) gives 
ℬ𝑡 =
 𝛾𝑡+1𝛾𝑡+2ℬ𝑡+2
𝓇𝑡+1𝓇𝑡
+
𝛾𝑡+1(ℛ𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡)
𝓇𝑡
+
𝛾𝑡+1𝛾𝑡+2(ℛ𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑡+1)
𝓇𝑡+1𝓇𝑡
                                   (5.5) 
Repeating this procedure (𝑗 − 1) times to recursively substitute out ℬ𝑡+1,  ℬ𝑡+2, … 
 ℬ𝑡+𝑗−1, we finally obtain 
ℬ𝑡 =∏
𝛾𝑡+𝑘ℬ𝑡+𝑗
𝓇𝑡+𝑘
𝑗
𝑘=0
+∑
∏ 𝛾𝑡+𝑖
𝑗
𝑖=1
∏ 𝓇𝑡−1
𝑡+𝑖−1𝑗
𝑖=0
(ℛ𝑡+𝑘 − 𝐸𝑡+𝑘)                     
𝑗
𝑘=0
                                 (5.6) 
Applying assumption (5.3) into (5.6) leads to the government lifetime budget constraint 
ℬ𝑡 =∑
∏ 𝛾𝑡+𝑖
𝑗
𝑖=1
∏ 𝓇𝑡−1
𝑡+𝑖−1𝑗
𝑖=0
(ℛ𝑡+𝑘 − 𝐸𝑡+𝑘)
𝑗
𝑘=0
                                                                                    (5.7) 
Basically, equation (5.7) says that the current level of sub-national outstanding debt 
should be equal to the present value of all its primary balances until the end of time.  
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The most basic tool used in fiscal sustainability analysis actually uses a steady state 
version of the lifetime budget constraint. To arrive at it, it is assumed that revenues and 
expenditures, both as a fraction of output, are constant at ℛ and 𝐸, respectively, real output 
grows at constant rate 𝛾, and the real gross interest rate is a constant 𝓇. Applying these 
assumptions in (5.7), the steady-state of lifetime budget constraint is 
ℬ𝑡 =∑
𝛾𝑘
𝓇𝑘+1
(ℛ − 𝐸)
𝑗
𝑘=0
                                                                                                            (5.8) 
The intuition behind the lifetime budget constraint (5.8) is that the present value of the 
primary balance, as a share of output, is equal to the interest and principal on the outstanding 
debt to output ratio.  
Furthermore, it is easy to show that,23 
lim
𝑗→∞
∑
𝛾𝑘
𝓇𝑘+1
𝑗
𝑘=0
=
1
(𝓇 − 𝛾)
                                                                                                          (5.9) 
the steady-state debt-output ratio satisfies the following condition 
                                                          
23 ∑
𝛾𝑘
𝑟𝑘+1
𝑗
𝑘=0 =
1
𝑟
+
1
𝑟
𝛾
𝑟
+⋯+
1
𝑟
(
𝛾
𝑟
)
𝑗
 
  ∑
𝛾𝑘
𝑟𝑘+1
𝑗
𝑘=0 =
1
𝑟
(1−(
𝛾
𝑟
)
𝑗+1
)
1−
𝛾
𝑟
 if 
𝛾
𝑟
≠ 1 
  lim
𝑗→∞
∑
𝛾𝑘
𝑟𝑘+1
𝑗
𝑘=0 = lim𝑗→∞
1
𝑟
1−
𝛾
𝑟
− lim
𝑗→∞
1
𝑟
(
𝛾
𝑟
)
𝑗+1
1−
𝛾
𝑟
  
  lim
𝑗→∞
1
𝑟
(
𝛾
𝑟
)
𝑗+1
1−
𝛾
𝑟
= 0 since (
𝛾
𝑟
)
𝑗
→ 0 when |
𝛾
𝑟
| < 0 
  ⇒   lim
𝑗→∞
∑
𝛾𝑘
𝑟𝑘+1
𝑗
𝑘=0 = lim𝑗→∞
1
𝑟
1−
𝛾
𝑟
=
1
(𝑟−𝛾)
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ℬ =
ℛ − 𝐸
𝓇 − 𝛾
                                                                                                                                 (5.10) 
Condition (5.10) indicates the growth-adjusted ratio of the annual value of the primary 
balance to the gross regional domestic product that is required for the debt to gross regional 
domestic product ratio to stabilize at a target level.  
However, the debt level set by this rule is static and does not consider uncertainty and 
dynamics in all the terms in the right hand side of equation. Therefore, if the debt-to-output 
limit (𝜙) is determined by the primary balance level that occurs in a fiscal crisis, which is the 
difference between the lowest possible revenue realization-to-output (ℛ) and the credibly 
announced lowest expenditures-to-output level (𝐸), then any debt-to-output ratio greater 
than(𝜙) can endanger fiscal sustainability and lead to fiscal crisis.  
That is, the debt limit is 
ℬ𝑡+1 ≤ 𝜙 =
ℛ − 𝐸
𝓇 − 𝛾
                                                                                                                (5.11) 
In other words, expression (5.11) says that fiscal policy is considered sustainable if the 
current level of debt is not higher than the growth-adjusted ratio of the annual primary balance 
that may occur in a fiscal crisis. That is, current debt should not exceed the level that can be 
financed in a fiscal crisis. 
However, sub-national borrowing is regulated differently in different countries and with 
different measures of enforcement, all of which can certainly have an effect on sub-national 
borrowing behavior, but not all of which can guarantee fiscal sustainability. Furthermore, the 
sub-national revenue structure also differs - in some countries lower levels of government are 
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more dependent on transfers from the central government, whereas in others, they rely more on 
own resources. It is very important to have in mind that different sources of revenue give 
governments different incentives, affecting their behavior in terms of revenue effort and 
spending responsibility. Therefore, it would seem necessary to incorporate the institutional 
framework defining borrowing, on the one hand, and the primary balance, on the other, in order 
to investigate how the borrowing limit may change in different circumstances.  
By incorporating the institutional framework surrounding sub-national borrowing we 
develop three general conjectures: The debt limit would be expected to be greater for 
governments that have  
a) more stable revenues, including more revenue autonomy (discretion over either choosing 
the revenue instruments, and/or base and rates) and less dependence on financing from 
the central governments. Transfers, in particular, may lead to a positive incentive to 
spending without generally stimulating revenue collections; 
b) more flexibility to adjust expenditures; 
c) higher output growth rates and lower real interest rates. 
Showing under what conditions these three conjectures hold true will provide the basic 
framework for testing the main hypothesis that is the focus of this study: 
ℋ: If sub-national borrowing is numerically limited and restricted to financing capital 
investments and the sub-national governments are provided with some measure of 
revenue autonomy, sub-national borrowing should not endanger fiscal sustainability.  
Before proceeding to investigate these three conjectures above, it is helpful to make the 
following set of assumptions for defining the primary balance components and borrowing.  
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ASSUMPTIONS ON THE FUNDAMENTAL SUB-NATIONAL BUDGET COMPONENTS 
AND ON THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Before listing the set of assumptions applying to the components of the budget constraint, it is 
important to disaggregate the primary balance into all the fundamental components that are of 
main interest for the purpose of this analysis. 
First, the primary balance 𝒮𝑡  includes all flows of revenues ℛ𝑡 minus noninterest 
expenditures 𝐸𝑡, 
𝒮𝑡 = ℛ𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡                                                                                                                              (5.12)  
Sub-national governments have three major sources of revenues (ℛ), namely own 
revenues (𝒪ℛ), shared revenues (𝒮ℛ), and transfers (𝒯). Furthermore, transfers are (typically) 
divided into: unconditional transfers (𝒯𝒰), conditional transfers for capital purposes (𝒯𝒞𝒦), and 
other conditional transfers (𝒯𝒞).  
Hence, equation (5.12) can be rewritten as 
𝒮𝑡 = 𝒪ℛ𝑡 + 𝒮ℛ𝑡 + 𝒯𝒰,𝑡 + 𝒯𝒞𝒦,𝑡 + 𝒯𝒞,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡                                                                      (5.13)    
Furthermore, both conditional transfers for capital purposes and other conditional 
transfers can each be divided into two groups depending on whether they have no or some level 
of fungibility (𝓍), where (𝓍 ∈ [0,1]). Therefore, (𝓍𝒯𝒞𝒦) and (𝓍𝒯𝒞) would represent the fungible 
share of conditional transfers for capital purposes and other conditional transfers, respectively. A 
greater than zero fungibility exists when the sub-national government is already financing, up to 
a certain level, certain expenditure functions for which the transfer was issued. Hence, in this 
case, the transfers may or may not be fully used for that stated function. For example, if the 
particular expenditure function is financed by own sources in an amount greater  than the amount 
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of the transfer, the sub-national government may decide to increase the financing of the purpose 
in question by either the full amount of the transfer or less than the full amount, or may not 
change the level of financing at all and reallocate the resources for some other purposes. 
Obviously, conditional transfers with a fungibility effect are more likely to happen in wealthier 
sub-national governments and those enjoying more revenue autonomy. 
The following sections describe the important assumptions concerning the fundamental 
components of the primary balance. 
Sub-National Own-Source Revenues 
Sub-national own-source revenues are primarily determined by the level of revenue 
autonomy (𝜌), including ability to choose instruments, to set and/or change tax base and/or tax 
rates, and ability to administer taxes (or any combination of these four).24 Greater revenue power 
is assumed to have a positive effect on potential own revenue collection.  
Furthermore, an important source of sub-national revenues may be shared revenues (𝒮ℛ). 
Shared revenues usually represent a fixed share (𝜃), set by the central government, of revenues 
collected within a sub-national government boundary that is returned by the central government. 
This is known as revenue sharing on a derivation basis. Given their predictability, size, and the 
low political costs to sub-national governments, they may lead to reduced sub-national effort in 
collecting their own revenues.  
                                                          
24 OECD (1999) classifies the sub-national control over own revenue sources into the following categories, by 
decreasing order: a) sub-national government sets tax rate and tax base; b) sub-national government sets tax rate 
only; c) sub-national government sets tax base only, d) tax sharing arrangements; d.1) sub-national government 
determines revenue-split; d.2) revenue-split can only be changed with consent of sub-national government; d.3) 
revenue-split fixed in legislation, may unilaterally be changed by central government; d.4) revenue-split determined 
by central government as part of the annual budget process; e) central government sets rate and base of sub-national 
government tax. In cases (a) - (c), and (d.1) - (d.2) the sub-national government has total or a significant control over 
its taxes. In the remaining cases, the sub-national tax autonomy is limited or non-existent.  
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Finally, the third important part of sub-national revenues is intergovernmental transfers.25 
Dependence on transfers from the central government, in general, generates a disincentive effect 
on sub-national own revenue collection. Sub-national governments may choose to reallocate 
their financing portfolio toward politically least cost sources; i.e., transfers. However, this effect 
may be different with different types of transfers.  
First, unconditional transfers are generally used for fiscal equalization purposes among 
sub-national governments. This latter means that not all the sub-national governments 
necessarily receive the unconditional transfers. In some cases, sub-national governments have to 
make a negative transfer, as in the case of Robin Hood systems of equalization. In the case of 
unconditional transfers (𝒯𝒰), the substitution effect from own-revenues to transfers to finance 
expenditures is probably the most common given the fact that unconditional transfers do not 
impose any conditions on recipients about the use of funds.  Hence, this type of transfers is very 
likely to be used for financing current expenditures and at the same time have a disincentive 
effect on own revenue effort. Furthermore, unconditional transfers are often decided each year or 
determined by formula. If the unconditional transfers are allocated by a formula which includes 
sub-national revenue effort as one of the factors, then the unconditional transfers may in fact 
increase own-revenue collection. Therefore, the effect of the unconditional transfers on own-
revenues collection is ambiguous.  
Second, all conditional transfers, both for capital purposes (𝒯𝒞𝒦) and other conditional 
transfers (𝒯𝒞), may discourage sub-national revenue effort. However, in the case of matching 
conditional transfers this effect tends to be less pronounced. The negative effect decreases with 
the proportion (𝓂 ≥ 0) with which the sub-national government has to meet the matching 
                                                          
25 More often than not, revenue classifications look at the different forms of revenue sharing as just being another 
form of transfers.  
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transfer requirements26 and, as discussed above, increases with the level of fungibility effect of 
these transfers (𝓍). Larger fungibility effects may discourage own revenue collection because the 
government officials may decide to use the released resources to buy votes by lowering own 
revenue collections.  
To summarize, based on the previous discussion, own revenues can be expressed as the 
following27 twice differentiable function 
𝒪ℛ = 𝒻(𝜌, 𝜃, 𝒯𝒰 , 𝒯𝒞𝒦(𝓂, 𝓍), 𝒯𝒞(𝓂, 𝓍))                                                                                (5.14)  
with the following assumptions 
𝒜1: 𝒻𝜌 ≥ 0  
𝒜2: 𝒻𝒯𝒰 ⋚ 0; (𝒻𝒯𝒞𝒦 , 𝒻𝒯𝒞) {
≤ 0, 𝑖𝑓𝓂 = 0
≥ 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝓂 > 0
 , (𝒻𝒯𝒞𝒦 , 𝒻𝒯𝒞) {
= 0, 𝑖𝑓𝓍 = 0
< 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝓍 > 0
  
Intergovernmental Transfers 
In general, the allocation of intergovernmental transfers depends on the level of sub-national 
expenditure needs that cannot be financed by their own revenues, or the so called vertical 
imbalance. These functions include either capital or current expenditures, and may depend on 
factors like level of urbanization, education, age dependency, etc. These effects, for simplicity, 
                                                          
26 Or in other words, the positive relationship between conditional transfers and sub-national revenue effort is a 
positive function of the proportion with which the sub-national government enters in financing particular 
expenditure function. 
27 Intergovernmental transfers may also be a function of sub-national own revenues (𝒪ℛ). This is, for example, the 
case with some equalization transfers that are improperly designed. Equalization transfers should be based on the 
sub-national potential revenues, rather than the actual revenues. Basing equalization transfers on actual revenues 
would “punish” those sub-national governments exercising higher revenue efforts. Another reason is that actual 
revenues may mislead the approximation of revenue capacity if the sub-national governments vary with respect to 
revenue effort. However, it often happens that regardless of these concerns, in the absence of the necessary data, 
equalization transfers may still be based on the actual revenues (Boex & Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). For simplicity 
purposes, it is assumed here that the transfers are not a function of the sub-national own revenues.  
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can be narrowed down to a common determinant, population (𝒩). Hence, transfers, on the one 
hand, depend on the level of expenditure decentralization (𝜀), and on the other hand, on 
expenditure needs, which are assumed here to be determined by population (𝒩). This 
relationship will tend to vary across different types of transfers. For example, greater expenditure 
responsibilities (without changing revenue autonomy) may increase the vertical and horizontal 
fiscal gaps, implying greater need for unconditional transfers. On the other hand, population 
growth may have a greater effect on the importance of capital transfers or conditional matching 
transfers. 
Transfers can be classified in several ways. Basically, they can be of two forms, namely, 
revenue sharing and grants. Revenue sharing represents a fixed share of given revenue sources 
that are allocated to the sub-national governments based on (1) the revenue accruing within each 
jurisdiction (also called the derivation principle) or (2) other criteria, typically population, 
expenditure needs, and/or tax capacity (Shah, 1994). Grants are financial resources flowing from 
one government (grantor) to another government (recipient). If the allocation of revenue sharing 
resources is not based on the origin, then there is very little practical difference between the 
revenue sharing and grants.  
Another typology of grants is related to the degree of autonomy of the sub-national 
governments in using the transfers. Unconditional (or general purpose transfers) are provided as 
general budget support, with no strings attached to their use. On the other hand, the conditional 
transfers provide help for particular services and define exactly how they are used. Between 
these extremes are the block grants, which allow the recipient discretion to allocate the funds 
within a defined functional area. For the purpose of this study, transfers will be distinguished 
between only unconditional and conditional transfers, as done in Bahl and Linn (1992).   
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Unconditional transfers are typically related the revenue effort of the sub-national 
government. They are commonly allocated according to a formula with the main purpose to 
provide sub-national governments with a stable source of revenue. When the purpose of the 
unconditional grants is predominantly to provide resources to underdeveloped or fiscally needy 
sub-national governments, the unconditional transfers are equivalent to equalization transfers 
(Martinez-Vazquez & Boex, 2005).  
Conditional transfers may incorporate matching requirements by the sub-national 
government to finance a specified percentage of expenditures using their own resources. 
Matching requirements can be either open ended, in which case the central government matches 
whatever level of resources the sub-national government provides, or closed ended, meaning that 
the central government matches the sub-national government’s funds only up to a predetermined 
limit. For the purpose of this study, two categories of conditional transfers are assumed, namely, 
conditional transfers for capital purposes and other conditional transfers. 
Unconditional transfers may be a function of sub-national own-revenues (𝒪ℛ), which 
may happen in case when equalization transfers are based on the sub-national potential revenues, 
rather than the actual revenues. In this case, sub-national governments with higher revenue 
efforts are “punished” by a lower level of transfers.  For the purpose of this study, transfers are 
not considered to be a function of own-revenues.  
The effect of greater revenue autonomy (𝜌) given to sub-national governments on the 
level of intergovernmental transfers is ambiguous. In general, it is expected that giving more 
revenue autonomy to sub-national governments would reduce their dependence on financing 
from the central government budget. This would be the case especially if the majority of 
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unconditional transfers are discretionary, which exacerbate the soft budget constraint. However, 
that may not always be the case. Greater revenue autonomy may at the same time increase 
regional disparities, leading to a greater need for equalization transfers. Moreover, if greater 
revenue autonomy has a positive effect on sub-national revenue effort, and if the revenue effort 
is one of the determinants for transfer allocation, then more revenue autonomy may have a 
positive effect on the level of transfers. Therefore, the final effect of revenue autonomy on 
intergovernmental transfers would depend on the structure of transfers. Moreover, greater 
revenue autonomy could also influence the transfer structure itself, where, conditional transfers 
would be less common, while relative share of the unconditional transfers would be increased.  
Therefore, transfers can be defined with the following functions 
 𝒯 = 𝓉(𝜀,𝒩, 𝜌)                                                                                                                       (5.15𝑎)  
𝒯𝒰 = 𝓊(𝜀,𝒩, 𝜌)                                                                                                                      (5.15b) 
𝒯𝒞𝒦 = 𝓋(𝜀,𝒩, 𝜌)                                                                                                                  (5.15c) 
𝒯𝒞 = 𝓌(𝜀,𝒩, 𝜌)                                                                                                                    (5.15d) 
and the following assumption 
 𝒜3: 𝓉𝜌 ⋚ 0,𝓊𝜌 ⋚ 0,𝓋𝜌 ≤ 0;𝓌𝜌 ≤ 0   
Sub-National (Non-Interest) Expenditures 
The assignment of expenditure responsibilities has been considered as the first and fundamental 
step in the design of fiscal decentralization (Martinez-Vazquez, 1999). It is argued that the 
design of other components of fiscal decentralization such as revenue assignment, 
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intergovernmental transfers and sub-national borrowing, in the absence of clear expenditure 
assignment would be like putting the cart before the horse (Bahl & Wallich, 1995). This is 
exactly what happened with some Latin American countries during 1990s which made the 
mistake of assigning revenues to sub-national governments before clearly assigning expenditure 
responsibilities. Successful functioning of a decentralized government system requires a clear 
assignment of expenditure responsibilities because failure to do so may lead to instability in 
intergovernmental relations and to the inefficient provision of public services.  
According to the subsidiarity principle, expenditure responsibilities are assigned to the 
lowest level that can provide it efficiently. Some expenditure responsibilities are always assigned 
to the central government because, due to economies of scale, assigning them to lower levels 
would be inefficient. Such expenditure responsibilities include national defense and monetary 
policy. On the other hand, some expenditure functions, such as education, sewerage, provision of 
drinking water, etc., are considered to be most efficiently provided by sub-national governments. 
The principal of efficiency demands that the assignment of expenditure responsibilities 
results in an efficient allocation of resources. In other words, public services with wider benefits 
should not be assigned to smaller government units, and vice versa, public services with smaller 
benefits should not be assigned to larger government units. In both cases the likely result is the 
under-provision of services and inefficient allocation of resources because when there is a larger 
distance between policy-makers and the people, the former are less informed about  people’s 
references and needs. Hence, efficiency in the provision of public service is achieved if benefits 
from consuming the public service are linked to the costs of their provision (fees, service charges 
and local taxes). 
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The lack of clarity in the definition of sub-national expenditure responsibilities leads to 
poorly designed revenue assignment. Decentralization of the revenue assignment based on 
expenditure responsibilities is desired so that sub-national governments do not have to solely rely 
on intergovernmental transfers to finance their expenditures.  Linking the sub-national revenues 
with expenditures is important for preserving the incentive for providing public services in a 
cost-effective manner (Shah, 1995).  Significant reliance on intergovernmental transfers to 
finance sub-national expenditures breaks the revenue-expenditure linkage, and can adversely 
affect sub-national fiscal management.  
The expenditure level primarily depends on expenditure assignments to sub-national 
governments (𝜀).  The greater are sub-national expenditure responsibilities, the greater is the 
overall level of expenditures. This applies to both capital and non-interest current expenditures. 
Furthermore, the level at which assigned functions are provided further depends on sub-national 
needs for services. In general, population(𝒩) can be assumed to be the basic determinant of all 
public service needs.28 
Finally, both the level and structure of sub-national expenditures is likely to be affected 
by the transfer system (𝒯). It is commonly found that transfers, in general, generate to the so-
called flypaper effect on sub-national government spending.29 This effect is more or less strong 
depending on the type of transfer. In case of unconditional transfers (𝒯𝒰), this effect is likely the 
smallest because this kind of transfer can be most easily used for rebates to local taxpayers 
through reduced taxes. On the other hand, the “flypaper effect” is more likely to occur in the case 
                                                          
28 Of course, there are other determinants of needs, such as cost differences for providing services, or special needs 
of population subgroups, such as young population, the elderly, etc. to simplify the analysis, those other 
determinants are assumed away.   
29 The “flypaper effect” postulates that once the sub-national government receives the transfer, it is more likely it 
will spend it than return it to the tax payers (“money sticks where it hits”)(Hines Jr & Thaler, 1995). 
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of conditional transfers, especially if they are matching (𝓂 > 0). As a consequence of matching 
conditional transfers, expenditures are more likely to increase. Furthermore, when it comes to the 
fungibility of transfers and its effect on sub-national expenditures, it is expected that either there 
is no effect or that effect is positive but sufficiently small.  
Summarizing the discussion above, sub-national expenditures can be represented by the 
following function 
𝐸 = ℎ(𝜀,𝒩,𝒯(𝓂, 𝓍))                                                                                                             (5.16)  
and we make the following assumptions: 
𝒜4: ℎ𝒯𝒰 = 0  
𝒜5: ℎ𝓂 ≥ 0; ℎ𝓍 ≥ 0  
Sub-National Primary Balance 
The effect of a primary balance on the debt limit 𝜙 is realized through three channels, namely 
sub-national revenues, non-interest expenditures, and sub-national borrowing regulations 𝜇. The 
first two have already been explained in the previous three sections, while this section explains 
the third channel.  
  Certain forms of borrowing controls or regulations determine the borrowing limit via 
budget balance. These include fiscal rules such as deficit targets, expenditure rules, borrowing 
limits related to the current deficit of the sub-national government budget; limits on debt service 
as a percent of current revenues, etc. These rules force sub-national governments to achieve and 
maintain a certain level of budget balance, implying that the budget balance is an increasing 
function of borrowing controls 𝜇. For convenience, 𝓈 is assumed to be continuous on 𝜇.  
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In other words, 
𝒮 = 𝓈(𝜇)                                                                                                                                        (5.17)  
and 
𝒜6: 𝓈𝜇 ≥ 0  
Sub-National Borrowing and the Real Interest Rate 
Sub-national borrowing is an increasing function of capital investments for which the sub-
national government has expenditure responsibility (𝜀), such as the building and maintenance of 
roads and highways, schools, industrial parks, or other infrastructure.  As explained in sections 2 
and 3 of this chapter, capital expenditures are determined by various factors, but again we will 
assume that the basic determinant that drives the need for particular assigned functions is 
population (𝒩). 
  Furthermore, sub-national borrowing depends positively on sub-national borrowing 
capacity, including own-source revenues(𝒪ℛ), shared revenues (𝒮ℛ) and intergovernmental 
transfers(𝒯). These latter are the case to the extent that some of the transfer funds can be 
diverted to service outstanding debt. Own revenues and shared revenues are important 
determinants of borrowing, contributing to greater sub-national creditworthiness. Creditors 
generally look at the sub-national government’s ability to pay, which is demonstrated by the 
availability of these revenue sources. Improved credit ratings in turn reduce the cost of 
borrowing, thus leading to greater volume of borrowing.  
Furthermore, different types of intergovernmental transfers have different effects on 
borrowing capacity and borrowing behavior. Unconditional transfers (𝒯𝒰) are a significant 
determinant of borrowing capacity, given that, because the funds are not conditioned for any 
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specific use, the sub-national government can use them to service the outstanding debt. Hence, 
they may contribute to an improvement in creditworthiness, to a lowering of borrowing costs, 
and through that, to greater borrowing. However, given that these transfers are unconditional, 
they can be used to finance capital investments as well, reducing the demand for borrowing 
through that channel.  
Conditional transfers for capital purposes (𝒯𝒞𝒦) are provided by the central government 
for financing specific capital investments, leading through this channel to, other things equal, 
lower borrowing demand. However, in the case of matching transfers, they may induce an 
increase in borrowing. This positive effect of conditional transfers for capital purposes on 
borrowing depends on the proportion the sub-national government is supposed to co-finance the 
capital investments (𝓂). Furthermore, if conditional transfers for capital purposes exhibit 
fungibility effect (𝓍) greater than zero, sub-national governments may use “released” funds to 
pay the interest or the principal on outstanding debt, which reduces the level of indebtedness and, 
in turn, borrowing costs, possibly leading to new borrowing. However, these released funds may 
also be used to finance capital investments, then having a negative effect on borrowing. 
Therefore, the fungibility (𝓍) of conditional transfers for capital purposes may have either a 
positive effect on borrowing through the interest rate (𝓇) (which will be more extensively 
discussed below), or a negative effect (the direct effect on demand for borrowing). 
Finally, other conditional transfers (𝒯𝒞), by their nature, do not have a direct effect on 
borrowing since their purpose is not to finance capital investments. However, through fungibility 
these transfers may also affect borrowing indirectly. This holds even if these transfers are 
matching, implying that regardless of how large 𝑚 is, that would not affect borrowing demand. 
However, as in the case of conditional transfers for capital purposes, they may have an effect on 
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borrowing, depending on the fungibility of these transfers (𝓍). If the fungibility effect is greater 
than zero, then the released resources could be used for paying interest or debt principal, or even 
for financing capital investments. Hence, if they have the fungibility effect these transfers may 
well have an effect on borrowing. This effect would be either direct and negative, or indirect and 
positive (through reduced borrowing costs).   
Moreover, sub-national borrowing is a negative function of the interest rate (𝓇). The 
interest rate is the cost of each unit of borrowing and is negatively correlated with sub-national 
capacity to service debt. The greater is sub-national capacity to service debt, the greater is its 
creditworthiness, leading to a lower risk of default and a lower cost of borrowing. However, not 
all revenue components have an equal effect on interest rate. Sub-national capacity to service 
debt will depend on the revenue assignment and the transfer system, on the one hand, and the 
stability of alternative revenue sources, on the other. 
  In general, greater dependence on sources from the central government (𝒯) reduces sub-
national creditworthiness, especially when the transfers are subject to central government 
discretion, meaning they can be changed drastically from one year to another, depending on the 
pressures on the national budget. When sub-national budgets are highly dependent on transfers 
from the central government, especially when transfer arrangements are unstable, it is very 
difficult to predict their ability to repay debt. This uncertainty about future revenue levels 
translates into credit risk. The risk is even greater if sub-national authorities have limited power 
to raise taxes or fees at their own initiative.  
Furthermore, any sub-national government’s fiscal risk is increased due to debt spillovers 
from other sub-national governments. More precisely, one sub-national government’s inability to 
repay its debt affects others’ income through decreased credit ratings, and possibly lower 
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economic activity, which would worsen their fiscal situation and translate into worsen fiscal 
standings. Lower central government revenue is likely to cause a reduction in transfers to lower 
levels of government, which increases the probability that other sub-national governments will 
have difficulty meeting their debt obligations as well. Hence, an excessive increase in one sub-
national government’s debt, and even more its default, is likely to lead to a reduction in the 
creditworthiness of others and to increase their borrowing costs.  
However, as elaborated above, depending on the stability of the transfer arrangement (𝜏), 
that is, whether transfers are determined at the discretion of the central government, or by a 
defined formula, some types of transfers provide funds that are more or less subject to sub-
national discretion. These funds can be used to service outstanding debt, reducing its level and 
contributing positively to sub-national ability to issue new debt under favorable terms. As 
discussed above, this is especially the case with unconditional transfers (𝒯𝒰). Therefore, the 
stability of transfer arrangement (𝜏) and their structure are important factors affecting sub-
national borrowing interest rates through the transfer system. 
Moreover, different own revenue instruments themselves are not equally stable. If the 
sub-national government has the power to choose the instruments, that is, to decide which 
revenue categories to use, it can reduce the volatility of its own revenues without giving up long 
term growth in revenues. Therefore, through own revenues, the interest rate is a function of the 
level of own revenues itself (𝒪ℛ) and sub-national revenue autonomy (𝜌). With respect to the 
stability of revenues, although shared revenues (𝒮ℛ) are not sub-national own revenues, they 
may be stable sources when they are allocated by a formula that determines the share (𝜃) and is 
established in the law. In this case they may contribute to lower borrowing costs.  
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Furthermore, sub-national borrowing is subject to regulations and monitoring (𝜇). 
Different countries use different frameworks to keep sub-national borrowing under control, and 
often use more than just one type of framework to achieve this goal. These frameworks, which 
were reviewed in Chapter IV, range from direct controls by the central government to allowing 
sub-national governments to borrow in the private capital markets where financial market 
imposes conditions sub-national government are required to meet in order to be able to borrow 
under favorable terms. Regardless of which exact framework a country applies, they all have the 
purpose of preventing sub-national borrowing from endangering the macroeconomic stability of 
the country. Therefore, if borrowing is allowed at the sub-national level, regulations are intended 
to restrain it and hold it below the level that would happen if there are no restrictions whatsoever.  
Finally, besides ability to pay off debt, creditworthiness is defined by the sub-national 
fiscal balance (𝒮) and level of outstanding debt (𝒟) as well. A higher fiscal balance gives 
lenders a signal that the borrower is able to finance its spending from available revenue sources, 
reducing the risk of default and the borrowing cost (𝓇). On the other hand, a higher level of 
outstanding debt (𝒟)  negatively affects creditworthiness, suggesting a borrower’s tendency to 
overspend and increasing the default risk and the borrowing cost (𝓇). For simplicity, it is 
assumed that (𝒟) is a decreasing function of borrowing regulations (𝜇). 
Taking into account all the points from the previous discussion, the level of sub-national 
borrowing can be expressed as the following function: 
ℬ = 𝓏(𝜀, 𝒯𝒰 , 𝒯𝒞𝒦(𝓂, 𝓍), 𝒯𝒞(𝓍), 𝜇, 𝓇(𝒮, 𝒟, 𝒯𝒰 , 𝒯𝒦𝒞(𝓍), 𝒯𝒞(𝓍), 𝜏, 𝒪ℛ, 𝜃, 𝜌))                (5.18)  
with the following assumptions 
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𝒜7: 𝓏𝒯𝒰 ≤ 0; 𝓏𝒯𝒞𝒦 {
= 0, 𝑖𝑓𝓍 = 0𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑟⁄ 𝓂 = 0 
< 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝓍 > 0                              
> 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝓂 > 0                           
;  𝓏𝒯𝒞 {
= 0, 𝑖𝑓𝓍 = 0
< 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝓍 > 0
  
𝒜8: 𝓏𝓇 ≤ 0  
𝒜9: 𝓏𝜇 ≤ 0  
𝒜10: 𝓇𝒮 ≤ 0; 𝓇𝒟 ≥ 0; 𝓇𝒪ℛ ≤ 0  
𝒜11: 𝓇𝜌 ≤ 0; ; 𝓇𝜃 ≤ 0; 𝓇𝜏 ≤ 0  
𝒜12: 𝓇𝒯 ≥ 0; 𝓇𝒯𝒰 ≤ 0; (𝓇𝒯𝒞𝒦 , 𝓇𝒯𝒞) {
= 0, 𝑖𝑓𝓍 = 0
< 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝓍 > 0
  
𝒜13: 𝒟𝜇 ≤ 0  
Gross Regional Domestic Product Growth Rate 
The hypothesis this study attempts to prove proposes that if sub-national borrowing is 
numerically limited and allowed to be issued only for financing capital investments and sub-
national governments are provided with some measure of revenue autonomy, then the primary 
balance should remain sustainable. In other words, when borrowing is used only for productive 
purposes, it may contribute, through improved infrastructure, to a growth rate of gross regional 
domestic product and should not lead to an increase in the primary balance deficit that would 
lead to fiscal crises. However, if the growth rate of gross regional domestic product is a function 
of many factors other than just sub-national borrowing, and often those other factors may have a 
predominant effect. Hence, for the purpose of this analysis, the growth rate of gross regional 
domestic product (𝛾) is assumed to be exogenous and given.  
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DEBT LIMIT AND FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
The focus of this section is testing the main hypothesis of this study, that is, that sub-national 
borrowing, numerically limited and restricted to financing capital investments only, in addition 
to  providing a certain measure of revenue autonomy. It requires investigating the response of the 
debt limit (𝜙) in equation (5.11) to the dynamics in its components with respect to variables of 
interest, namely, revenue autonomy (𝜌) and borrowing regulations (𝜇).  
The debt limit (𝜙) represents the maximum level of current debt that the sub-national 
government can finance in fiscal crises, that is, with lowest possible realization of revenues and 
the credibly announced lowest expenditures. In order to be able to increase borrowing without 
risking a crisis, the sub-national government’s objective is to maximize the debt limit (𝜙). In 
other words, the sub-national government’s objective is that in case of a fiscal crisis, the lowest 
possible revenue collection and the credibly announced lowest expenditures are as high as 
possible. As already discussed, the debt limit (𝜙) may be increased in at least one of the 
following three ways, holding everything else constant: 
a) With more stable revenues, including more revenue autonomy (discretion over either 
choosing the revenue instruments, and/or bases and rates) and less dependence on 
financing from the central governments. Transfers, in particular, may provide a positive 
incentive to spending without generally stimulating revenue collections; 
b) With more flexibility to adjust expenditures; 
c) With higher output growth rates and lower real interest rates. 
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However, having in mind that  sub-national borrowing played a major role in some of the 
recent crises, it is very important to include sub-national borrowing regulation as one of the main 
factors that could prevent sub-national debt to exceed the debt limit (𝜙). 
After incorporating all necessary assumptions in equation (5.11), testing the main 
hypothesis of this study that sub-national borrowing, numerically limited sub-national borrowing 
that is restricted to finance capital investment, when sub-national governments are provided with 
a certain measure of revenue autonomy, requires investigating how the debt limit, presented with 
equation (5.19), changes with respect to variables of interest, namely, revenue autonomy (𝜌) 
and borrowing regulations (𝜇). 
𝜙 =
ℛ − 𝐸
𝓇 − 𝛾
=
𝓈 ((𝒻(⋅) + 𝓉(⋅) − ℎ(⋅)) , 𝜇)
𝓇(⋅) − 𝛾
                                                                        (5.19) 
where 
𝒻 = 𝒻(𝜌, 𝓉(⋅),𝓂, 𝓍)  
𝓉 = 𝓉(𝜀,𝒩, 𝜌)  
ℎ = ℎ(𝜀,𝒩, 𝓉(⋅),𝓂, 𝓍)  
𝓇 = 𝓇(𝓈(ℛ, 𝐸, 𝜇),𝒟(𝜇), 𝓉(⋅), 𝑥, 𝜏, 𝒻(⋅), 𝜃, 𝜌)  
and 
𝜌 ≡ Revenue autonomy; 
𝜀 ≡ Expenditure autonomy; 
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𝜃 ≡ Share of revenue kept by the sub-national government in the revenue-sharing scheme; 
𝜇 ≡ Borrowing regulation and monitoring; 
𝜏 ≡ Degree of government discretion in the transfer system; 
𝓂 ≡ Proportion of the cost with which the sub-national government “matches” a conditional 
intergovernmental transfer in financing particular purpose;  
𝓍 ≡ Fungibility of intergovernmental transfers; 
𝒩 ≡ Demand for public goods provision by the sub-national government, proxied by the 
population size 
𝒟 ≡ Level of outstanding debt 
Debt Limit Response to an Increase in Revenue Autonomy 
Investigating how the debt limit (𝜙) reacts to an increase in sub-national revenue autonomy 
requires finding the partial derivative of equation (5.19) with respect to revenue autonomy (𝜌), 
which results in the following expression 
𝜙𝜌 =
(𝓇 − 𝛾)(𝔄) − (ℛ − 𝐸)(𝔅)
(𝓇 − 𝛾)2
                                                                                        (5.20) 
where 
(𝔄) ≡ 𝑓𝜌 + 𝓉𝜌 + 𝑓𝒯𝒰𝓊𝜌 + 𝑓𝒯𝒞𝒦𝓋𝜌 + 𝑓𝒯𝒞𝓌𝜌 − ℎ𝒯𝓉𝜌 
(𝔅) ≡  𝓇𝒯𝒰𝓊𝜌 + 𝓇𝒯𝒞𝒦𝓋𝜌 + 𝓇𝒯𝒞𝓌𝜌 + 𝓇𝒪ℛ(𝔄) + 𝓇𝜌 
To determine the direction of the debt limit response to a change in revenue autonomy, we 
investigate the sign of the components in (5.20):  
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A. The response of primary budget balance to a change in revenue autonomy (𝔄):  
(𝔄) ≡ 𝑓𝜌 + 𝓉𝜌 + 𝑓𝒯𝒰𝓊𝜌 + 𝑓𝒯𝒞𝒦𝓋𝜌 + 𝑓𝒯𝒞𝓌𝜌 − ℎ𝒯𝓉𝜌 
From assumption 𝒜1 it implies that 𝑓𝜌 ≥ 0.  
Next, assumption 𝒜2 implies that 𝑓𝒯𝒰 ⋚ 0, which means that the effect of the 
unconditional transfers on own-revenue collection depends on the type of unconditional 
transfers. Some unconditional transfers may have a disincentive effect on sub-national revenue 
effort and through it on revenue collection because they can easily be used for rebates to the 
taxpayers through reduced taxes. However, if the unconditional transfers are allocated based on a 
formula that, among other factors, includes sub-national revenue effort, then the unconditional 
transfers may in fact have positive effect on own-revenue collection. Furthermore, based on the 
assumption 𝒜3, 𝓊𝜌 ⋚ 0. As already discussed, greater revenue autonomy given to sub-national 
governments may lead to an increase in unconditional transfers due to potential greater regional 
disparities. Moreover, unconditional transfers may increase as a result of greater revenue 
autonomy when they are designed to reward those sub-national governments with a higher 
revenue effort. However, greater revenue effort may reduce unconditional transfers if they are 
mostly discretionary and made to sub-national government to bail them out in case of their 
insolvency. Hence, 𝑓𝒯𝒰𝓊𝜌 ⋚ 0, depending on whether sub-national governments are “rewarded” 
or not for their greater revenue efforts through unconditional transfers.  
Furthermore, according to the same assumptions, greater sub-national revenue autonomy 
is expected to reduce the share of conditional transfers in total, i.e., 𝓋𝜌 ≤ 0 and 𝓌𝜌 ≤ 0. On the 
other hand, the signs of terms  𝑓𝒯𝒞𝒦  and 𝑓𝒯𝒞  depend on  
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- whether the transfers are matching. If yes (𝑚 > 0),  both terms may be positive, whereas if 
not (𝑚 = 0), both terms may be negative; and 
- whether the transfers have the fungibility effect. If yes (𝑥 > 0), then 𝑓𝒯𝒞𝒦  and/or  𝑓𝒯𝒞  may 
likely be negative, whereas if not (𝑥 = 0), they would be equal to zero. 
This implies that if the conditional transfers are mostly matching and have low or no fungibility, 
terms 𝑓𝒯𝒞𝒦  and 𝑓𝒯𝒞  are likely to be positive, implying 𝑓𝒯𝒞𝒦𝓋𝜌 ≤ 0 and 𝑓𝒯𝒞𝓌𝜌 ≤ 0. 
Next, greater revenue autonomy given to the sub-national governments should reduce 
their dependence on financing from the central government budget. This may be even more the 
case if the majority of transfers are those that exacerbate a soft budget constraint. However, if a 
significant share of transfers consists of unconditional transfers that are allocated by a formula 
that takes into account sub-national revenue effort, then greater revenue autonomy may also 
increase regional disparities, leading to greater need for unconditional transfers. Depending on 
the change of unconditional transfers, and assuming no change in conditional transfers, total 
transfers may increase or not change. Hence, the final effect is ambiguous. That is, 𝓉𝜌 ⋚
0 (Assumption 𝒜3).  
Finally, the sign of term ℎ𝒯𝓉𝜌 depends on the transfer structure as well. Firstly, as just 
discussed,  𝓉𝜌 ⋚ 0.  Next, if increased revenue autonomy would cause a change in the transfer 
structure, the sign of the term ℎ𝒯 would mostly depend on this change. As already discussed, 
unconditional transfers have the least pronounced “flypaper effect”. If greater revenue autonomy 
causes the transfer structure to change in a way that the unconditional transfers allocated by a 
predetermined formula become more common, as opposed to other types of transfers, then  ℎ𝒯is 
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either equal to zero or positive but sufficiently small. Hence, the sign of ℎ𝒯𝓉𝜌 mostly depends on 
a change in the transfer structure.  
To conclude, the response of the primary budget balance to a change in sub-national 
revenue autonomy depends primarily on the effect of revenue autonomy on the change in the 
transfer structure. If transfers are designed in a way that they promote sub-national revenue effort 
and do not have the “flypaper effect”, then the response in primary budget balances to a change 
in revenue autonomy should be positive. Unconditional transfers at the same time have the 
smallest “flypaper effect” and, if allocated by a predetermined formula that “rewards” greater 
revenue effort, may increase the revenue effort. Conditional matching grants may have positive 
effect on revenue effort as well, especially if 𝑚 is large.  
(𝔄) ≡ 𝑓𝜌 + 𝓉𝜌 + 𝑓𝒯𝒰𝓊𝜌 + 𝑓𝒯𝒞𝒦𝓋𝜌 + 𝑓𝒯𝒞𝓌𝜌 − ℎ𝒯𝓉𝜌 ⋚ 0 
B. Response of the gross interest rate to a change in the sub-national revenue 
autonomy (𝔅): 
(𝔅) ≡  𝓇𝒯𝒰𝓊𝜌 + 𝓇𝒯𝒞𝒦𝓋𝜌 + 𝓇𝒯𝒞𝓌𝜌 + 𝓇𝒪ℛ(𝔄) + 𝓇𝜌 
As already discussed above, 𝓊𝜌 ⋚ 0, 𝓋𝜌 ≤ 0 and 𝓌𝜌 ≤ 0.  
Next, assumption 𝒜12 implies that 𝓇𝒯𝒰 ≤ 0. Moreover, the terms 𝓇𝒯𝒞𝒦  and 𝓇𝒯𝒞  are 
either negative (if there is some fungibility effect), or are equal to zero (if there is no fungibility 
effect). Hence, 𝓇𝒯𝒞𝒦𝓋𝜌 ≥ 0 and 𝓇𝒯𝒞𝓌𝜌 ≥ 0. Furthermore, assumptions 𝒜10 and 𝒜11 imply 
𝓇𝜌 ≤ 0 and 𝓇𝒪ℛ ≤ 0.  
Therefore, as in case of the primary balance, a change in the gross interest rate with 
respect to revenue autonomy depends on the transfer structure. If the transfers are designed to 
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increase sub-national incentives for higher revenue effort, then the gross interest rate is expected 
to be reduced with more sub-national revenue autonomy, that is  
(𝔅) ≡  𝓇𝒯𝒰𝓊𝜌 + 𝓇𝒯𝒞𝒦𝓋𝜌 + 𝓇𝒯𝒞𝓌𝜌 + 𝓇𝒪ℛ(𝔄) + 𝓇𝜌 ≤ 0 
C. The response in the output growth rate to a change in the sub-national revenue autonomy 
(ℭ): 
(ℭ) ≡  𝛾ℬ(𝓏𝒯𝒰𝓊𝜌 + 𝓏𝒯𝒞𝒦𝓋𝜌 + 𝓏𝒯𝒞𝓌𝜌 + 𝓏𝓇(𝔅)) 
Summarizing the results obtained for (𝔄) and (𝔅), and assuming that the sub-national 
government runs a primary surplus, (ℛ − 𝐸) > 0 (i.e., borrowing is not allowed for deficit 
financing), and convergence condition is satisfied, (𝓇 − 𝛾) > 0, it can be concluded that 
𝜙𝜌 ≥ 0   (5.20′) 
In other words,  
 The fiscally sustainable debt limit increases with more revenue autonomy if the transfer 
structure gives more incentive to higher revenue effort. This suggests that the transfer structure 
in which unconditional transfer allocated by a predetermined formula that rewards revenue 
effort, and matching conditional transfers with significantly large (𝑚) may be preferable over 
other transfers.   
Debt Limit Response to a Change in Borrowing Regulations 
Investigating the effect of borrowing regulations on the sustainable debt limit requires 
calculating the partial derivative of equation (5.19) with respect to 𝜇, resulting in the following 
expression: 
𝜙𝜇 =
𝒮𝜇(𝓇 − 𝛾) − (ℛ − 𝐸)( 𝓇𝒮𝒮𝜇 + 𝓇𝒟𝒟𝜇)
(𝓇 − 𝛾)2
                                                                (5.21) 
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Following assumption 𝒜6, 𝒮𝜇 ≥ 0, this component represents the effect of regulations 
based on the fiscal rules that “target” budget balance and its components, including the revenue 
rules, expenditure rules, deficit rules, and the “golden rule”.30  
Next, components  𝓇𝒮𝒮𝜇 and 𝓇𝒟𝒟𝜇 represent the effect of regulations by the financial 
markets and fiscal rules, but affecting primary balance through the cost of borrowing. In other 
words, fiscal rules, including the revenue rules, expenditure rules, deficit rules, the “golden rule”, 
and the limit on debt affect sub-national government creditworthiness and credit ratings and, 
through borrowing costs, fiscal performance. According to assumptions 𝒜6, 𝒜10, and 𝒜13,  
 𝓇𝒮𝒮𝜇 ≤ 0 and 𝓇𝒟𝒟𝜇 ≤ 0. 
It can, therefore be concluded that 
𝜙𝜇  ≥ 0    (5.21′) 
In other words, assuming that the convergence condition is satisfied, (𝓇 − 𝛾) > 0, and 
assuming that the sub-national government runs a primary surplus, (ℛ − 𝐸) > 0 (i.e., borrowing 
is not allowed for deficit financing), 
 The fiscally sustainable debt limit increases with borrowing regulations which target 
fiscal performance, sub-national creditworthiness, and borrowing cost (e.g., fiscal rules and 
market-based regulations).  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter investigated how fiscally sustainable debt limits change with higher revenue 
autonomy given to sub-national governments and with different types of sub-national borrowing 
                                                          
30 According to the “golden rule”, current spending can only be financed with current revenues. Hence, over the 
cycle, the current budget (i.e.,, net of investment) must balance or be brought into surplus.  
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regulations. Fiscally sustainable debt limits result from the lifetime budget constraint and 
represents the maximum level of debt a sub-national government can finance from its revenues. 
In other words, fiscal policy is considered sustainable if the present value of future primary 
balances equals the current level of debt. This limit is assumed to be higher with more revenue 
and expenditure autonomy, lower interest rate (resulting from better sub-national 
creditworthiness) and higher output growth rate (as a result of the productive use of borrowing).  
Results obtained in this chapter provide support to the hypothesis that regulated sub-
national borrowing with more revenue autonomy, when borrowing can be issued only to finance 
capital investments (i.e., the “golden rule”) should not endanger fiscal sustainability. More 
precisely, the following two conclusions are made with respect to the effect of sub-national 
revenue autonomy and borrowing regulations on sustainable debt limits. 
1. Higher revenue autonomy has a positive effect on the fiscally sustainable debt limit if 
sub-national governments rely more on transfers that promote sub-national revenue 
effort; and  
2. Sub-national borrowing regulations that focus on improving creditworthiness and 
reducing borrowing costs through improving fiscal performance, including the “golden 
rule”, have an increasing effect on fiscally sustainable debt limit.  
These results suggest that both sub-national financing and borrowing regulations should 
be designed in a way to give incentives to sub-national governments to be fiscally responsible. 
On the one hand, more reliance on own-source revenues and more autonomy over these sources, 
and, on the other, less reliance on transfers, especially those that reduce sub-national revenue 
efforts and increase spending, improve fiscal performance. Furthermore, sub-national borrowing 
regulations that primarily affect fiscal responsibility rather than focusing on limiting borrowing 
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either through the ceilings or approvals, positively affect fiscal sustainability. The latter 
conclusion suggests that regulations based on fiscal rules and market base regulations should be 
the most efficient types of regulations, while the administrative regulation is the least. As 
described in the previous chapter, the cooperative type of regulation includes many components 
of the other three types, and if it is properly implemented, it should show their best 
characteristics. In other words, if cooperatively made decisions about borrowing issuance are not 
made based on discretion but on rules, they should be as efficient as fiscal rules. 
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VI. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This chapter empirically tests the hypotheses set out in chapter V. It evaluates the determinants 
of choosing particular forms of sub-national borrowing regulations and tests whether sub-
national borrowing affects a country’s fiscal performance. Of particular interest is whether sub-
national borrowing restricted to financing capital investments and supported by a higher level of 
sub-national revenue autonomy has a significant positive effect on national fiscal sustainability. 
From a policy viewpoint, this is the most advisable policy to follow. The question is whether it 
makes a difference in the real world.  
This chapter is organized as follows. First, we explain the design of sub-national 
borrowing regulation variables. Second, we describe the methodologies for testing the effects of 
sub-national borrowing regulation on fiscal sustainability and for evaluating the determinants of 
sub-national borrowing regulation, and discuss dependent and independent variables. Third, we 
present and discuss results of the analyses of the determinants and of the effects of regulations. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the results. 
SUB-NATIONAL BORROWING REGULATIONS 
The analysis in this chapter is based on data for 57 developed, developing and transition 
countries, between 1990 and 2008. The data on the main variables of interest, sub-national 
borrowing regulations, are based on information collected by the author from various sources, 
such as laws, country reports, and individual country or regional studies.31 This information 
considers whether borrowing is allowed at the sub-national level, and if so, how it is regulated 
and controlled.  
                                                          
31 See the Appendix for details for sources by country. 
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Countries usually implement a combination of different types of regulations in an attempt 
to control sub-national borrowing and improve sub-national creditworthiness. For the purpose of 
this study, information about sub-national borrowing regulation that has been implemented refers 
to the dominant regulation in a particular country and year. Based on this information, countries 
are classified into the following six broad categories, with the following basic criteria: 
1. Prohibited: Sub-national governments are not allowed to borrow in private capital 
markets; 
2. Administrative: Each borrowing issuance requires an approval from the central 
government authority; 
3. Cooperative: A decision on each borrowing issuance is cooperatively made by members 
of a body (e.g., a council, committee) that consists of representatives of all government 
units; 
4. Centrally-imposed rules: Regulation is based on fiscal rules (e.g., deficit targets, 
maximum expenditure rules, or rules related to debt payment capacity) imposed by the 
central government that are clearly specified in the constitution or organic laws; 
5. Self-imposed rules: Sub-national borrowing is regulated by fiscal rules that sub-national 
governments imposed on themselves to improve their creditworthiness;  
6. Market-based: Only financial markets regulate borrowing at the sub-national level. 
Besides the six categories described above, the following three qualitative indicators of 
sub-national borrowing regulations are observed separately: 
1. Restricting sub-national borrowing for solely financing capital investments (i.e., the 
“golden rule”); 
2. Imposing ceilings on debt or total borrowing; 
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3. Ability to borrow in foreign capital markets. This indicator consists of two categories: a) 
not allowed to borrow in the foreign market; b) allowed to borrow with or without an 
approval from the central government authority. 
Therefore, if ceilings on debt or total borrowing and/or the “golden rule” are the only 
fiscal rules that regulate sub-national borrowing, then regulation was classified as marked based. 
Moreover, because the effectiveness of fiscal rules significantly depends on legal sanctions for 
non-compliance, this indicator is observed as well. Countries implement three types of legal 
sanctions for non-compliance, namely administrative, political and financial sanctions. However, 
for the purpose of this study, we do not separately identify the types of sanctions. 
Table 1. Sub-National Borrowing Regulations, Sample Structure1 
 
Number of 
observations 
% of Total 
Number of 
Countries 
Prohibited 143 18% 16 
Administrative 154 19% 17 
Cooperative 116 14% 7 
Centrally-imposed rules 190 23% 19 
Self-imposed rules 45 6% 3 
Market-based 159 20% 11 
Total 807 100% 732 
    
The "golden rule" 356 44% 28 
Limit on debt or borrowing 427 53% 37 
Foreign: allowed 219 27% 13 
Foreign: with approval 257 32% 23 
1 Period: 1990-2008, 57 countries,  data based on an unbalanced panel 
   2 Does not add up to 57 because some countries changed dominant borrowing regulation during the sample period 
 
Table 1 presents our sample structure in terms of sub-national borrowing regulation, 
based on an unbalanced sample of 57 countries, during the period 1990-2008. As can be 
observed, there were 16 changes of dominant sub-national borrowing regulations during the 
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observation period.32 Furthermore, 28 countries in the sample restricted borrowing for financing 
only capital investments at some point during the observation period, while 37 countries imposed 
limits on debt and borrowing. 
METHODOLOGY 
Effect of Sub-National Borrowing On Fiscal Sustainability 
As discussed in chapter V, fiscal sustainability has become one of the most widely used terms in 
the assessment of fiscal policy. However, what fiscal sustainability actually means is hardly ever 
explained. For the purpose of this study, fiscal sustainability is defined in the following way - 
fiscal policy is called sustainable if the present value of future primary balances equals the 
current level of debt. If this condition is met, the government avoids excessive debt 
accumulation, and is able to roll over its debt and there is no risk of insolvency (Burnside, 2005).  
In order to estimate the effects of sub-national borrowing and regulations on fiscal 
sustainability, we evaluate the relationship between sub-national outstanding debt and borrowing 
regulations, on the one hand, and the primary fiscal balance, on the other hand. The primary 
balance is observed at both general and sub-national government levels. The reason for choosing 
the general government primary balance is the following. When the central government faces 
sub-national fiscal imbalances, it can react in one of the following three ways. First, the central 
government can decide to cover the sub-national fiscal imbalances (i.e., a bailout). Second, it can 
re-design the tax and/or transfer system through which the sub-national government would 
receive a larger portion of the overall revenues collected. Finally, the central government can 
ignore the sub-national fiscal imbalances. Regardless of which option the central government 
will choose, the overall national fiscal balance is likely to deteriorate. However, to obtain a better 
                                                          
32 Note that 15 countries have changed regime once, and one (Bulgaria) has changed it twice. See the Appendix for 
more details on changes in regulations. 
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picture about which of these three scenarios is more likely to take place, the same model will be 
estimated with the sub-national primary balance as the dependent variable. By doing so, we will 
be able to investigate whether sub-national and general government policies are coordinated and 
whether there is a difference in the effectiveness of the sub-national borrowing regulations in the 
sub-national and the general government framework. In addition, the analysis with the sub-
national primary balance as the dependent variable will serve as a robustness check of our 
results. 
Regardless of whether the general or sub-national government primary balance is 
observed, it is almost certain that the current period primary balance depends on its level(s) in 
the previous year(s), and a set of variables representing the supply and demand for borrowing, as 
well as the institutional setup in the country. Therefore, the objective model to be tested has the 
following form: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑅𝑚,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑅𝑓,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                    (6.1) 
In equation (6.1), 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents the ratio of the primary fiscal balance to GDP in country 
𝑖 in year 𝑡,  𝑖 = 1,…𝑛, 𝑡 = 1,…𝑇,  while 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 represents its value in year 𝑡 − 1. Next, 𝐵𝑖𝑡 
represents the level of outstanding debt at the sub-national level in country 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 𝑅𝑚,𝑖𝑡 
represents a vector of dummy variables representing six broad types of regulation of sub-national 
borrowing in county 𝑖 in year 𝑡, (𝑚 = 1,…6). Vector 𝑅𝑓,𝑖𝑡 includes dummy variables 
representing the presence of the “golden rule”, limits on sub-national borrowing, allowing 
borrowing in the foreign market, and the existence of sanctions for non-compliance, 
(𝑓 = 1,… ,4). Furthermore, 𝐹𝑖𝑡 represents a vector of measures of fiscal decentralization, 
including the share of intergovernmental transfers in total sub-national revenues, a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the transfer allocation is based on a “stable” formula, the share 
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of sub-national expenditures in total general government expenditures, and a dummy that takes a 
value of 1 if the sub-national authority is able to set and/or change rates for income, business or 
consumption taxes. Next, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents a vector of other control variables generally thought to 
affect primary fiscal balances, including: urbanization, population growth, age dependency, 
government stability, government fractionalization, corruption index, central bank independence, 
bailout history, GDP per capita, inflation rate, and the central government budget balance (for 
the sub-national government regressions). Finally, 𝜐𝑖 stands for unobserved country fixed effects. 
A discussion of the variables of interest and control variables is provided in the following section 
of this chapter. 
However, first we need to address several econometric problems that may arise while 
estimating equation (6.1):   
1. The borrowing regulation variables in 𝑅𝑚,𝑖𝑡 are assumed to be endogenous. This is 
because causality may run in both directions – from the primary balance to the decision 
how to regulate borrowing and vice versa – these regressors may be correlated with the 
error term; 
2. Time-invariant country characteristics (fixed effects), such as geography and 
demographics, may be correlated with the explanatory variables. The fixed effects are 
contained in the error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡  in equation (6.1), which consists of the unobserved 
country-specific effects, 𝜈𝑖, and the observation-specific errors, 𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜈𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡; 
3. The presence of the lagged dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is likely to give rise to 
autocorrelation; 
4. The panel dataset has a short time dimension (T =19) and a larger country dimension 
(N=57). This causes a potential problem because when the time dimension is short, the 
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correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error term, and hence the dynamic 
panel bias, may be significant. In this case, applying a straightforward fixed effects 
estimator is not appropriate (Roodman, 2006).  
The endogeneity problem (problem 1) arises due to a concern that there may be a reverse 
causality issue between the sub-national primary balance, and through it, the general government 
primary balance, and the choice of sub-national borrowing regulations. Countries with less 
disciplined sub-national governments may choose stricter regulations, while countries with more 
disciplined sub-national governments may rely more on market-based regulations. This problem 
is partly alleviated by the fact that most countries chose sub-national borrowing regulations 
before the observed period in this study, suggesting that the average sub-national fiscal balance 
could not directly affect the choice. However, because current average sub-national fiscal 
balances tend to correlate with past averages, the endogeneity concern still exists. 
To address problem 1, one would usually choose an instrumental variables approach. 
However, because the potentially endogenous variables in 𝑅𝑚,𝑖𝑡 are a set of mutually exclusive 
dummy variables, the first stage in the instrumental variable regression is modified to incorporate 
a multinomial logit model instead of the usual linear regression. The multinomial logit 
methodology, which allows estimating probabilities with which a country chooses a particular 
type of regulation, is discussed in section 6.2.2 below.  
To address the problems 2, 3, and 4, we will use the GMM estimator (Arellano & Bond, 
1991), which was first proposed by (Holtz-Eakin, Newey, & Rosen, 1988). The difference GMM 
estimator uses first differences to transform equation (6.1) into  
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽Δ𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾∆𝑅𝑚,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃∆𝑅𝑓,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑Δ𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡 + Δυ𝑖 + Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡          (6.2) 
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Because fixed country-specific effects do not vary over time, they disappear by this 
transformation, solving problem (2). That is,   
Δ𝑢𝑖𝑡 = Δ𝜈𝑖 + Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                       (6.3) 
or 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝜈𝑖 − 𝜈𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1                                                                                         (6.3′)                            
𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1                                                                                                            (6.4) 
Next, the autocorrelation (problem 3) is addressed by “instrumenting” first-differenced 
lagged dependent variable with its past levels. However, when series are very persistent, lagged 
levels are weak instruments for first differences (Blundell & Bond, 1998). According to Arellano 
and Bover (1995), efficiency can be increased by adding the original equation in levels to the 
system. If the first differences in the explanatory variables are not correlated with the individual 
effects, lagged values of the first differences can then be used as instruments in the equation in 
levels. Lagged differences of the dependent variable may also be valid instruments for the level 
equation.   
Following the above considerations, Blundell and Bond’s (1998) methodology is applied 
and equation (6.1) is estimated using the “system” GMM estimator. The system GMM estimator 
uses the level equations to obtain a system of two equations – one differenced and one in levels. 
This additional equation enables additional instruments to be obtained. Therefore, variables in 
the level equations are instrumented with their own first difference, which tends to increase 
efficiency (Roodman, 2006). In order to satisfy the assumption of no correlation across 
individuals in the idiosyncratic disturbances, it is important to include time dummies into the 
regression, which makes this assumption more likely to hold (Roodman, 2006).  
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Finally, the Arellano – Bond estimator is designed for small-T large-N panels (problem 
4). In large-T panels, a shock to the country-specific fixed effect, which appears in the error 
term, declines with time. Similarly, the correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the 
error term is insignificant (Roodman, 2006). On the other hand, if N is small, the cluster-robust 
standard errors and the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test may be unreliable. In these cases, one 
does not necessarily have to use the Arellano – Bond estimator. 
Furthermore, in evaluating the effect of sub-national government debt and borrowing 
regulations on fiscal sustainability, duration analysis is applied to estimate the marginal effects 
on duration of fiscally sustainable primary balances. This methodology allows evaluation of by 
how much would the median duration of fiscally sustainable primary balance change as a result 
of changes in the independent variables.  
Two alternative approaches can be followed to assess the determinants of fiscal 
sustainability using duration analysis; namely, the gradient and the level approach (Adam & 
Bevan, 2003). Under the gradient approach, fiscal adjustment ends when a country fails to keep 
reducing the deficit by a certain threshold amount each year.  Under the level approach, the end 
of a fiscal consolidation episode is reached when the deficit is above a certain deficit threshold. 
In this study the level approach is employed, with two alternative thresholds used for defining 
fiscal consolidation; namely, 
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐺𝐷𝑃 ≥  0 %  and  𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐺𝐷𝑃 ≥  −3 %.  
Furthermore, based on the primary balance to GDP ratio, a dummy variable called 
“Failure” is generated, which takes the value zero when the primary balance to GDP is greater or 
equal to the predetermined threshold (i.e., years of fiscal consolidation), and takes the value one 
when is lower than the threshold (i.e., years of fiscal expansion). Using the dates in which failure 
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event occurs, a new variable called “Duration” is built, which counts the intervening years 
between consecutive failures (the time span that fiscal consolidation lasts). In the sample used in 
this study, the minimum number of years that a consolidation lasts is one year, and the maximum 
is nineteen years.  
Table A.5 presents the descriptive statistics for failure and duration by threshold. As the 
table shows, the number of failures under the “stronger” definition of the threshold 
(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐺𝐷𝑃 ≥  0 %) is larger than under the -3 percent threshold. Furthermore, 
under the “stronger” definition, the average probability of ending the fiscal consolidation is 
higher (20 versus 6.7 percent for general government, and 23.9 versus 8.1 percent for sub-
national primary balance). Moreover, the average duration is lower for the zero than for the -3 
percent threshold (5.4 versus 7.2 years for both general and sub-national primary balance). 
When using duration analysis, non-parametric and parametric analysis can be applied. 
Non-parametric analysis basically investigates whether fiscal consolidation is positively or 
negatively dependent on their accumulated duration. This is typically done by estimating the two 
following functions  
1. The survivor function gives the probability that the duration of the fiscal consolidation33  
(T) is greater or  equal to t, and is defined as 
𝑆(𝑡) = Pr(𝑇 ≥ 𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡)                                                                                                  (6.5) 
2. The hazard function gives, for each duration, the probability of ending a consolidation 
episode, conditioned on the duration of the consolidation through that moment; is defined 
as 
                                                          
33 T is the discrete random variable that measures the time that passes between the beginning of a fiscal 
consolidation and its transition to a non-consolidation period. 
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ℎ(𝑡) = Pr(𝑇 = 𝑡 𝑇⁄ ≥ 𝑡)                                                                                                          (6.6)            
However, non-parametric analysis does not allow the analysis of other factors other than 
the accumulated duration (that may explain the probability of ending fiscal consolidations). To 
address this issue, a Model of Proportional Hazard (PH) is estimated, which assumes that the 
hazard function can be split as follows: 
ℎ(𝑡, 𝑋) = ℎ0(𝑡) ∙ 𝑔(𝒲)                                                                                                             (6.7) 
where ℎ0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard that captures the dependency of data to duration, while 𝑔(𝒲) 
is a function of individual variables. This function of explanatory variables is a negative 
function, usually defined as 𝑔(𝒲) = exp (𝒲 ′𝛽), so the model has the following form: 
ℎ(𝑡, 𝑋) = ℎ0(𝑡) ∙ exp(𝒲
′𝛽)                                                                                                     (6.8)          
This model can be estimated initially without imposing any specific functional form on 
the baseline hazard function, following the Cox Model. An alternative estimation can be done by 
imposing one specific parametric form to the function ℎ0(𝑡). In this case, the models most 
commonly used are the Weibull Model and the Exponential Model. In the Weibull Model, 
ℎ0(𝑡) = 𝑝𝑡
𝑝−1, where 𝑝 is a parameter that has to be estimated. When p = 1, the Weibull Model 
is equal to the Exponential Model, where there exists no dependency on duration. On the other 
hand, when the parameter p > 1, there exists a positive dependency on duration, and a negative 
dependency when p < 1. Therefore, by estimating p it is possible to test the hypotheses of 
duration dependency of fiscal consolidations. 
The case examined in this study is a case of multiple failure-time data where more than 
one failure occurs for the same subject (country), causing failure-times to be correlated within 
cluster (country). This violates the independence of failure-times assumption required in 
traditional duration analysis. If more than one spell is observed for a country, it is realistic to 
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assume that these spells are not independent. Thus, the likelihood function based on model (6.6) 
is misspecified for multiple spells since it does not account for intra-country correlation of the 
spells observed on the same country.  
Following Lin and Wei (1989), it is necessary and sufficient to modify only the variance-
covariance matrix of the estimators since the correlated durations affect the variance while the 
model parameters can be estimated consistently without accounting for this correlation. This 
implies that parameters of the model can be estimated by treating spells as independent. The 
obtained variance and covariance estimates can be then modified to account for the dependences. 
More precisely, given that the estimated variance-covariance matrix obtained as the inverse of 
the information matrix does not take into account the additional correlation in the data, (Lin & 
Wei, 1989) propose a modification of the following form: 
𝑉 = 𝐼−1(?̂?)𝐺 ′(?̂?)𝐺(?̂?)𝐼−1(?̂?)                                                                                                 (6.9)           
where 𝐺(?̂?) is a 𝑚 × 𝑝 matrix of the group efficient score residuals (𝑚 is the number of clusters 
(𝐺1, 𝐺2, … , 𝐺𝑚), while 𝑝 is the number of time-dependent covariates).  
The variables included in matrix 𝒲 in equation (6.8) are: the number of previous 
failures; the initial budget balance; the size of the fiscal adjustment; and all variables used to 
estimate equation (6.1), excluding lagged value of the primary balance. 
Sub-national Borrowing and Fiscal Sustainability: Variables 
This section provides a discussion on variables used to estimate equations (6.1) and (6.8). The 
description of variables is provided in Table A.2 while in this section we discuss on their 
expected effect on fiscal performance and fiscal sustainability. All variables used for estimating 
both equations (6.1) and (6.8) are divided in four groups; namely, sub-national borrowing and 
regulations, fiscal decentralization, the demand for borrowing, and institutional, political and 
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macroeconomic variables. In addition, three more variables are used for estimating equation 
(6.8); namely,  number of previous failures, initial budget balance, and size of the fiscal 
adjustment, which will be discussed more below.  
 Sub-national Borrowing and Regulations: 
Sub-national outstanding debt may have both positive and negative effects on the fiscal 
balance. On the one hand, borrowing in private credit markets requires borrower’s 
creditworthiness for better terms of borrowing (i.e., lower interest rate). Therefore, there may be 
a positive relationship between debt and fiscal balance, due to sub-national governments’ attempt 
to improve their fiscal performance for reducing their cost of borrowing. Furthermore, if past 
debt was issued for productive purposes, high outstanding debt today may be positively 
correlated with higher current revenue collection from investment projects financed by the debt. 
Third, if borrowing is not prohibited through refinancing, debt can be issued for financing debt, 
reducing the budget deficit. On the other hand, higher debt may be correlated with higher 
spending, leading to a higher budget deficit. Hence, the effect of sub-national debt on fiscal 
balance is ambiguous.  
Previously described broad types of sub-national borrowing regulations differ from 
each other with respect to the level of borrowing autonomy that sub-national governments have, 
administrative being the most centralized34 and market-based regulations the most decentralized. 
No one level of borrowing autonomy is appropriate for all cases, but rather it depends on the 
particular circumstances of the country. Hence, one cannot make any certain predictions about 
which one among broad types of regulations is more efficient in regulating the effect of sub-
national borrowing on fiscal performance.  
                                                          
34 Not including prohibited borrowing at the sub-national level. 
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The “golden rule” is expected to have a positive effect on the primary fiscal balance 
through more than one channel. First, prohibiting borrowing for financing current fiscal deficits 
positively affects sub-national fiscal responsibility. Second, borrowing for capital investments 
potentially has a positive effect on increasing the sub-national revenue base in the long run and, 
through it, potentially higher revenue collection. Economic growth theory emphasizes the 
importance of capital accumulation in the attainment of economic growth. The higher the stock 
of capital the higher the level of the economic output will be in the long-run. Governments invest 
in physical infrastructure in order to increase the productive capacity of the economy. 
Government spending on public infrastructure reduces transactions cost for businesses and 
signals commitment of the government to ensure profitability for prospective investors. 
Therefore, a positive relationship between borrowing for investment financing and fiscal 
discipline is expected.  
Imposing limits on debt and borrowing is expected to reduce the probability of over-
spending and may have a positive effect on the fiscal balance. Limits on the level of debt and 
debt servicing capacity are important because even if borrowing is issued only to finance capital 
investments.  Excessive debt can endanger fiscal sustainability because the debt service would 
overburden current expenditures, having long-term consequences on sub-national credit ratings. 
For example, in the 1840s, eight American states defaulted on their debts and they still continued 
paying a premium in the 1990s (English, 1996). 
Borrowing in the foreign market: If borrowing is largely domestic, this may lead to 
lower investment because of less loanable funds available, and thus, to lower output and 
consumption in the long-run (Stiglitz, 2000). However, central governments often use the 
following arguments in favor of prohibiting external borrowing. First, allowing the sub-national 
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governments to individually access the international capital markets may be less efficient and 
may result in less favorable borrowing terms than when it is coordinated by the center. Second, 
there is always the possibility of a spillover effect in which the default of any one sub-national 
government would affect the creditworthiness and risk rating of others as well as of the central 
government. Third, international lenders usually require a central government guarantee (Giugale 
et al., 2000) 
Sanctions for non-compliance: The existence of either fiscal rules in general or rules as 
to the purpose of borrowing, does not necessarily have to be efficient if there are no legal 
sanctions for debtors’ non-compliance. 
 Fiscal Decentralization: 
The literature on fiscal decentralization does not provide conclusive evidence on its effect 
on fiscal performance. On the one hand, Shah (2005) finds that fiscal decentralization is 
associated with improved fiscal performance and better functioning of the internal common 
market. Fiscal decentralization may also promote price stability, especially in higher-income 
countries (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 2006). On the other hand, Prud'homme (1995) argues 
that one of the dangers of decentralization is that it makes macroeconomic stabilization programs 
more difficult to implement because sub-national government fiscal policies can run counter to 
national policies.  Fiscal decentralization can, therefore, lead to worse fiscal outcomes. Similarly, 
Plekhanov and Singh (2007) indicate that it may also reflect the central government’s attempt to 
shift part of the fiscal burden onto sub-national governments. Hence, the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on fiscal balance is ambiguous.  
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Intergovernmental transfers (IGT):  The literature provides evidence that more 
dependence on financing from the central government is positively correlated with sub-national 
fiscal indiscipline and higher spending (e.g., de Mello, 2000)  
Transfer formula: The greater predictability of unconditional transfers may affect the 
cost of borrowing through more than one channel. First, unconditional transfers can be used to 
pay debt installments or interest, reducing the level of outstanding debt and likely positively 
affecting terms for new debt issuance. Second, predictable revenues suggest that the borrower 
will be better able to repay debt, which is very important to lenders and may reduce the cost of 
borrowing through lower interest rates on new debt issuance. 
Tax autonomy:  It is expected that sub-national governments with more tax autonomy are 
better able to optimize their revenues to their expenditure needs and avoid jeopardizing their 
fiscal balance. Moreover, sub-national governments can use their discretionary tax autonomy to 
pay their debts. This variable is, therefore, expected to be positively correlated with fiscal 
performance. 
Sub-national government expenditures contribute to an increase in overall government 
expenditures, ceteris paribus. However, decentralization of spending increases efficiency because 
local governments have better local information and hence can better match policies with the 
preferences of citizens, which may lead to a reduction in expenditures (Samuelson, 1954; Oates, 
1972, 1993). Moreover, taxpayers are more willing to cooperate with accountable local 
governments, leading to larger revenue collection (Wasylenko, 1987). According to the latter 
two arguments, one would expect a positive effect of expenditure decentralization on overall 
fiscal balance. However, expenditures decentralization may (also) have negative effect on the 
fiscal balance. For example, local governments may lack economies of scale in the provision of 
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public goods; information and coordination costs may be higher for local governments because 
of lack of institutional and administrative capacity (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 1998; Blanchard & 
Shleifer, 2001). Furthermore, the central government may be unable to credibly commit to a 
hard-budget constraint (no bailout of the local government) due to political concerns, leading to 
even larger spending (Goodspeed, 2002).  
 Demand for Borrowing: 
Urbanization affects the fiscal balance through both revenues and expenditures. On the 
revenue side, because of the higher population density in urban areas, monitoring of tax 
compliance may become less expensive, implying higher overall tax compliance. However, 
because people live close to their neighbors in urban settings, informal transactions become more 
feasible which in turn may tend to reduce tax collections (Kau & Rubin, 1981). On the 
expenditures side, higher urbanization may affect demand for more government spending. 
Therefore, the effect of urbanization on fiscal deficit is ambiguous. 
Population growth: similar to urbanization, higher population growth induces more 
demand for public services and larger government spending. However, larger population growth 
may as well represent an increase in the revenue base, likely leading to larger revenue collection. 
Moreover, increasing population density from higher population growth implies a higher cost of 
publicly provided goods due to congestion (Fenge & Meier, 2002). However, for some public 
goods, such as sewers, the costs can fall with increasing population density (Haug, 2004). 
Age dependency: De Mello (2001) finds a positive relationship between the dependency 
ratio and the long-run welfare-related liabilities of the public sector, which puts pressure on sub-
national governments by increasing the need for public borrowing and may negatively affect 
fiscal outcomes. 
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GDP per capita: High GDP per capita accounts for larger demand for public services and 
spending due to higher incomes. This variable is expected to account for better fiscal 
performance of developed countries as well. The expectation is that spending levels will rise 
with increasing levels of economic development (Wagner’s law) so more functions would be 
assigned to the sub-national governments, which may lead to greater demand for borrowing if 
their own-source revenues are not sufficient. At the same time, a higher level of development is 
correlated with a greater capacity to pay and collect taxes (Bahl, 1971; Chelliah, 1971; Bird et 
al., 2005), especially if debt is issued for productive expenditures. 
 Institutional, Political, and Macroeconomic Variables: 
Government stability is an assessment both of the government’s ability to carry out its 
declared programs, and its ability to stay in office. More stable governments are expected to 
more likely impose harder budget constraints on all levels of government and may improve fiscal 
outcomes. 
Government fractionalization is expected to negatively affect fiscal performance. 
Roubini and Sachs (1989) find the lack of political cohesion to be highly related with budget 
deficits. Similarly, Rodden (2002) finds that political cohesion contributes to total public sector 
fiscal outcome. 
Perceived corruption is assumed to be associated with weak government institutions and, 
therefore, lower fiscal discipline and a higher probability of an end of a consolidation episode.  
Central bank independence (CBI): The theoretical literature (Masciandaro & Tabellini, 
1987; Castellani & Debrun, 2001; Montiel, 2003) shows that CBI should affect the design of 
fiscal policy, i.e., a greater degree of independence influences the central government toward 
fiscal discipline. The adoption of an independent central bank deprives the government from 
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using the inflation tax and so constitutes a strong signal for fiscal discipline.  However, empirical 
studies provide inconclusive results. Sikken and Haan (1998) address this issue for developing 
countries and find no relationship between CBI and the level of budget deficits. 
Bailout history is likely to be highly correlated with current bailout expectations and can 
be used as an instrument for bailout expectations. Pettersson-Lidbom and Dahlberg (2005) find 
strong evidence that bailout expectations have a large and significant impact on local 
government debt. On average, a local government increases its debt by 30 percent if it is certain 
of being bailed out as compared to when it is certain of not being bailed out. 
Inflation gives an incentive to the government to collect seignorage revenue, which in 
turn negatively affects fiscal performance. However, according to (Mankiw, 1987) inflation is an 
important source of revenue - as debt and interest rates are measured in nominal terms (i.e., 
interest rates are not indexed to the inflation rate), and so generating inflation depreciates the real 
value of intern public debt and interest payments. On the other hand, governments find it 
difficult to fully recognize the need to restrain expenditures in real terms during periods of 
inflation. 
Central government budget balance: Rodden (2002) argues that sub-national 
government fiscal performance may be positively correlated with long-term central government 
fiscal performance. Plekhanov and Singh (2007) provide the following three reasons for this 
relationship. First, the average central government fiscal balance is a proxy for the society´s 
preference toward the fiscal sustainability. Second, the average central government fiscal balance 
captures possible business cycle effects, especially for countries having few observations on sub-
national government fiscal balances. Third, the central government fiscal balance partly absorbs 
the effects of fiscal crises that affect the fiscal performance.  
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Finally, we expect that EU countries that adopted the stability and growth pact (SGP) 
should be more fiscally responsible and that may have better fiscal performance.  
 The following three variables also are used in the duration analysis: 
Number of previous failures controls for the accumulated number of ends of fiscal 
consolidations that have taken place in each country before the current consolidation. It is, ceteris 
paribus, expected that the larger this number, the higher is the probability an episode of fiscal 
consolidation would end.  
Initial budget balance takes into account the fact that initial fiscal consolidations 
influence policymakers in deciding how much adjustment is needed to stabilize public finances. 
This controls for the fact that countries with high budget balance may not feel compelled to 
continue with fiscal adjustment, as the balance may already be close to sustainable levels. 
Therefore, this variable is expected to increase the probability of ending a consolidation episode. 
The size of the fiscal adjustment is measured as the cumulative change in the budget 
balance during the fiscal consolidation episode. The larger the size of the consolidation, the 
longer the episode is hypothesized to last, because a larger adjustment tends to signal the 
willingness of the authorities to achieve fiscal sustainability. 
In the next section we set up the methodology for evaluating the determinants and 
estimating probabilities of choosing one of six broad types of sub-national borrowing regulations 
previously discussed.  
Determinants of Sub-National Borrowing Regulations 
To evaluate the determinants of choosing a particular type of sub-national borrowing regulation, 
we use a multinomial logit model.  
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As already mentioned, vector 𝑅𝑚,𝑖𝑡 consists of 𝑚 = 1,2,… 6 borrowing regulation 
variables. Based on the vector 𝑅𝑚,𝑖𝑡, variable 𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗  is designed in the following way: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ =
{
  
 
  
 
𝑚1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑅1,𝑖𝑡 = 1, (𝑝𝑟𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔)           
𝑚2, 𝑖𝑓 𝑅2,𝑖𝑡 = 1, (𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
𝑚3, 𝑖𝑓 𝑅3,𝑖𝑡 = 1, (𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)        
𝑚4, 𝑖𝑓 𝑅4,𝑖𝑡 = 1, (𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠)       
𝑚5, 𝑖𝑓 𝑅5,𝑖𝑡 = 1, (𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠)                  
𝑚6, 𝑖𝑓 𝑅6,𝑖𝑡 = 1, (𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)     
                                             (6.10) 
The probability of choosing any of categories 𝑚 = 2, 3, … ,6 is compared to the 
probability of choosing the reference category (prohibited borrowing). This requires the 
calculation of five equations, one for each category relative to the reference category.  
Hence, if the first category is the reference one, then, for 𝑚 = 2, 3,… ,6,  
𝑙𝑛
𝑃(𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑚)
𝑃(𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ = 1)
= 𝛼𝑚 +∑𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑊𝑖𝑘 = 𝑍𝑚𝑖  
𝐾
𝑘=1
, 𝑚 = 2,…6                                               (6.11) 
Therefore, for each choice, there will be five predicted log odds, one for each category 
relative to the reference category.35  
Probabilities for 𝑚 = 2, 3,… ,6 are 
𝑃(𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑚) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑍𝑚𝑖)
1 + ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑍𝑚𝑖)
6
𝑚=2
, 𝑚 = 2,… ,6                                                             (6.12) 
While, for the reference category, 𝑚 = 1  
𝑃(𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ = 1) =
1
1 + ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑍𝑚𝑖)
6
𝑚=2
                                                                                      (6.13) 
Hence, the model to be estimated is shown in equation (6.11), where 𝑋𝑖𝑘 is the vector of 
variables representing potential determinants of sub-national borrowing regulations, which are 
discussed in the following section. 
                                                          
35 Note, when 𝑚 = 1, then ln(1) = 0 = 𝑍11 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝(0) = 1 
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Determinants of Sub-national Borrowing Regulations: Variables 
As addressed above, one of the problems with estimating equation (6.1) is the potential reverse 
causality between sub-national borrowing regulations and the fiscal balance. More precisely, 
because of the strong concern about the possible danger of sub-national borrowing for fiscal and 
macroeconomic stability, the decision of how to regulate borrowing at the sub-national level is 
expected to depend on the government’s fiscal performance. It is assumed that countries with 
stronger macroeconomic stability are more likely to allow sub-national borrowing in the private 
credit market. Moreover, it is expected that the more stability at the macroeconomic level, the 
more likely a country would choose more decentralized types of sub-national borrowing 
regulations, such as market-based regulation or regulation based on fiscal rules.  
In order to resolve the reverse causality issue, an exogenous instrument has to be found 
which is correlated with borrowing regulations but not with the fiscal balance. Having in mind 
the nature of all fiscal decentralization variables, it is very difficult to find an exogenous 
instrument that would allow obtaining an unbiased estimate of sub-national borrowing regulation 
on fiscal balance. Besides other factors, the ability of sub-national governments to access private 
financial markets significantly depends on the depth of the country’s financial markets and the 
development of financial institutions. The depth of financial markets has an effect on how sub-
national borrowing is regulated, but at the same time is not directly affected by the size of the 
fiscal deficit, thus representing a potentially good instrument for sub-national borrowing 
regulation.  
The development of financial markets is expected to significantly affect sub-national 
borrowing autonomy. First, the supply of funds in the financial market affects the sub-national 
governments’ ability to borrow, and second, the depth of the financial market is correlated with 
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the development of financial institutions. Hence, it is expected that countries with more 
developed financial markets are more likely to allow more borrowing autonomy to the sub-
national governments. To measure the depth of financial markets, two variables are used, namely 
the liquid liabilities indicator and the index of financial freedom. 
The liquid liabilities indicator represents the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, where 
liquid liabilities consist of currency held outside the banking system plus demand and interest 
bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank financial intermediaries. Thus, the liquid liabilities 
indicator is a typical measure of “financial depth”. The index of financial freedom is a measure 
of banking efficiency as well as a measure of independence from government control and 
interference in the financial sector. It is created based on five broad areas that are considered to 
assess an economy’s overall level of financial freedom that ensures easy and effective access to 
financing opportunities for people and businesses in the economy.36 An overall score on a scale 
of 0 to 100 rate an economy’s financial freedom through deductions from the ideal score of 100. 
The depth of the financial market represents the supply of borrowing. On the demand 
side, important variables that affect the decision as to how to regulate borrowing are the 
government primary balance, sub-national outstanding debt, expenditures and own revenues, 
sub-national tax autonomy, GDP per capita and population growth. Besides the supply and 
demand for borrowing, the decision as to how to regulate borrowing depends as well on political 
and institutional determinants, such as government stability, government fractionalization, and 
bailout history. The following discussion explains the rationale behind these determinants. 
                                                          
36 These five areas are: the extent of government regulation of financial services; the degree of state intervention in 
banks and other financial firms through direct and indirect ownership; the extent of financial and capital market 
development; government influence on the allocation of credit, and openness to foreign competition (The Heritage 
Foundation, 2011). 
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Low primary fiscal balances and high sub-national outstanding debt may affect a 
government’s decision to either prohibit borrowing at the sub-national level or to choose a more 
centralized type of regulations. Both general government and sub-national government primary 
balances are used to evaluate the determinants of sub-national borrowing regulation. 
  Next, sub-national governments’ ability to borrow in private financial markets depends 
on their creditworthiness, which in turn, depends on different factors, including the sub-national 
governments’ ability to repay debt. Sub-national governments with more own revenues are 
expected to have a greater ability to repay debt, everything else constant, especially if at the same 
time they have more tax autonomy, that is, ability to set and/or change tax rates for important tax 
instruments. Therefore, the share of sub-national own tax revenues in total sub-national revenues 
is included as a potential determinant of sub-national borrowing regulation. However, even 
though it is expected that more sub-national own revenues are positively correlated with 
creditworthiness, and through it, with sub-national borrowing regulation, higher sub-national 
own revenues at the same time may result in lower demand for borrowing. The central 
government may, for that reason, consider borrowing at the sub-national level as less necessary 
and may prefer to restrict it, if not prohibit it. Therefore, the expected sign on this variable is 
ambiguous. Moreover, tax autonomy is expected to have a positive effect on the probability of 
allowing borrowing at the sub-national level. 
Higher sub-national expenditures may indicate larger sub-national expenditure needs and 
higher demand for financing and, therefore, may positively affect the decision to allow sub-
national governments to borrow in the capital market.   
GDP per capita and population growth represent indicators of demand for public 
services, suggesting that with their increase there may be a higher probability of allowing 
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borrowing at the sub-national level. Moreover, as discussed above, GDP per capita is supposed 
to account for better fiscal performance of developed countries and more developed financial 
markets. 
More stable governments are expected to be more likely to impose harder budget 
constraints on all levels of government, suggesting a higher probability of choosing more 
decentralized sub-national borrowing regulation.  
Taking into account the governments’ ability to make decisions cooperatively, one would 
expect that countries with less fractionalized governments are more likely to have cooperatively 
regulated sub-national borrowing, or borrowing regulated by fiscal rules. 
Finally, bailout history is likely to be highly correlated with current bailout expectations 
and can be used as an instrument for bailout expectations. It is expected that countries with a 
history of bailouts may be more likely to choose more centralized types of sub-national 
borrowing regulations.  
RESULTS 
Determinants of Sub-National Borrowing Regulations 
As explained above in section 6.2.2, the first part of the empirical analysis includes estimating 
probabilities with which countries choose sub-national borrowing regulation types. For that 
purpose, multinomial logit regressions are utilized. Table 2 presents the relative risk ratios of 
choosing particular sub-national borrowing regulation for unit increase in independent variable.  
Given that both general and sub-national government primary balances are observed as 
potential determinants of sub-national borrowing regulations, Table 2 presents the estimated 
relative risks for both options. However, based on the results in Table 2, no definite conclusions 
can be made about whether sub-national or general government primary balance is more relevant 
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in deciding on how to regulate sub-national borrowing. This is because of the way results are 
presented in Table 2 which can only suggest how much the determinants affect probability of 
choosing a particular borrowing regulation compared to a reference category. These results, 
however, cannot suggest anything about the decision between the non-reference categories.  
As the results show, the liquid liabilities variable seems to be relatively significant in 
choosing cooperative regulation and regulation based on centrally-imposed rules, compared to 
administrative regulations. More precisely, a one percentage point increase in the share of liquid 
liabilities in GDP increases the probability of choosing cooperative regulation by 0.2 percentage 
points over choosing administrative regulations.  
However, as mentioned above, from the results in Table 2 we cannot make a conclusion 
about the probabilities of choosing among the regulation types presented in the table. Because 
this analysis includes comparison among six categories, this way of presenting the relative risk 
ratios of choosing one category over the other is somewhat tricky and confusing. Therefore, it 
may be more useful for the purpose of analysis to present the results as in Table 3 and Table 4 
where it is possible to compare the effects of independent variables on the relative risk of 
choosing one type of regulation over the other. For example, the effect of one percentage point 
increase in liquid liabilities to GDP ratio on the relative risk of regulating sub-national borrowing 
through centrally-imposed rules over administrative regulation equals between 0.06 and 0.10, 
depending on the specification. Similarly, the same effect for choosing centrally-imposed rules 
over market-based regulation is between 0.05 and 0.07, depending on the specification.  
The results in Table 3 and Table 4 suggest that the depth of the financial market is 
particularly important for choosing cooperative regulations and regulations based on centrally 
and self-imposed rules, over the other types of regulation. Furthermore, countries with a higher 
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general government primary balance are most likely to choose administrative, self-imposed rules 
and market-based regulations over the other types. Moreover, countries with a higher sub-
national primary balance are more likely to choose self-imposed rules and market-based 
regulations over the others, and are least likely to prohibit borrowing at the sub-national level. 
Finally, countries with higher sub-national outstanding debt seem to be more likely to choose 
self-imposed fiscal rules to regulate sub-national borrowing.  
The results also suggest that higher-income countries tend to choose cooperative 
regulations and self-imposed fiscal rules over the others. Next, higher sub-national expenditures 
seem to lead to a higher probability of choosing administrative and cooperative regulations. 
Finally, countries in which sub-national governments have tax autonomy are more likely to 
choose more decentralized types of regulations; namely, self-imposed rules and market-based 
regulations. 
Tables 6.4.A and 6.4.B present the probabilities of choosing a particular sub-national 
borrowing regulation by country compared with an average value of the independent variable. 
The difference between Table 5 and 6 is that the former presents results obtained from the 
specification including the general government primary balance while the latter uses the sub-
national primary balance. First, the results show no significant differences in probabilities 
depending whether the general or the sub-national primary balance is included. Second, the 
results suggest that a developing country with an average share of liquid liabilities to GDP will 
be more likely to choose an administrative type of sub-national borrowing regulation or to 
prohibit sub-national borrowing. On the other hand, a developed country with an average share 
of liquid liabilities to GDP will be more likely to choose sub-national regulations based on 
centrally-imposed rules, market-based or cooperative regulation. 
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Table 2. Factor change in relative risk ratio of choosing sub-national borrowing regulation (for unit increase in independent variable) 
 Specification 1* Specification 2** 
 Prohibited Cooperative Central 
Rule 
Self Rule Market Prohibited Cooperative Central 
Rule 
Self Rule Market 
Liquid Liabilities 7.593 0.205* 0.062*** 0.351 0.950 0.008 0.365 0.096*** 0.753 1.995 
 (6.328) (0.671) (0.600) (0.849) (0.611) (6.486) (0.675) (0.586) (0.848) (0.606) 
Financial 
Freedom 
1.228* 0.982 0.998 1.019 0.986 1.303* 0.981 0.992 1.012 0.982* 
 (0.090) (0.010) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.121) (0.010) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) 
Primary Balance 0.000* 0.000* 13.576 42.452 0.305 4.542 1.401** 2.501** 2.301*** 1.881*** 
 (1.955) (0.177) (3.383) (7.344) (3.544) (9.424) (1.537) (2.286) (1.237) (1.529) 
Debt1 0.000 6.740*** 8.110*** 6.351*** 7.021*** 0.000 4.751*** 4.801*** 1.501*** 1.621*** 
 (.) (4.255) (4.068) (4.458) (4.080) (.) (2.272) (2.053) (1.497) (1.094) 
GDP per capita 0.761 2.514*** 1.847*** 3.350*** 1.004 26.347 2.627*** 1.818*** 3.256*** 1.006 
 (1.393) (0.163) (0.132) (0.215) (0.136) (1.980) (0.170) (0.135) (0.213) (0.142) 
Expenditures1 1.032 4.923 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 1.012 1.905 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 
 (5.309) (2.928) (2.910) (4.993) (2.891) (5.274) (3.043) (0.945) (0.309) (0.967) 
Own Revenues1 5.532* 0.000*** 0.420 0.139 0.002*** 1.473* 0.001*** 0.846 1.679 0.025* 
 (4.971) (1.865) (1.604) (2.531) (1.835) (2.506) (0.868) (1.536) (2.632) (0.808) 
Tax Autonomy 0.000*** 3.137** 1.781 4.729* 7.402*** 0.000*** 3.235** 2.414* 9.119*** 11.980*** 
 (1.663) (0.409) (0.385) (0.632) (0.386) (1.384) (0.439) (0.412) (0.663) (0.419) 
Stability 0.640 1.082 0.880 1.118 0.891 0.341* 1.087 0.930 1.242 0.936 
 (0.473) (0.094) (0.080) (0.150) (0.085) (0.524) (0.094) (0.082) (0.152) (0.088) 
Fractionalization 3.153 2.338 6.279*** 9.751* 0.870 3.160 2.169 5.500*** 7.292* 0.750 
 (.) (0.608) (0.509) (0.900) (0.554) (.) (0.612) (0.516) (0.912) (0.568) 
Bailout 1.156 0.238*** 0.973 0.026*** 0.693 0.016 0.340** 1.197 0.029*** 0.824 
 (3.658) (0.368) (0.291) (0.624) (0.316) (1.579) (0.368) (0.293) (0.644) (0.326) 
Population 
Growth 
0.000 2.212 0.000*** 2.487*** 0.000** 7.601 2.711 0.000*** 1.246*** 0.000*** 
 (2.209) (2.113) (1.928) (3.149) (1.800) (7.727) (2.602) (1.055) (1.988) (1.397) 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.442 0.445 
Chi2 1212.833 1222.516 
P 0.000 0.000 
Coefficient represent factor changes in relative risk for unit increase in independent variable X = exp(b); In parentheses: exp(b)*SD(b); ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10; Administrative 
regulation is the base category; *Primary balance is general government (GG) primary balance; **Primary balance is sub-national government (SNG) primary balance; 1At sub-
national government level  
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Table 3. Factor change in the odds - Specification with General Government (GG) Primary Balance 
Category 1 Category 2 
Liquid 
Liabilities 
Financial 
Freedom 
GG Primary 
Balance 
SNG Debt GDP Per Capita 
SNG 
Expenditures 
exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| 
Prohibited Cooperative 5.758 0.482 1.250 0.014 0.000 0.030 . . 0.303 0.392 7.081 0.591 
Prohibited Central Rule 5.984 0.371 1.231 0.022 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.412 0.524 1.382 0.390 
Prohibited Self Rule 0.171 0.538 1.205 0.042 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.227 0.291 6.482 0.398 
Prohibited Market 8.518 0.645 1.245 0.016 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.758 0.842 5.432 0.444 
Prohibited Administrative 7.593 0.650 1.228 0.023 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.761 0.844 1.032 0.534 
Cooperative Prohibited 0.012 0.482 0.800 0.014 1.790 0.030 . . 3.304 0.392 0.000 0.591 
Cooperative Central Rule 3.335 0.050 0.984 0.104 0.000 0.005 0.083 0.275 1.361 0.044 1.951 0.000 
Cooperative Self Rule 0.585 0.494 0.964 0.025 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.001 0.750 0.150 9.161 0.000 
Cooperative Market 0.216 0.010 0.996 0.686 0.000 0.062 0.010 0.030 2.503 0.000 7.671 0.000 
Cooperative Administrative 0.205 0.018 0.982 0.073 0.000 0.032 6.740 0.000 2.514 0.000 4.923 0.089 
Central Rule Prohibited 0.004 0.371 0.813 0.022 1.930 0.011 . . 2.427 0.524 0.000 0.390 
Central Rule Cooperative 0.300 0.050 1.016 0.104 1.080 0.005 12.043 0.275 0.735 0.044 0.000 0.000 
Central Rule Self Rule 0.175 0.028 0.979 0.196 0.320 0.875 0.001 0.004 0.551 0.004 0.469 0.880 
Central Rule Market 0.065 0.000 1.012 0.166 44.563 0.258 0.116 0.149 1.839 0.000 0.004 0.044 
Central Rule Administrative 0.062 0.000 0.998 0.821 13.577 0.441 8.110 0.000 1.847 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Self Rule Prohibited 0.020 0.538 0.830 0.042 6.040 0.012 . . 4.403 0.291 0.000 0.398 
Self Rule Cooperative 1.709 0.494 1.038 0.025 3.370 0.089 9.843 0.001 1.333 0.150 0.000 0.000 
Self Rule Central Rule 5.700 0.028 1.021 0.196 3.127 0.875 7.326 0.004 1.814 0.004 2.131 0.880 
Self Rule Market 0.369 0.182 1.034 0.042 13.343 0.488 9.397 0.037 3.336 0.000 0.008 0.333 
Self Rule Administrative 0.351 0.217 1.019 0.243 42.452 0.610 6.351 0.000 3.350 0.000 0.000 0.007 
Market Prohibited 0.054 0.645 0.803 0.016 4.340 0.016 . . 1.320 0.842 0.000 0.444 
Market Cooperative 4.631 0.010 1.004 0.686 2.738 0.062 4.227 0.030 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Market Central Rule 5.444 0.000 0.988 0.166 0.022 0.258 8.654 0.149 0.544 0.000 4.431 0.044 
Market Self Rule 2.709 0.182 0.968 0.042 0.007 0.488 0.011 0.037 0.300 0.000 9.426 0.333 
Market Administrative 0.950 0.933 0.986 0.121 0.305 0.737 7.021 0.000 1.004 0.975 0.000 0.003 
Administrative Prohibited 0.057 0.650 0.814 0.023 1.420 0.014 . . 1.314 0.844 0.000 0.534 
Administrative Cooperative 4.874 0.018 1.018 0.073 7.739 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.398 0.000 0.007 0.089 
Administrative Central Rule 6.255 0.000 1.002 0.821 0.074 0.441 0.000 0.000 0.541 0.000 1.351 0.000 
Administrative Self Rule 2.852 0.217 0.981 0.243 0.024 0.610 0.000 0.000 0.299 0.000 6.321 0.007 
Administrative Market 1.053 0.933 1.014 0.121 3.282 0.737 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.975 5.629 0.003 
exp(b)=factor change in odds (relative risk) for unit increase in x; P>|z|=p-value for z-test of b=0; b=relative risk 
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Table 3. Factor change in the odds - Specification with General Government Primary Balance (cont’d) 
Category 1 Category 2 
SNG Own 
Revenues 
Tax Autonomy 
Government 
Stability 
Government 
Fractionalization 
Bailout 
Population 
Growth 
exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| 
Prohibited Cooperative 2.782 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.592 0.271 1.153 0.000 8.544 0.064 0.000 0.338 
Prohibited Central Rule 1.322 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.727 0.501 4.052 0.000 7.025 0.142 1.672 0.704 
Prohibited Self Rule 3.972 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.572 0.256 2.652 0.000 6.269 0.015 0.000 0.038 
Prohibited Market 3.022 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.718 0.485 2.915 0.000 4.855 0.118 1.872 0.938 
Prohibited Administrative 5.532 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.640 0.345 . . 1.156 0.143 0.000 0.609 
Cooperative Prohibited 0.000 0.003 1.867 0.000 1.690 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.064 6.484 0.338 
Cooperative Central Rule 0.001 0.000 1.761 0.087 1.229 0.024 0.372 0.075 0.244 0.000 1.085 0.000 
Cooperative Self Rule 0.001 0.006 0.663 0.479 0.968 0.822 0.240 0.099 9.202 0.000 0.000 0.004 
Cooperative Market 0.109 0.181 0.424 0.010 1.213 0.037 2.688 0.082 0.343 0.004 8.434 0.000 
Cooperative Administrative 0.000 0.000 3.137 0.005 1.082 0.403 2.338 0.163 0.238 0.000 2.212 0.156 
Central Rule Prohibited 0.000 0.013 1.057 0.000 1.375 0.501 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.142 0.000 0.704 
Central Rule Cooperative 2.864 0.000 0.568 0.087 0.814 0.024 2.686 0.075 4.094 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Central Rule Self Rule 3.011 0.630 0.377 0.100 0.787 0.104 0.644 0.605 7.674 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Central Rule Market 2.303 0.000 0.241 0.000 0.987 0.871 7.221 0.000 1.405 0.277 0.000 0.140 
Central Rule Administrative 0.420 0.588 1.781 0.134 0.880 0.108 6.279 0.000 0.973 0.925 0.000 0.000 
Self Rule Prohibited 0.000 0.012 2.807 0.000 1.747 0.256 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 7.289 0.038 
Self Rule Cooperative 7.758 0.006 1.508 0.479 1.034 0.822 4.171 0.099 0.109 0.000 1.125 0.004 
Self Rule Central Rule 0.332 0.630 2.656 0.100 1.271 0.104 1.553 0.605 0.027 0.000 1.210 0.000 
Self Rule Market 6.160 0.064 0.639 0.449 1.254 0.122 9.212 0.005 0.037 0.000 9.479 0.000 
Self Rule Administrative 0.139 0.436 4.729 0.014 1.118 0.458 9.751 0.011 0.026 0.000 2.487 0.000 
Market Prohibited 0.000 0.005 4.387 0.000 1.393 0.485 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.118 0.001 0.938 
Market Cooperative 9.214 0.181 2.360 0.010 0.824 0.037 0.372 0.082 2.915 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Market Central Rule 0.004 0.000 4.157 0.000 1.013 0.871 0.139 0.000 0.712 0.277 1.281 0.140 
Market Self Rule 0.013 0.064 1.565 0.449 0.797 0.122 0.089 0.005 6.820 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Market Administrative 0.002 0.001 7.402 0.000 0.892 0.178 0.870 0.801 0.693 0.244 0.000 0.004 
Administrative Prohibited 0.000 0.015 5.927 0.000 1.563 0.345 . . 0.005 0.143 2.932 0.609 
Administrative Cooperative 6.423 0.000 0.319 0.005 0.925 0.403 0.428 0.163 4.208 0.000 0.000 0.056 
Administrative Central Rule 2.384 0.588 0.562 0.134 1.137 0.108 0.159 0.000 1.028 0.925 4.894 0.000 
Administrative Self Rule 7.177 0.436 0.212 0.014 0.895 0.458 0.103 0.011 8.722 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Administrative Market 6.588 0.001 0.135 0.000 1.122 0.178 1.150 0.801 1.444 0.244 3.822 0.004 
exp(b)=factor change in odds (relative risk) for unit increase in x; P>|z|=p-value for z-test of b=0; b=relative risk 
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Table 4. Factor change in the odds - Specification with Sub-National Government Primary Balance 
Category 1 Category 2 
Liquid 
Liabilities 
Financial 
Freedom 
SNG Primary 
Balance 
SNG Debt GDP Per Capita 
SNG 
Expenditures 
exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| 
Prohibited Cooperative 0.023 0.562 1.328 0.020 3.251 0.422 . . 10.030 0.245 6.682 0.363 
Prohibited Central Rule 0.087 0.707 1.313 0.025 1.811 0.433 0.000 0.000 14.489 0.177 4.823 0.216 
Prohibited Self Rule 0.011 0.491 1.288 0.038 1.981 0.690 0.000 0.000 8.091 0.293 4.803 0.203 
Prohibited Market 0.004 0.400 1.327 0.020 2.411 0.626 0.000 0.000 26.187 0.099 3.023 0.236 
Prohibited Administrative 0.008 0.461 1.303 0.029 4.542 0.144 0.000 0.000 26.347 0.098 1.012 0.317 
Cooperative Prohibited 4.316 0.562 0.753 0.020 0.000 0.422 . . 0.100 0.245 0.000 0.363 
Cooperative Central Rule 3.787 0.036 0.989 0.251 0.559 0.876 0.099 0.313 1.445 0.019 7.231 0.000 
Cooperative Self Rule 0.485 0.369 0.970 0.067 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.004 0.807 0.275 7.191 0.000 
Cooperative Market 0.183 0.006 1.000 0.995 0.000 0.007 0.029 0.106 2.611 0.000 4.521 0.000 
Cooperative Administrative 0.365 0.135 0.981 0.063 1.401 0.004 4.751 0.000 2.627 0.000 1.905 0.199 
Central Rule Prohibited 11.439 0.707 0.762 0.025 0.000 0.433 . . 0.069 0.177 0.000 0.216 
Central Rule Cooperative 0.264 0.036 1.011 0.251 1.789 0.876 10.097 0.313 0.692 0.019 0.000 0.000 
Central Rule Self Rule 0.128 0.010 0.981 0.234 0.000 0.062 0.003 0.014 0.558 0.004 9.950 0.665 
Central Rule Market 0.048 0.000 1.011 0.189 0.000 0.016 0.296 0.420 1.807 0.000 0.063 0.311 
Central Rule Administrative 0.096 0.000 0.992 0.355 2.501 0.002 4.801 0.000 1.818 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Self Rule Prohibited 9.347 0.491 0.777 0.038 0.000 0.690 . . 0.124 0.293 0.000 0.203 
Self Rule Cooperative 2.063 0.369 1.031 0.067 1.641 0.044 3.840 0.004 1.240 0.275 0.000 0.000 
Self Rule Central Rule 7.811 0.010 1.020 0.234 9.180 0.062 3.548 0.014 1.791 0.004 0.101 0.665 
Self Rule Market 0.377 0.197 1.031 0.062 12.202 0.674 2.785 0.042 3.237 0.000 0.006 0.333 
Self Rule Administrative 0.753 0.738 1.012 0.480 2.301 0.000 1.501 0.000 3.256 0.000 0.000 0.004 
Market Prohibited 6.825 0.400 0.753 0.020 0.000 0.626 . . 0.038 0.099 0.000 0.236 
Market Cooperative 5.467 0.006 1.000 0.995 1.350 0.007 4.120 0.106 0.383 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Market Central Rule 20.704 0.000 0.989 0.189 7.253 0.016 3.379 0.420 0.553 0.000 5.984 0.311 
Market Self Rule 2.651 0.197 0.970 0.062 0.082 0.674 0.011 0.042 0.309 0.000 9.044 0.333 
Market Administrative 1.995 0.254 0.982 0.037 1.881 0.000 1.621 0.000 1.006 0.966 0.000 0.001 
Administrative Prohibited 8.691 0.461 0.768 0.029 0.000 0.144 . . 0.038 0.098 0.000 0.317 
Administrative Cooperative 2.740 0.135 1.019 0.063 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.381 0.000 0.007 0.099 
Administrative Central Rule 10.376 0.000 1.008 0.355 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.550 0.000 4.791 0.000 
Administrative Self Rule 1.328 0.738 0.988 0.480 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.307 0.000 4.761 0.004 
Administrative Market 0.501 0.254 1.019 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.994 0.966 3.000 0.001 
exp(b)=factor change in odds (relative risk) for unit increase in x; P>|z|=p-value for z-test of b=0; b=relative risk 
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Table 4. Factor change in the odds - Specification with Sub-National Government Primary Balance (cont’d) 
Category 1 Category 2 
SNG Own 
Revenues 
Tax Autonomy 
Government 
Stability 
Government 
Fractionalization 
Bailout 
Population 
Growth 
exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| exp(b) P>|z| 
Prohibited Cooperative 1.623 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.313 0.028 1.416 0.000 0.046 0.582 0.000 0.913 
Prohibited Central Rule 1.733 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.366 0.056 5.416 0.000 0.013 0.438 1.564 0.468 
Prohibited Self Rule 8.733 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.274 0.017 4.116 0.000 0.541 0.913 0.000 0.381 
Prohibited Market 5.933 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.364 0.055 4.016 0.000 0.019 0.478 4.234 0.550 
Prohibited Administrative 1.473 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.341 0.040 . . 0.016 0.457 7.601 0.895 
Cooperative Prohibited 0.000 0.005 2.697 0.000 3.191 0.028 0.000 0.000 11.620 0.582 3.571 0.913 
Cooperative Central Rule 0.001 0.000 1.340 0.393 1.169 0.079 0.394 0.089 0.284 0.000 5.575 0.000 
Cooperative Self Rule 0.001 0.003 0.355 0.085 0.875 0.357 0.297 0.162 9.691 0.000 0.000 0.006 
Cooperative Market 0.037 0.057 0.270 0.000 1.161 0.097 2.891 0.062 0.413 0.018 1.514 0.000 
Cooperative Administrative 0.001 0.000 3.235 0.007 1.087 0.375 2.169 0.206 0.340 0.003 2.711 0.141 
Central Rule Prohibited 0.000 0.011 2.017 0.000 2.730 0.056 0.000 0.000 6.006 0.438 0.000 0.468 
Central Rule Cooperative 9.496 0.000 0.746 0.393 0.855 0.079 2.536 0.089 3.516 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Central Rule Self Rule 0.504 0.776 0.265 0.029 0.749 0.049 0.754 0.742 4.102 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Central Rule Market 4.231 0.018 0.202 0.000 0.993 0.934 7.331 0.000 1.453 0.236 0.000 0.344 
Central Rule Administrative 0.847 0.914 2.414 0.032 0.930 0.376 5.500 0.001 1.197 0.539 0.000 0.000 
Self Rule Prohibited 0.000 0.012 7.597 0.000 3.646 0.017 0.000 0.000 1.849 0.913 1.645 0.381 
Self Rule Cooperative 11.649 0.003 2.819 0.085 1.143 0.357 3.362 0.162 0.086 0.000 4.595 0.006 
Self Rule Central Rule 1.984 0.776 3.777 0.029 1.336 0.049 1.326 0.742 0.024 0.000 2.570 0.000 
Self Rule Market 7.899 0.085 0.761 0.652 1.327 0.052 9.719 0.008 0.035 0.000 6.939 0.000 
Self Rule Administrative 1.679 0.844 9.119 0.001 1.242 0.153 7.292 0.029 0.029 0.000 1.246 0.000 
Market Prohibited 0.000 0.007 9.977 0.000 2.748 0.055 0.000 0.000 5.298 0.478 0.000 0.550 
Market Cooperative 7.271 0.057 3.703 0.000 0.861 0.097 0.346 0.062 2.419 0.018 0.000 0.000 
Market Central Rule 0.029 0.018 4.963 0.000 1.007 0.934 0.136 0.000 0.688 0.236 3.691 0.344 
Market Self Rule 0.015 0.085 1.314 0.652 0.754 0.052 0.103 0.008 2.281 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Market Administrative 0.025 0.041 11.980 0.000 0.936 0.450 0.750 0.613 0.824 0.551 0.000 0.001 
Administrative Prohibited 0.000 0.011 8.327 0.000 2.936 0.040   6.506 0.457 0.000 0.895 
Administrative Cooperative 11.797 0.000 0.309 0.007 0.920 0.375 0.461 0.206 2.937 0.003 0.000 0.141 
Administrative Central Rule 1.181 0.914 0.414 0.032 1.076 0.376 0.182 0.001 0.836 0.539 2.054 0.000 
Administrative Self Rule 0.596 0.844 0.110 0.001 0.805 0.153 0.137 0.029 4.342 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Administrative Market 4.439 0.041 0.084 0.000 1.068 0.450 1.333 0.613 1.214 0.551 5.573 0.001 
exp(b)=factor change in odds (relative risk) for unit increase in x; P>|z|=p-value for z-test of b=0; b=relative risk
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Table 5. Probabilities of Choosing Sub-National Borrowing Regime at Average Values of 
Independent Variables, Developing versus Developed Countries, Specification with General 
Government Primary Balance 
Variable Sample 
P
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Liquid Liabilities 
Developing 0.358 0.247 0.061 0.202 0.016 0.117 
Developed 0.000 0.178 0.229 0.269 0.082 0.241 
Total 0.170 0.210 0.149 0.237 0.051 0.182 
Financial Freedom 
Developing 0.378 0.241 0.046 0.199 0.020 0.115 
Developed 0.000 0.171 0.260 0.260 0.059 0.249 
Total 0.180 0.204 0.158 0.231 0.040 0.186 
GG primary 
balance 
Developing 0.401 0.227 0.045 0.195 0.020 0.112 
Developed 0.000 0.173 0.258 0.264 0.056 0.249 
Total 0.191 0.199 0.157 0.231 0.039 0.184 
GDP Per Capita 
Developing 0.402 0.219 0.041 0.228 0.013 0.096 
Developed 0.000 0.208 0.183 0.234 0.047 0.328 
Total 0.191 0.213 0.116 0.232 0.031 0.218 
SNG Expenditures 
Developing 0.404 0.265 0.058 0.176 0.012 0.085 
Developed 0.000 0.201 0.104 0.286 0.064 0.344 
Total 0.192 0.232 0.082 0.234 0.039 0.220 
SNG Own 
Revenues 
Developing 0.481 0.250 0.040 0.142 0.010 0.077 
Developed 0.002 0.229 0.091 0.275 0.058 0.345 
Total 0.240 0.239 0.065 0.209 0.034 0.212 
Tax Autonomy 
Developing 0.481 0.250 0.040 0.142 0.010 0.077 
Developed 0.002 0.229 0.091 0.275 0.058 0.345 
Total 0.240 0.239 0.065 0.209 0.034 0.212 
Government 
Stability 
Developing 0.519 0.231 0.036 0.133 0.009 0.072 
Developed 0.002 0.230 0.088 0.276 0.055 0.349 
Total 0.269 0.230 0.061 0.202 0.031 0.206 
Government 
Fractionalization 
Developing 0.550 0.224 0.034 0.108 0.007 0.076 
Developed 0.002 0.226 0.091 0.270 0.046 0.365 
Total 0.295 0.225 0.061 0.183 0.026 0.210 
Bailout 
Developing 0.550 0.224 0.034 0.108 0.007 0.076 
Developed 0.002 0.226 0.091 0.270 0.046 0.365 
Total 0.295 0.225 0.061 0.183 0.026 0.210 
Population Growth 
Developing 0.550 0.224 0.034 0.108 0.007 0.076 
Developed 0.002 0.226 0.091 0.270 0.046 0.365 
Total 0.295 0.225 0.061 0.183 0.026 0.210 
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Table 6. Probabilities of Choosing Sub-National Borrowing Regime at Average Values of 
Independent Variables, Developing versus Developed Countries, Specification with General 
Government Primary Balance 
Variable Sample 
P
ro
h
ib
it
ed
 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
C
o
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
C
en
tr
al
 R
u
le
 
S
el
f 
R
u
le
 
M
ar
k
et
 
Liquid Liabilities 
Developing 0.354 0.241 0.056 0.207 0.015 0.127 
Developed 0.000 0.185 0.226 0.272 0.080 0.236 
Total 0.168 0.212 0.145 0.241 0.049 0.184 
Financial Freedom 
Developing 0.368 0.234 0.050 0.205 0.018 0.124 
Developed 0.000 0.176 0.249 0.267 0.061 0.246 
Total 0.175 0.204 0.155 0.238 0.041 0.188 
SNG primary 
balance 
Developing 0.369 0.234 0.049 0.203 0.020 0.125 
Developed 0.000 0.166 0.262 0.275 0.058 0.239 
Total 0.175 0.199 0.161 0.240 0.040 0.185 
GDP Per Capita 
Developing 0.369 0.234 0.042 0.234 0.013 0.108 
Developed 0.000 0.201 0.179 0.251 0.051 0.317 
Total 0.175 0.217 0.114 0.243 0.033 0.218 
SNG Expenditures 
Developing 0.404 0.260 0.058 0.181 0.012 0.086 
Developed 0.000 0.196 0.096 0.292 0.073 0.343 
Total 0.192 0.226 0.078 0.239 0.044 0.221 
SNG Own 
Revenues 
Developing 0.482 0.238 0.042 0.149 0.010 0.079 
Developed 0.002 0.217 0.083 0.286 0.065 0.346 
Total 0.241 0.227 0.063 0.218 0.038 0.213 
Tax Autonomy 
Developing 0.482 0.238 0.042 0.149 0.010 0.079 
Developed 0.002 0.217 0.083 0.286 0.065 0.346 
Total 0.241 0.227 0.063 0.218 0.038 0.213 
Government 
Stability 
Developing 0.520 0.220 0.038 0.139 0.008 0.074 
Developed 0.002 0.218 0.082 0.288 0.060 0.350 
Total 0.269 0.219 0.060 0.211 0.033 0.208 
Government 
Fractionalization 
Developing 0.550 0.213 0.037 0.115 0.007 0.079 
Developed 0.002 0.214 0.085 0.284 0.051 0.364 
Total 0.295 0.214 0.059 0.193 0.027 0.211 
Bailout 
Developing 0.550 0.213 0.037 0.115 0.007 0.079 
Developed 0.002 0.214 0.085 0.284 0.051 0.364 
Total 0.295 0.214 0.059 0.193 0.027 0.211 
Population 
Growth 
Developing 0.550 0.213 0.037 0.115 0.007 0.079 
Developed 0.002 0.214 0.085 0.284 0.051 0.364 
Total 0.295 0.214 0.059 0.193 0.027 0.211 
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Sub-National Borrowing and Fiscal Performance 
General Government Fiscal Performance 
As discussed above, an important problem with estimating equation (6.1) directly is the possible 
the reverse causality problem between the sub-national primary balance (and through it, general 
government primary balance), and the choice of sub-national borrowing regulations. Countries 
with less disciplined sub-national governments may choose stricter type of regulations, while 
countries with more disciplined sub-national governments may rely more on market-based 
regulations. This problem is partly alleviated by the fact that most countries had decided on sub-
national borrowing regulations before the observed period of this study, suggesting that the 
average sub-national fiscal balances could not directly affect the choice. However, because 
current average sub-national fiscal balances tend to correlate with past averages, the endogeneity 
concern still exists. 
To resolve this issue, the first stage in the instrumental variable regression is modified to 
incorporate a multinomial logit model to estimate the probabilities of choosing different types of 
borrowing regulations. The results of the first-stage estimation are summarized in Table A.6. The 
probabilities of adopting each approach estimated in the first stage are then used instead of their 
respective dummy variables in the second stage to estimate equation (6.1) using a 2SLS 
approach.   
Table 7 presents the results for the effect of sub-national borrowing and regulations on 
the general government primary balance. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 7 show the results obtained 
by applying the dynamic GMM estimator to estimate equation (6.1) when sub-national 
borrowing regulations are assumed to be exogenous. Columns 3-6, on the other hand, show the 
results obtained when the assumed endogeneity in sub-national borrowing regulations is 
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corrected by using the previously predicted values obtained from estimating equation (6.11) by 
the multinomial logit estimator. As the results suggest, after correcting for endogeneity some 
coefficients change sign and/or statistical significance.  
According to the results in columns 3-6 in Table 7, allowing borrowing at the sub-
national level, ceteris paribus, has a significant and positive effect on general government 
primary balance. This result is consistent with expectations because it assumes no restrictions on 
either the amount of borrowing or its purpose. That is, once the sub-national government is 
allowed to borrow from private financial markets, and can borrow as much as it wants and for 
any purpose, it may as well borrow to finance the current deficit. Once we account for the 
existence of sub-national borrowing regulations, we obtain different conclusions for different 
types of regulations. For example, centrally-imposed rules and market-based regulations seem to 
reduce its positive effect on primary balance. On the other hand, cooperative types of sub-
national borrowing regulations seem to have positive effect on the primary balance.  
The negative effect of rule-based regulations is expected because as soon as the rules are 
imposed, the sub-national governments may have to reduce the amount of borrowing. This 
reduction in the amount of borrowing is the result of the requirements the sub-national 
governments must meet considering revenues, expenditures and deficit.37 Therefore, sub-national 
governments’ ability to finance deficits through borrowing is thus reduced. The negative effect 
of the market-based regulations is the result of the similar reason, except in this case the sub-
national governments have to improve their creditworthiness in order to be able to borrow with 
lower interest rates. Since the level of indebtedness contributes to a higher cost of borrowing, 
sub-national governments may reduce the amount of borrowing, so they may less be able to 
                                                          
37 Recall that this variable does not include the “golden rule” and limit on borrowing and debt.  
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cover the deficit. Finally, as discussed in Chapter IV, the cooperative type of regulations includes 
many components of the other three types, and if it is properly implemented, this type of 
regulations shows the positive characteristics of the other types. The estimated positive effect of 
cooperative regulations when the sub-national debt is increasing provides support for this 
conjecture.    
Furthermore, the results suggest that the “golden rule” and imposed limits on sub-
national borrowing and debt are efficient in regulating sub-national borrowing and improving the 
effectiveness of a broad variety of regulations. Moreover, when sub-national governments have 
to face legal sanctions for non-compliance to imposed fiscal rules, they may have better fiscal 
performance. The coefficient for this variable, however, sometimes shows no effect on the 
primary balance, which may be explained by the noise in its measurement. In fact, legal 
sanctions for non-compliance can be administrative, financial or political, and no distinction was 
made between them while creating this variable due to basic data limitations. Given that not all 
types of sanctions are equally efficient, the estimated coefficient on this variable may not be 
robust. Finally, the results suggest that allowing sub-national governments to enter foreign 
financial markets may deteriorate countries fiscal performance. A possible reason for this is that 
access to the foreign financial markets may increase exposure to the external shocks. 
Next, a greater dependence on financing from the central government, negatively affects 
the effectiveness of regulations based on fiscal rules (especially self-imposed rules) and 
administrative regulation. This negative effect of intergovernmental transfers may be due to 
moral hazard, especially in case of the administrative regulation. Moreover, high dependence on 
intergovernmental transfers may be reducing the effectiveness of self-imposed rules through 
reduced commitment to the rules. On the other hand, cooperative and market-based regulations 
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seem to have positive effects on the primary fiscal balance in the case of a high dependence on 
transfers. In the case of cooperative regulations, this effect may be explained by possible higher 
transparency given that representatives of all government units cooperatively make decisions on 
fiscal policy. Moreover, the positive effect of market-based regulations on the primary fiscal 
balance in the case of high financing from the central government budget may be explained in 
the following way. High sub-national dependence on intergovernmental transfers may make 
creditors feel more certain that a borrower may be more likely bailed out in case of default, and 
to decide to lend more funds to the borrower. This would increase the indebtedness of the debtor 
and the interest on debt, causing the primary balance to be higher, given that interest payments 
are not included in the primary balance. The results also suggest that a history of bailouts has a 
very significant negative effect on the general government primary balance. 
Furthermore, in the case of high dependence on intergovernmental transfers, their 
predictability (i.e., transfers allocated based on a predictable formula) seems to have a positive 
effect on the general government primary balance. The effect of predictability of transfers on the 
primary balance, however, is not straightforward. According to the results, only when the share 
of intergovernmental transfers in the sub-national total revenue is at least 30 percent, does their 
predictability have a positive effect on the primary balance. The results also suggest that sub-
national tax autonomy positively affects a country’s overall fiscal performance, especially when 
the sub-national governments rely less on financing from the central government budget and 
more on own-source revenues.  
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Table 7. Effect of Sub-national Borrowing on General Government Primary Balance 
 GMM 
(regulations exogenous) 
GMM 
(regulations endogenous) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
GG Primary balance-1 0.188 0.205 0.376*** 0.215 0.215 0.204 
 (0.149) (0.147) (0.128) (0.147) (0.134) (0.142) 
SNG debt 0.048* 0.026 0.525*** 0.598*** 0.202 0.493** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.181) (0.205) (0.192) (0.199) 
Administrative 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.078*** 0.188*** 0.135*** 0.171*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.024) (0.038) (0.027) (0.034) 
Cooperative 0.056*** 0.069*** -0.069** -0.158*** -0.161*** -0.166*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.029) (0.038) (0.035) (0.037) 
Central Rules 0.020*** 0.019** 0.074*** 0.165*** 0.175*** 0.150*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.023) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030) 
Self Rules 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.058 0.257** 0.291*** 0.301*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.076) (0.103) (0.094) (0.097) 
Market 0.025*** 0.022** -0.154*** -0.308*** -0.339*** -0.309*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.041) (0.062) (0.058) (0.057) 
SNG debt * Administrative -0.418*** -0.423*** -1.177*** -0.173 0.196 -0.203 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.392) (0.412) (0.431) (0.420) 
SNG debt * Cooperative -0.400*** -0.399*** 0.182 1.068*** 1.251*** 1.068*** 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.274) (0.365) (0.362) (0.357) 
SNG debt * Central Rules -0.290*** -0.279*** -0.415** -0.676*** -0.355* -0.511** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.183) (0.221) (0.198) (0.207) 
SNG debt * Self Rules -0.571*** -0.541*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.127) (0.126) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SNG debt * Market 0.000 0.000 -0.695*** -0.482* 0.151 -0.404 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.264) (0.289) (0.298) (0.282) 
Sanctions -0.006*** -0.002 0.005*** 0.003** -0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Limit on debt -0.028*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.025*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
SNG debt * Limit on debt 0.296*** 0.268*** 0.150*** 0.236*** 0.216*** 0.201*** 
 (0.049) (0.047) (0.034) (0.043) (0.036) (0.036) 
“Golden rule” -0.009*** -0.013***  -0.021*** -0.014*** -0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
SNG debt * “Golden rule” 0.177*** 0.199***  0.192*** 0.116*** 0.171*** 
 (0.032) (0.037)  (0.035) (0.023) (0.031) 
Foreign -0.008*** -0.010***  -0.008*** -0.004** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SNG debt * Foreign -0.009 0.019  -0.068** -0.095*** -0.065** 
 (0.026) (0.026)  (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) 
IGT -0.039*** -0.028*** -0.002 0.021** -0.010 0.011 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
IGT * Administrative 0.027*** 0.010 -0.098*** -0.179*** -0.112*** -0.168*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.029) (0.038) (0.028) (0.035) 
IGT * Cooperative -0.025 -0.054*** 0.109** 0.055 0.125** 0.104** 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.047) (0.052) (0.051) (0.050) 
IGT * Central Rules 0.026 0.024 -0.030 -0.118*** -0.068* -0.100** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.036) (0.044) (0.036) (0.039) 
IGT * Self Rules 0.060* 0.048 -0.467*** -1.031*** -0.782*** -1.010*** 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.151) (0.216) (0.165) (0.199) 
IGT * Market -0.016 -0.013 0.265*** 0.454*** 0.414*** 0.464*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.075) (0.094) (0.080) (0.089) 
Transfer formula -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.022*** -0.027*** -0.018*** -0.021*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
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IGT* Transfer formula 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.040*** 0.069*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) 
Tax autonomy -0.012** -0.010** 0.009* 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
IGT * Tax autonomy 0.009 0.009 -0.043*** -0.057*** -0.070*** -0.062*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
SNG Expenditures    0.001   
    (0.020)   
Urbanization 0.149 0.251** 0.239*** 0.448*** 0.208*** 0.305*** 
 (0.100) (0.104) (0.066) (0.093) (0.071) (0.081) 
Population growth  -0.294***    -0.317*** 
  (0.104)    (0.099) 
Age Dependency -0.128***    -0.142***  
 (0.024)    (0.024)  
Government Stability -0.001***  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  
 (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  
Government fractionalization -0.001 0.001   -0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) 
Corruption -0.000    -0.001*  
 (0.001)    (0.001)  
CBI 0.010* 0.014** 0.017*** 0.029*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Bailout 0.006*** 0.003* -0.016*** -0.038*** -0.029*** -0.031*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
GDP per capita 0.003** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Inflation  0.000    0.000 
  (0.001)    (0.001) 
SGP -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.006** -0.008*** -0.004 -0.007*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Corr (Y, Yhat) sq. 0.649 0.644 0.798 0.799 0.801 0.801 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.790 0.775 0.174 0.241 0.212 0.220 
AR(2) Test (p-value) 0.926 0.950 0.755 0.671 0.736 0.641 
Observations 745 745 749 749 745 745 
Number of id 57 57 57 57 57 57 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Sub-national Government Fiscal Performance 
As discussed above, in the case of sub-national government insolvency, the general government 
can react in of the following three ways. First, the central government can decide to cover the 
sub-national fiscal imbalances (i.e., bailout). Second, it can re-design the tax and/or transfer 
system through which the sub-national government would receive a larger portion of the overall 
revenues collected. Finally, the central government can ignore the sub-national fiscal imbalances. 
Regardless of which option the central government chooses, the overall national fiscal balance is 
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likely to deteriorate. However, to obtain a better picture about which of these three scenarios is 
more likely to happen, equation (6.1) is estimated again but this time with the sub-national 
primary balance as the dependent variable. 
Table 8. Effect of Sub-national Borrowing on Sub-National Government Primary Balance 
 GMM 
(regulations exogenous) 
GMM 
(regulations endogenous) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
SNG Primary balance-1 0.651*** 0.717*** 0.552*** 0.604*** 0.503*** 0.588*** 
 (0.171) (0.173) (0.176) (0.174) (0.177) (0.166) 
CG Primary Balance -0.028 -0.034 -0.060 -0.025 -0.034 -0.032 
 (0.122) (0.126) (0.107) (0.109) (0.099) (0.105) 
SNG debt -0.016 -0.038 0.358 0.257 0.170 0.254 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.240) (0.264) (0.233) (0.248) 
Administrative -0.003 -0.003 0.041 0.051 0.051* 0.047 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.033) (0.034) (0.030) (0.031) 
Cooperative 0.014 0.014 -0.011 -0.008 -0.043 -0.024 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) 
Central Rules 0.002 -0.001 0.058** 0.071** 0.096*** 0.069** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.028) (0.032) (0.035) (0.029) 
Self Rules 0.015 0.011 0.038 0.128 0.169 0.120 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.093) (0.109) (0.106) (0.109) 
Market 0.011 0.007 -0.126** -0.166*** -0.199*** -0.156*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.051) (0.059) (0.064) (0.055) 
SNG debt * Administrative -0.132 -0.109 -0.829 -0.297 -0.232 -0.367 
 (0.086) (0.082) (0.542) (0.539) (0.499) (0.529) 
SNG debt * Cooperative -0.132* -0.108 0.277 0.540 0.645* 0.489 
 (0.073) (0.069) (0.362) (0.386) (0.380) (0.376) 
SNG debt * Central Rules -0.083 -0.057 -0.312 -0.257 -0.252 -0.286 
 (0.056) (0.052) (0.235) (0.273) (0.239) (0.251) 
SNG debt * Self Rules -0.176 -0.139 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.134) (0.127) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SNG debt * Market 0.000 0.000 -0.480 -0.243 -0.040 -0.243 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.350) (0.377) (0.346) (0.359) 
Sanctions -0.000 0.001 0.004** 0.004* 0.001 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Limit on debt -0.012** -0.009* -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.012*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
SNG debt * Limit on debt 0.109** 0.086* 0.094** 0.066 0.086** 0.059* 
 (0.053) (0.047) (0.047) (0.041) (0.042) (0.035) 
“Golden rule” -0.005 -0.006*  -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
SNG debt * “Golden rule” 0.064* 0.058  0.081** 0.073*** 0.082*** 
 (0.035) (0.036)  (0.032) (0.024) (0.028) 
Foreign -0.004 -0.004  -0.004* -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
SNG debt * Foreign 0.013 0.032  -0.032 -0.057* -0.037 
 (0.034) (0.036)  (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) 
IGT -0.027*** -0.021** -0.009 -0.006 -0.017** -0.011 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
IGT * Administrative 0.031*** 0.025** -0.013 -0.009 -0.014 -0.010 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.050) (0.051) (0.043) (0.047) 
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IGT * Cooperative 0.013 0.007 -0.049 -0.098 -0.026 -0.077 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.090) 
IGT * Central Rules 0.029 0.028 -0.035 -0.038 -0.029 -0.033 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.043) (0.046) (0.040) (0.042) 
IGT * Self Rules 0.027 0.020 -0.327* -0.441** -0.455** -0.428** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.192) (0.224) (0.198) (0.213) 
IGT * Market 0.003 0.004 0.246*** 0.259*** 0.286*** 0.263*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.086) (0.091) (0.086) (0.088) 
Transfer formula -0.010 -0.008 -0.018*** -0.012** -0.010** -0.010** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
IGT* Transfer formula 0.022 0.016 0.028** 0.024* 0.028** 0.023* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Tax autonomy -0.007 -0.007 0.001 -0.000 0.006 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
IGT * Tax autonomy 0.015 0.017 -0.009 0.004 -0.016 0.001 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) 
SNG Expenditures    -0.033   
    (0.022)   
Urbanization 0.088 0.100 0.245*** 0.339*** 0.243*** 0.271*** 
 (0.117) (0.126) (0.077) (0.091) (0.075) (0.082) 
Population growth  -0.113    -0.051 
  (0.134)    (0.124) 
Age Dependency -0.052**    -0.064**  
 (0.024)    (0.028)  
Government Stability -0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Government fractionalization -0.002 -0.002   -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.003) 
Corruption -0.001    -0.001  
 (0.001)    (0.001)  
CBI 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Bailout 0.002 0.000 -0.014** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
GDP per capita 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Inflation  -0.000    -0.000 
  (0.001)    (0.001) 
SGP -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Corr (Y, Yhat) 0.841 0.856 0.861 0.864 0.841 0.856 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.899 0.884 0.492 0.424 0.899 0.884 
AR(2) Test (p-value) 0.438 0.413 0.278 0.256 0.438 0.413 
Observations 745 745 749 749 745 745 
Number of id 57 57 57 57 57 57 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
As the results in Table 8 suggest, sub-national debt does not seem to affect the sub-
national primary balance, ceteris paribus. Moreover, none of the broad types of sub-national 
borrowing regulations seems to have an effect on sub-national primary balances in the case of 
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high sub-national debt. However, the “golden rule” and imposed limits on sub-national 
borrowing and debt seem to have a positive and significant effect on the sub-national primary 
balance.  
Furthermore, in the case of a high level of financing from the central government budget, 
market-based regulation seems to have positive effect on the sub-national primary balance, as 
opposed to self-imposed fiscal rules. These results are consistent with those obtained for the 
general government primary balance. Moreover, the negative effect of intergovernmental 
transfers on fiscal performance is diminished when transfers are predictable, which is also 
consistent with its effect on the general government primary balance. Finally, at the sub-national 
level, tax autonomy has no effect on fiscal performance when there is high reliance on central 
government financing, suggesting that, at the margin, sub-national tax autonomy does not matter 
much for the fiscal performance.  
Sub-National Borrowing and Duration of Fiscal Sustainability 
This section of the chapter evaluates the effect of sub-national borrowing and its regulations on 
the duration of fiscal sustainability using duration analysis. Results obtained by this approach 
contribute to the final conclusions by providing a slightly different view on the issue investigated 
in this study. The results previously discussed support the observation of how the primary 
balance itself changes as a result of changes in its components and factors that influence it. 
However, a change in the primary balance suggests that it may be moving closer to or moving 
away from a fiscally sustainable balance, but does not necessarily mean that it is fiscally 
sustainable. Duration analysis, however, allows us to investigate this issue by making 
assumptions about different levels of a fiscally sustainable primary balance.  
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As discussed above, two alternative thresholds of fiscally sustainable primary balance to 
GDP are assumed, namely 0 and -3 percent, based on which the failure and duration variables are 
calculated. Furthermore, because the reverse causality between the level of primary balance and 
the chosen sub-national regulations still exists, prior to estimating equation (6.8), we estimate the 
probabilities of choosing types of regulation. These are then used in equation (6.8) (see Table 
A.6 for the results of the first stage regression). Finally, equation (6.8) is estimated for both the 
general and the sub-national government primary balances. 
General Government Fiscal Sustainability 
Before estimating marginal effects on the median duration of fiscal sustainability, it is important 
to determine which one among three previously discussed hazard functions should be chosen.  
Log likelihood ratio, Akaike information criteria (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 
are used to discriminate among three parametric models. Although the best fitting model is the 
one with the largest log likelihood, the preferred model is the one with the smallest AIC value. 
Table A.7 shows that the Weibull estimation is the parametric model that at the same time best 
fits the data (has the largest log likelihood) and also is the most preferred (has the smallest both 
AIC and BIC value). This conclusion holds for both 0 and -3 percent thresholds, and for both 
general and sub-national government primary balance.  
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Table 9. Marginal Effects on Median Reported Duration, General Government Primary Balance 
 Threshold = 0% Threshold = -3% 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Number of previous failures -1.712*** -1.709*** -1.725*** -1.734*** -0.981*** -1.02*** -1.045*** -1.000*** 
 (0.285) (0.282) (0.275) (0.288) (0.111) (0.111) (0.103) (0.106) 
Initial budget balance 0.422*** 0.426*** 0.437*** 0.412*** 0.164*** 0.179*** 0.225*** 0.192*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) 
Size of the adjustment 1.451 1.019 -1.870 1.496 5.515** 5.804** 1.498 6.788*** 
 (1.868) (1.89) (1.862) (1.794) (2.274) (2.279) (2.158) (2.195) 
SNG debt -0.465*** -0.490*** -0.473*** -0.476*** -0.262 -0.110 -0.104 -0.130 
 (0.134) (0.143) (0.135) (0.143) (0.171) (0.186) (0.173) (0.184) 
Administrative -3.606*** -3.393*** -3.585*** -3.357*** 1.213 0.822 0.699 0.518 
 (0.049) (0.996) (0.971) (0.078) (2.785) (2.743) (2.689) (2.808) 
Cooperative 0.371 0.793 0.630 -0.313 -1.096 0.127 1.449 -0.029 
 (3.379) (3.371) (3.385) (3.699) (4.458) (4.499) (4.403) (4.745) 
Central Rules -0.941 -1.142 -0.574 -1.328 -3.918 -5.142 -5.462* -5.204** 
 (2.339) (2.418) (2.345) (2.479) (3.126) (3.349) (3.145) (2.164) 
Self Rules -2.823*** -3.084*** -2.437*** -3.454*** -2.052** -3.208*** -2.971*** -3.386*** 
 (0.749) (0.819) (0.842) (0.920) (0.938) (1.102) (1.084) (1.174) 
Market 1.460*** 1.538*** 1.243*** 1.574*** 1.130* 1.477** 1.423** 1.562** 
 (0.411) (0.434) (0.418) (0.432) (0.591) (0.660) (0.639) (0.644) 
SNG debt * Administrative -0.273 -0.311 -0.397** -0.287 0.275 0.044 -0.121 0.138 
 (0.214) (0.213) (0.201) (0.216) (0.278) (0.287) (0.263) (0.284) 
SNG debt * Cooperative 0.320** 0.299* 0.240 0.271 0.186 0.034 -0.055 0.016 
 (0.159) (0.157) (0.151) (0.182) (0.210) (0.218) (0.209) (0.232) 
SNG debt * Central Rules 0.361* 0.368* 0.342* 0.327 0.516* 0.390 0.368 0.412 
 (0.204) (0.205) (0.193) (0.207) (0.272) (0.293) (0.278) (0.285) 
SNG debt * Self Rules 1.531*** 1.622*** 1.515*** 1.653*** 0.663 0.525 0.459 0.606 
 (0.369) (0.386) (0.387) (0.416) (0.454) (0.449) (0.428) (0.455) 
SNG debt * Market 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sanctions -0.100 -0.163 -0.052 -0.197 -0.572*** -0.835*** -0.813*** -0.933*** 
 (0.196) (0.201) (0.197) (0.206) (0.223) (0.229) (0.231) (0.242) 
Limit on debt 0.177 -0.107 -0.253 -0.168 0.978*** 0.490 0.213 0.515 
 (0.253) (0.287) (0.296) (0.305) (0.305) (0.310) (0.316) (0.321) 
SNG debt * Limit on debt -0.039* -0.026 -0.027 -0.008 -0.044 -0.008 0.005 0.001 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) 
“Golden rule”  0.597** 0.247 0.474  1.007*** 0.649** 1.071*** 
  (0.297) (0.307) (0.300)  (0.298) (0.309) (0.309) 
SNG debt * “Golden rule”  -0.007 -0.009 -0.009  -0.089*** -0.109*** -0.104*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)  (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
Foreign  0.139 0.035 0.075  0.401 0.279 0.339 
  (0.259) (0.249) (0.265)  (0.290) (0.278) (0.303) 
SNG debt * Foreign  0.001 0.017 0.008  -0.070 -0.048 -0.058 
  (0.033) (0.029) (0.034)  (0.046) (0.041) (0.046) 
IGT -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.044*** -0.040*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.032*** 0.046*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
IGT * Administrative 0.116*** 0.131*** 0.116*** 0.129*** -0.073* -0.061 -0.065 -0.069 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) 
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IGT * Cooperative 0.148*** 0.139*** 0.206*** 0.152*** 0.054 0.020 0.116* 0.037 
 (0.042) (0.050) (0.049) (0.053) (0.062) (0.071) (0.070) (0.073) 
IGT * Central Rules -0.006 -0.018 -0.023 -0.019 0.015 0.016 0.030 0.025 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.06) (0.063) (0.058) (0.059) 
IGT * Self Rules 0.12 0.116 0.039 0.158 0.261* 0.502*** 0.488** 0.524*** 
 (0.124) (0.132) (0.133) (0.132) (0.158) (0.194) (0.194) (0.192) 
IGT * Market -0.018 -0.007 0.049 -0.038 -0.167 -0.240** -0.214* -0.276** 
 (0.063) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.102) (0.115) (0.113) (0.112) 
Transfer formula 0.419 0.008 0.644 -0.232 0.410 0.092 0.893 -0.046 
 (0.422) (0.456) (0.48) (0.459) (0.532) (0.555) (0.563) (0.572) 
IGT* Transfer formula -0.017** -0.011 -0.018* -0.006 -0.005 0.000 -0.007 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Tax autonomy -0.284 -0.039 0.492 0.211 1.061 1.569 2.576** 2.069** 
 (0.489) (0.511) (0.509) (0.534) (0.891) (0.998) (1.009) (1.02) 
IGT * Tax autonomy 0.011 0.004 -0.012 0.000 -0.034* -0.045** -0.070*** -0.056*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.02) (0.019) (0.02) 
SNG Expenditures  0.004    0.019   
  (0.022)    (0.032)   
Urbanization -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.025** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.029*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Population growth    0.080    -0.111 
    (0.112)    (0.146) 
Age Dependency   -0.009    -0.031*  
   (0.014)    (0.017)  
Government Stability 0.245*** 0.260*** 0.260***  0.210*** 0.199*** 0.223***  
 (0.047) (0.048) (0.045)  (0.059) (0.061) (0.056)  
Government fractionalization   0.087 0.046   0.421 0.351 
   (0.299) (0.313)   (0.331) (0.343) 
Corruption   -0.484***    -0.732***  
   (0.079)    (0.103)  
CBI 1.722*** 1.658*** 1.779*** 1.734*** 2.615*** 3.422*** 3.507*** 3.285*** 
 (0.46) (0.511) (0.49) (0.504) (0.594) (0.621) (0.629) (0.636) 
Bailout 0.141 0.231 0.329 0.03 0.146 0.237 0.556 0.27 
 (0.435) (0.433) (0.411) (0.475) (0.520) (0.510) (0.473) (0.551) 
GDP per capita 0.239* 0.393*** 0.585*** 0.466*** 0.691*** 0.844*** 1.110*** 0.848*** 
 (0.128) (0.135) (0.130) (0.135) (0.157) (0.178) (0.169) (0.172) 
Inflation    -0.179***    -0.328*** 
    (0.051)    (0.06) 
SGP 0.049 -0.128 -0.122 -0.115 -0.374 -0.603* -0.413 -0.452 
  (0.341) (0.333) (0.331) (0.329) (0.318) (0.316) (0.330) (0.322) 
Duration Dependence Parameter 
(P) 2.783 2.827 2.870 2.800 3.867 3.904 4.205 3.933 
Median 3.992 3.990 3.992 3.997 5.844 5.844 5.850 5.845 
OBS 806 806 806 806 806 806 806 806 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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The results in Table 9 show that median duration is 4 years for the zero percent threshold 
and around 6 years for the -3 percent threshold. Furthermore, the results suggest that the effect of 
sub-national outstanding debt on fiscal sustainability depends on the definition of fiscal 
sustainability. When a 0 percent threshold is used to define fiscal sustainability, the sub-national 
outstanding debt regulated by self-imposed rules seems to increase the duration of fiscal 
sustainability by around one year above the median. Other types of sub-national borrowing 
regulations seem to have either no or very small negative effects on the duration of fiscal 
sustainability. Moreover, the “golden rule” has a positive effect on the duration of fiscal 
sustainability when the more relaxed -3 percent definition of fiscal sustainability is used. This 
positive effect, however, is reduced as sub-national outstanding debt increases. On the other 
hand, when fiscal sustainability is defined using the 0 percent threshold, the “golden rule” seems 
to have no effect on its duration. 
Furthermore, the effect of intergovernmental transfers on duration of fiscal sustainability 
also depends on the definition of fiscal sustainability. With no restricted sub-national borrowing, 
intergovernmental transfers in fact have a very small effect on the duration of fiscal sustainability 
(around half of a month for one percentage point increase in intergovernmental transfers). 
Moreover, more centralized types of sub-national borrowing regulations (i.e., administrative and 
cooperative regulations) seem to have an effect on duration of fiscal sustainability when the 
stricter (0 percent) definition of fiscal sustainability is used. On the other hand, more 
decentralized types of sub-national borrowing regulations are more effective when more relaxed 
(-3 percent) definition is implemented.  
 
 
 144 
 
Table 10. Marginal Effects on Median Reported Duration, Sub-National Government Primary 
Balance 
  0% -3% 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Number of previous failures -3.373*** -3.375*** -3.238*** -3.332*** -0.760*** -0.760*** -0.749*** -0.783*** 
 (0.192) (0.19) (0.19) (0.193) (0.087) (0.091) (0.082) (0.086) 
Initial budget balance 0.157*** 0.161*** 0.193*** 0.177*** 0.142*** 0.147*** 0.191*** 0.151*** 
 (0.03) (0.029) (0.032) (0.031) (0.040) (0.041) (0.038) (0.042) 
Size of the adjustment 3.9 3.525 3.376 4.921* 8.590** 7.643** 4.512 9.134*** 
 (3.084) (2.965) (3.033) (2.93) (3.42) (3.497) (3.050) (3.418) 
SNG Primary Balance 7.036*** 6.435*** 5.691*** 7.106*** 5.270** 3.463 4.350* 5.452** 
 (2.024) (2.117) (2.033) (2.002) (2.676) (2.850) (2.583) (2.692) 
SNG debt -0.393*** -0.407** -0.551*** -0.403** -0.359*** -0.228 -0.312* -0.287 
 (0.148) (0.165) (0.165) (0.171) (0.137) (0.182) (0.165) (0.181) 
Administrative -3.274* -3.52* -2.852 -3.489* -0.572 -1.629 -3.059 -2.917 
 (1.818) (1.806) (1.853) (1.895) (2.467) (2.518) (2.401) (2.614) 
Cooperative 0.867*** 0.910** 0.909** 0.934** 0.431 0.681 0.860* 0.552 
 (0.336) (0.379) (0.369) (0.376) (0.442) (0.513) (0.474) (0.490) 
Central Rules -1.876 -2.430 -3.142 -2.955 -3.389 -5.292* -5.434** -5.103* 
 (3.039) (3.084) (2.088) (3.087) (3.079) (3.217) (2.165) (3.079) 
Self Rules -1.166 -1.827* -1.757 -2.497** 0.583 -1.355 -0.854 -1.172 
 (0.977) (1.100) (1.129) (1.150) (1.078) (1.291) (1.262) (1.366) 
Market 1.340*** 1.508*** 1.666*** 1.580*** 0.545 0.802 0.984* 0.921 
 (0.493) (0.523) (0.519) (0.546) (0.523) (0.575) (0.520) (0.566) 
SNG debt * Administrative -0.218 -0.317 -0.331 -0.284 0.109 -0.047 -0.194 0.027 
 (0.257) (0.259) (0.249) (0.26) (0.271) (0.294) (0.279) (0.296) 
SNG debt * Cooperative -0.254 -0.330* -0.268 -0.336* -0.192 -0.391 -0.515** -0.452* 
 (0.161) (0.177) (0.176) (0.181) (0.209) (0.247) (0.236) (0.248) 
SNG debt * Central Rules 0.394* 0.440* 0.652*** 0.420* 0.595*** 0.532** 0.628*** 0.531** 
 (0.23) (0.249) (0.241) (0.249) (0.220) (0.252) (0.241) (0.247) 
SNG debt * Self Rules 1.224*** 1.286** 1.573*** 1.420*** 1.073** 1.292** 1.186** 1.397*** 
 (0.475) (0.540) (0.545) (0.554) (0.446) (0.528) (0.501) (0.522) 
SNG debt * Market 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sanctions -0.569*** -0.483** -0.181 -0.342 -0.661*** -0.880*** -0.791*** -1.032*** 
 (0.190) (0.217) (0.247) (0.243) (0.216) (0.244) (0.243) (0.25) 
Limit on debt 0.518** 0.523* 0.520* 0.407 1.074*** 0.930*** 0.945*** 0.949*** 
 (0.256) (0.276) (0.266) (0.27) (0.312) (0.330) (0.313) (0.322) 
SNG debt * Limit on debt -0.087*** -0.083*** -0.089*** -0.069** -0.088*** -0.076** -0.111*** -0.063* 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) 
“Golden rule”  -0.005 -0.333 0.022  0.184 -0.258 0.131 
  (0.334) (0.321) (0.321)  (0.312) (0.311) (0.315) 
SNG debt * “Golden rule”  -0.037 -0.031 -0.04  -0.048 -0.064** -0.047 
  (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)  (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) 
Foreign  0.222 0.131 0.216  1.004*** 0.901*** 0.855** 
  (0.281) (0.268) (0.283)  (0.323) (0.303) (0.340) 
SNG debt * Foreign  0.009 0.038 0.009  -0.107** -0.063 -0.083* 
  (0.031) (0.03) (0.031)  (0.047) (0.041) (0.047) 
IGT -0.003 -0.002 -0.007 -0.005 0.008 0.003 -0.014 0.004 
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 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
IGT * Administrative -0.006 -0.013 -0.027 -0.014 -0.041 -0.040 -0.025 -0.033 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.03) (0.028) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.039) 
IGT * Cooperative 0.003 0.022 0.101 0.025 0.017 0.015 0.098 0.053 
 (0.055) (0.062) (0.065) (0.063) (0.062) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) 
IGT * Central Rules -0.102* -0.086* -0.067 -0.078 0.026 0.066 0.117* 0.040 
 (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.060) (0.063) (0.061) (0.059) 
IGT * Self Rules -0.117 0.002 -0.062 0.057 -0.179 0.016 0.109 -0.038 
 (0.143) (0.150) (0.156) (0.151) (0.151) (0.182) (0.175) (0.186) 
IGT * Market 0.048 0.014 0.020 -0.016 0.024 -0.058 -0.093 -0.055 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.086) (0.092) (0.085) (0.089) 
Transfer formula -0.148 -0.043 0.469 -0.323 -0.101 -0.405 0.196 -0.376 
 (0.616) (0.628) (0.625) (0.669) (0.587) (0.609) (0.617) (0.610) 
IGT* Transfer formula 0.010 0.006 -0.001 0.009 0.006 0.014 0.009 0.015 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Tax autonomy -0.720 -0.853 -0.839 -0.924 -0.659 -0.454 0.264 -0.222 
 (0.588) (0.577) (0.553) (0.577) (0.697) (0.758) (0.746) (0.761) 
IGT * Tax autonomy 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.025* 0.005 0.000 -0.016 -0.007 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
SNG Expenditures  0.015    -0.004   
  (0.024)    (0.029)   
Urbanization -0.014** -0.018** -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.011 -0.015 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.01) (0.009) (0.010) 
Population growth    0.210    -0.305** 
    (0.132)    (0.151) 
Age Dependency   0.019    -0.059***  
   (0.018)    (0.018)  
Government Stability 0.124** 0.113** 0.123**  0.201*** 0.208*** 0.200***  
 (0.048) (0.050) (0.048)  (0.061) (0.062) (0.058)  
Government fractionalization   -0.085 -0.089   -0.258 0.000 
   (0.317) (0.300)   (0.355) (0.35) 
Corruption   -0.444***    -0.653***  
   (0.093)    (0.111)  
CBI 1.170** 1.563** 1.327** 1.553*** 2.166*** 2.697*** 2.221*** 2.44*** 
 (0.585) (0.619) (0.579) (0.590) (0.592) (0.636) (0.622) (0.636) 
Bailout 1.508 1.507 1.461 1.089 0.598 0.537 1.227 0.988 
 (0.43) (0.466) (0.433) (0.480) (0.492) (0.509) (0.476) (0.561) 
GDP per capita 0.536*** 0.528*** 0.755*** 0.550*** 0.868*** 0.944*** 1.014*** 1.001*** 
 (0.124) (0.127) (0.150) (0.128) (0.154) (0.159) (0.160) (0.162) 
Inflation    -0.231***    -0.334*** 
    (0.056)    (0.068) 
SGP -0.838*** -0.754** -0.841*** -0.757** -0.597** -0.551* -0.315 -0.369 
  (0.288) (0.325) (0.305) (0.323) (0.297) (0.327) (0.33) (0.329) 
Duration Dependence 
Parameter (P) 2.463 2.508 2.533 2.524 3.655 3.681 3.860 3.746 
Median 3.942 3.945 3.962 3.960 5.714 5.714 5.753 5.744 
OBS 806 806 806 806 806 806 806 806 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Moreover, sub-national tax autonomy has a significant and highly positive effect on the 
duration of fiscal sustainability when a more relaxed definition of fiscal sustainability is used. 
However, this positive effect is reduced the more sub-national governments are dependent on 
intergovernmental transfers. On the other hand, sub-national tax autonomy seems to have no 
effect on duration with the stronger definition of fiscal sustainability. 
Sub-national Government Fiscal Sustainability 
The results on the effect of sub-national borrowing and regulations on duration of sub-national 
fiscal sustainability are presented in Table 5.8. As the results suggest, the median duration is 
close to the one obtained for general government primary balance. Furthermore, the effect of 
sub-national borrowing and regulations on duration of fiscal sustainability seems to be more 
robust than in case of general government primary balance. According to the results, sub-
national debt regulated by self-imposed rules leads to an increase in the duration of fiscal 
sustainability by around one year above the median. Centrally-imposed rules have also a positive 
effect, but it is much smaller in magnitude.  
Furthermore, limits on borrowing and debt levels seem to have an effect on sub-national 
fiscal sustainability while the “golden rule” does not. Moreover, the effect of borrowing and debt 
limits declines as the level of sub-national outstanding debt increases. Interestingly, sanctions for 
non-compliance reduce the duration of fiscal sustainability below the median for both general 
and sub-national government primary balance. This effect actually measures the effect of a 
discrete change from no sanctions to their introduction, and is between 6 months and one year, 
depending on the specification. Hence, it suggests that introduction of sanctions for non-
compliance may reduce the duration of fiscal sustainability and this effect should be considered 
as short term.    
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter empirically investigated the effects of sub-national borrowing and its regulations on 
general and sub-national government fiscal performance and the duration of fiscal sustainability. 
Firstly, the determinants of the sub-national borrowing regulations are evaluated using the 
multinomial logit estimator. Next, the effect of sub-national borrowing on fiscal performance and 
sustainability is investigated using the system GMM estimator and the duration analysis.  
The results in this chapter suggest that the depth of the financial market is particularly 
important for choosing cooperative regulations and regulations based on centrally and self-
imposed rules. Furthermore, countries with higher primary balances (both general and sub-
national) are more likely to choose self-imposed rules and market-based regulations over the 
other types. Finally, countries with higher sub-national outstanding debt seem to be most likely 
to choose self-imposed fiscal rules to regulate sub-national borrowing.  
 The empirical results suggest that, in general, the conclusion about the effects of the sub-
national borrowing and regulations on fiscal sustainability depend on the level of government at 
which they are tested, and can be summarized as follows: 
 The cooperative type of the sub-national borrowing regulations seems to have positive 
effect on improving general government fiscal performance even in the case of a high 
level of sub-national debt and a high dependence on the intergovernmental transfers. 
However, none of the broad types of the sub-national borrowing regulations seems to 
show a significant effect on fiscal sustainability at the sub-national level. These results 
are not consistent with the expectations that policies focused on regulating sub-national 
behavior should be effective at the sub-national level. On the contrary, our results suggest 
that they have no effect at the sub-national level and provide support to the hypothesis 
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that sub-national fiscal behavior primarily affects the overall fiscal balance of the 
country; 
 When a particular level of the primary balance is predetermined to be considered as 
sustainable, then self-imposed rules seem to be the only effective method in maintaining 
the primary balance above that predetermined threshold, for all government levels;  
 The “golden rule” and limits on debt and borrowing positively affect the primary balance 
at all levels of government. However, their effectiveness in maintaining the primary 
balance above a predetermined threshold for a sustainable primary balance depends on 
the level of the threshold, being more efficient in the case of the lower threshold; 
 More centralized types of regulations (administrative and cooperative) seem to be more 
effective with a higher threshold for fiscally sustainable primary balance, while more 
decentralized regulations (self-imposed rules) seem to show better performance with 
lower thresholds; 
 Sub-national tax autonomy contributes to a higher general government primary balance 
but only when the sub-national governments do not depend on intergovernmental 
transfers. This effect is not found to be significant at the sub-national level, suggesting 
that the effect of sub-national tax autonomy is actually, on the margin, not significantly 
high; 
 In those countries with a history of bailouts at the sub-national government level, the 
primary balance is, on average, lower at both the sub-national and the general 
government levels than in other countries, suggesting the importance of the absence of 
moral hazard for fiscal responsibility. 
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The results obtained suggest that sub-national borrowing should not endanger fiscal 
sustainability if it is allowed only for financing capital investments, regardless of how centralized 
decisions on the borrowing issuances are. The limit on borrowing and debt is also proven to play 
important role on fiscal discipline. Sub-national tax autonomy does not seem to be as important 
as we expected given its low marginal effect. The results also emphasize the risk of a soft budget 
constraint and moral hazard. High central government financing may give encouraging signs to 
the sub-national governments to over-borrow and to expect to be bailed out by the central 
government. This deteriorates the general government budget directly, through the unplanned 
bailout from the central government, and indirectly, through the spillover effect on other sub-
national governments that are highly fiscally dependent on the central government transfers.  
Depending on how the central government defines the fiscally sustainable balance, it may 
choose more or less centralized types of the sub-national borrowing regulations. More 
centralized regulations of sub-national borrowing (e.g., administrative and cooperative) seem to 
be more appropriate when the central government’s definition of fiscal sustainability is more 
strict, while for a more relaxed definition of fiscal sustainability, the more decentralized options 
for regulating the sub-national borrowing seem to be more suitable. Finally, no one of the broad 
types of regulations shows a dominant effect on fiscal behavior at both the sub-national and the 
general government level.  
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VII. CONCLUSION, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND THE NEED FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
The debt crisis in Brazil and Argentina which involved the sub-national government borrowing 
are often used to illustrate potential danger of decentralizing borrowing autonomy on fiscal 
sustainability and macroeconomic stability. Moreover, recent events in the European Union 
related to the soaring government debt of some of its member countries and violations of fiscal 
rules add to the importance of revisiting this issue. The argument for this potential hazardous 
effect focuses on the possible moral hazard resulting from the soft budget constraint to the sub-
national governments.  
On the other side are the arguments in favor of devolving more borrowing autonomy to 
the sub-national governments. Financing large capital investments would be inefficient if it was 
done by the current revenues. Moreover, since the benefits of such investments are not enjoyed 
only by the current generation, but often spans over few future generations, it is equitable that 
future generations should too participate in their financing. Furthermore, access to the financial 
markets can increase fiscal transparency and political accountability of the sub-national 
governments. Finally, sub-national access to the financial markets contributes to their deepening.  
Hence, having in mind potential benefits of the sub-national borrowing, but as well its 
potential hazardous impact on fiscal sustainability, the challenge is how to simultaneously 
achieve both goals, allowing the sub-national governments to borrow and maintain fiscal 
sustainability. The main hypothesis which is the focus of this dissertation is that, if the sub-
national borrowing is numerically limited and restricted to only financing capital investments 
and the sub-national governments are provided with certain measure of revenue autonomy, then 
the sub-national borrowing should not endanger fiscal sustainability. The basic theoretical 
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framework for testing this hypothesis if first developed, and then the hypothesis is tested on a 
sample of 57 industrialized, developing and countries in transition using two alternative 
methodologies, namely, the “system” GMM and duration analysis. In overall, results of this 
study provide support for the main hypothesis of this dissertation.  
The theoretical results of this study are based on the assumption that borrowing is 
allowed only for financing capital investments and can be summarized as follows: 
 The fiscally sustainable debt limit increases with more revenue autonomy given to the 
sub-national governments if the transfer structure gives more incentive to an increase in 
revenue efforts and creditworthiness; and 
 Fiscally sustainable debt limit increases with borrowing regulations that target fiscal 
performance and the borrowing costs. 
These theoretical results suggest that giving more revenue autonomy to the sub-national 
governments and allocating the intergovernmental transfers in a way which would reward the 
sub-national revenue efforts should give the sub-national governments more ability to borrow 
without endangering fiscal sustainability. In addition, the results suggest that, besides allowing 
the sub-national borrowing for financing only the capital investments, the sub-national 
borrowing regulations which are based on the fiscal rules and the market discipline would be 
effective in maintaining the sub-national debt within the sustainable limit.  
  The empirical results suggest that, in general, the empirical support for the obtained 
theoretical results depends on the government level at which they are tested, and can be 
summarized as follows: 
 Depth of the financial market is particularly important when choosing the cooperative 
regulations and regulations based on centrally and self-imposed rules. Furthermore, 
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countries with higher primary balance (both general and sub-national) are more likely to 
choose self-imposed rules and market-based regulations over the other types. Finally, 
countries with higher sub-national outstanding debt seem to be most likely to choose self-
imposed fiscal rules to regulate the sub-national borrowing; 
 Cooperative type of the sub-national borrowing regulations seems to have positive effect 
on improving general government fiscal performance even in the case of high level of the 
sub-national debt and high dependence on the intergovernmental transfers. However, 
none of the broad types of sub-national borrowing regulations seems to show significant 
effect on fiscal sustainability at the sub-national level. These results are not consistent 
with the expectations that the policies focused on regulating the sub-national behavior 
should show the effectiveness at the sub-national level. On the contrary, our results 
suggest that they have no effect at the sub-national level and provide support to the 
conjecture that the sub-national fiscal behavior primarily affects the overall fiscal balance 
of the country; 
 When a particular level of the primary balance is predetermined as sustainable, then self-
imposed rules seem to be the only one effective in maintaining the primary balance above 
that threshold, for all government levels;  
 The “golden rule” and limits on debt and borrowing positively affect the primary balance 
at all levels of government. However, their effectiveness in maintaining the primary 
balance above a predetermined threshold for sustainable primary balance depends on the 
level of the threshold, being more efficient in the case of the lower threshold; 
 More centralized types of regulations (administrative and cooperative) seem to be more 
effective with a higher threshold for fiscally sustainable primary balance, while more 
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decentralized regulations (self-imposed rules) seem to show better performance with 
lower thresholds; 
 The sub-national tax autonomy contributes to higher general government primary balance 
but only when the sub-national governments do not depend on the intergovernmental 
transfers. This effect is not found to be significant at the sub-national level, suggesting 
that the effect of the sub-national tax autonomy is actually, on the margin, not 
significantly high; 
 In those countries with the history of bailouts at the sub-national government level, the 
primary balance is, on average, lower at both the sub-national and the general 
government level is than in other countries, suggesting the importance of the absence of 
moral hazard for fiscal responsibility. 
The obtained results suggest that the sub-national borrowing should not endanger fiscal 
sustainability if it was allowed only for financing capital investments, regardless of how 
centralized decisions on the borrowing issuances are. The limit on borrowing and debt is also 
proven to play important role on maintaining fiscal discipline. The importance of the sub-
national tax autonomy does not seem to be as important as we expected given its low marginal 
effect. The obtained results also emphasize the risk of the soft budget constraint and the moral 
hazard. High central government financing may give encouraging signs to the sub-national 
governments to over-borrow and to expect being bailed out by the central government. This 
deteriorates the general government budget directly, through the unplanned bailout from the 
central government, and indirectly, through the spillover effect on other sub-national 
governments that are highly fiscally dependent on the central government transfers.  
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When choosing the sub-national borrowing regulations, the central government 
authorities should be guided, among other requirements, by their preferences towards fiscal 
sustainability. Depending on how the central government defines the fiscally sustainable fiscal 
balance, it may choose more or less centralized types of the sub-national borrowing regulations. 
More centralized regulations of the sub-national borrowing (e.g., administrative and cooperative) 
seem to be more appropriate when the central government’s definition of the fiscal sustainability 
is more strict, while for a more relaxed definition of fiscal sustainability, the more decentralized 
options for regulating the sub-national borrowing seem to be more suitable. Finally, no one of 
the broad types of regulations shows the dominant effect on fiscal behavior at both the sub-
national and the general government level.  
Results obtained in this study point out to the importance of strong institutions (??).  
While this dissertation has accomplished to provide support to its main hypothesis 
indicated above, it highlights the need for future research on this topic. First, extending the 
dataset to even larger number of countries and longer observation period would enable to reduce 
the potential sample selection bias. Furthermore, an extension under consideration is to evaluate 
the direct effect of sub-national debt and its regulation on macroeconomic stability. Finally, even 
though the depth of financial markets is intuitively good instrument for the sub-national 
borrowing regulations, future research could consider using additional or alternative instruments.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable OBS Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GG primary balance 847 0.029 0.042 -0.13 0.22 
SNG primary balance 847 0.007 0.047 -0.33 0.33 
CG primary balance 847 0.022 0.058 -0.36 0.37 
SNG debt 993 0.067 0.093 0.00 0.89 
Liquid liabilities 1075 0.558 0.355 0.06 2.42 
Financial freedom 987 58.987 18.883 10 90 
Intergovernmental transfers (IGT) 847 0.385 0.211 0.01 0.89 
SNG expenditures 847 0.117 0.077 0.01 0.37 
Prohibited 1140 0.247 0.432 0 1 
Administrative 1140 0.243 0.429 0 1 
Cooperative 1140 0.098 0.298 0 1 
Centrally-imposed Rules 1140 0.204 0.403 0 1 
Self-imposed Rules 1140 0.046 0.211 0 1 
Market-based 1140 0.161 0.367 0 1 
Limit on debt 1140 0.479 0.500 0 1 
The "golden rule"  1140 0.438 0.496 0 1 
Foreign: prohibited 1140 0.452 0.498 0 1 
Foreign: allowed 1140 0.204 0.403 0 1 
Foreign: approval 1140 0.341 0.474 0 1 
Transfer formula 1140 0.457 0.498 0 1 
Tax autonomy 1140 0.514 0.500 0 1 
Bailout 1140 0.396 0.489 0 1 
Sanctions 1140 0.394 0.489 0 1 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 1140 0.096 0.295 0 1 
Corruption 1043 3.516 1.419 0.33 6 
Government stability 1044 8.129 1.805 2.17 12 
GDP per capita 1124 1.392 1.088 0.07 5.81 
Urbanization 1140 64.686 15.958 20.30 97.36 
Government fractionalization 1085 0.295 0.281 0.00 0.89 
Inflation 1116 0.744 5.646 -0.17 154.42 
Population growth 1140 0.006 0.011 -0.07 0.04 
Age dependency 1140 0.533 0.099 0.38 0.95 
Central bank independence (CBI) 1101 0.525 0.213 0.15 0.92 
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Table A.1.1. Descriptive Statistics, Balanced Panel 
Variable         OBS Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GG primary balance 807 0.026 0.040 -0.13 0.22 
SNG primary balance 807 0.006 0.047 -0.33 0.33 
CG primary balance 807 0.021 0.058 -0.36 0.37 
SNG debt 807 0.076 0.097 0.00 0.89 
Liquid liabilities 807 0.587 0.328 0.06 2.24 
Financial freedom 807 59.641 18.404 10 90 
Intergovernmental transfers (IGT) 807 0.391 0.211 0.02 0.89 
SNG expenditures 807 0.119 0.078 0.01 0.37 
Prohibited 807 0.177 0.382 0 1 
Administrative 807 0.203 0.403 0 1 
Cooperative 807 0.136 0.343 0 1 
Centrally-imposed Rules 807 0.235 0.425 0 1 
Self-imposed Rules 807 0.051 0.220 0 1 
Market-based 807 0.197 0.398 0 1 
Limit on debt 807 0.529 0.499 0 1 
The "golden rule"  807 0.441 0.497 0 1 
Foreign: prohibited 807 0.409 0.492 0 1 
Foreign: allowed 807 0.271 0.445 0 1 
Foreign: approval 807 0.318 0.466 0 1 
Transfer formula 807 0.542 0.499 0 1 
Tax autonomy 807 0.591 0.492 0 1 
Bailout 807 0.430 0.495 0 1 
Sanctions 807 0.437 0.496 0 1 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 807 0.130 0.337 0 1 
Corruption 807 3.673 1.439 0.33 6 
Government stability 806 8.334 1.671 2.92 12 
GDP per capita 807 1.607 1.077 0.09 5.81 
Urbanization 807 66.842 15.807 25.14 97.34 
Government fractionalization 802 0.309 0.280 0.00 0.89 
Inflation 807 0.237 1.367 -0.04 20.77 
Population growth 807 0.005 0.008 -0.04 0.02 
Age dependency 807 0.515 0.075 0.38 0.86 
Central bank independence (CBI) 807 0.554 0.216 0.17 0.92 
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Table A.2 Variables, Description and Sources 
Variable Description Sources 
GG primary balance General government primary balance 
IMF GFS Database; Ministry of Finance 
(Albania, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Serbia, Slovenia, USA, 
Vietnam); Statistical Agency (Japan) 
SNG primary balance Sub-national government primary balance 
CG primary balance Central government primary balance 
Intergovernmental transfers 
(IGT) 
Sub-national intergovernmental transfers as a share of 
total sub-national revenues 
SNG expenditures 
Sub-national expenditure to general government 
expenditure 
SNG debt Sub-national outstanding debt to GDP 
Various Sources: Central Bank (Brazil, Colombia, 
El Salvador, Honduras, Hungary, India, Romania, 
Slovakia, Spain, South Africa); Ministry of 
Finance (Argentina, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia); OECD 
Database (Austria, Canada, Mexico, Portugal, 
United Kingdom); Statistical Agency (Australia, 
Austria, Estonia, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Norway, Ukraine, USA) 
Liquid liabilities Liquid liabilities as share of GDP World Development Indicators 
Financial freedom 
Measure of banking efficiency as well as a measure of 
independence from government control and 
interference in the financial sector 
The Heritage Foundation 
Prohibited = 1 if sub-national borrowing is prohibited 
Various Sources  
(see Table A.4 for sources by country) 
Administrative 
= 1 if sub-national borrowing is administratively 
regulated 
Cooperative 
= 1 if sub-national borrowing is cooperatively 
regulated 
Centrally-imposed rules 
= 1 if sub-national borrowing is regulated by centrally-
imposed fiscal rules 
Self-imposed rules 
= 1 if sub-national borrowing is regulated by self-
imposed fiscal rules 
Market-based 
= 1 if sub-national borrowing is regulated solely by the 
financial market 
Limit on debt = 1 if there is a limit on debt and borrowing 
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The "golden rule"  
= 1 if sub-national borrowing is allowed only for 
financing capital investments 
Foreign: prohibited = 1 if borrowing in the foreign market is prohibited 
Foreign: allowed = 1 if borrowing in the foreign market is allowed 
Foreign: approval 
= 1 if borrowing in the foreign market is allowed with 
an approval from the central government authority 
Transfer formula 
= 1 if unconditional transfers are allocated based on a 
predetermined formula 
Tax autonomy 
= 1 if sub-national government has ability to set and/or 
change rates on income, business or consumption tax 
Bailout 
= 1 if country there is bailout history at the sub-
national level 
Sanctions 
= 1 if there are legal sanctions for non-compliance 
with the fiscal rules 
Stability and Growth Pact = 1 if country signed the Stability and Growth Pact 
Corruption 
Corruption index which value between 0 and 6, with 
higher index meaning lower corruption 
International Country Risk Guide 
Government stability 
Index of government stability. It is the sum of three 
subcomponents (government unity, legislative 
strength, and popular supports), each with a maximum 
of 4 and a minimum of 0 points. A score of 4 equates 
to “very low risk” and a score of 0 points to “very high 
risk” 
Government fractionalization 
Probability that two random draws will produce 
legislators from different parties 
Database of Political Indicators 
GDP per capita GDP per capita, PPP (current international $10,000) 
World Development Indicators 
Urbanization Urban population (% of total) 
Inflation Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 
Population growth Population growth (annual %) 
Age dependency 
Ratio of dependents (people younger than 15 or older 
than 64) to the working-age population (those ages 15-
64) per 100 working-age population 
Central bank independence Index of central bank independence (Polillo and Guillén, 2005) 
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Table A.3 Qualitative Indicators 
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Albania 2007-08 (L) 2002-08 2000-07 2008     2008 2008 P No 
Argentina No No     1990-04  1990-04 1990-04 AP No 
Armenia No No 2002-08      - - P - 
Australia 1990-08 1990-08  1990-93 1994-08    1990-08 No AL 1998-08 
Austria No 1990-08   1999-08 1990-98   No 1990-08 AP Yes 
Azerbaijan No No 1994-99      - - P - 
Belarus No No 1992-08      - - P - 
Belgium 1990-07 (L) 1990-07   1990-07    No 1990-07 AL 1996-08 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina No No 2004-08      - - P - 
Brazil 1997-08 (L) 1997-08    1997-08   1998-08 1997-08 AP 2000-08 
Bulgaria No 2003-08 1990-95   2005-08  1996-04 2002-08 2002-08 AL Yes 
Canada 1990-08 1990-08      1990-08 No No AL Yes 
Chile No 1991-08 1991-08      - - P - 
China No 1995-08 1995-08      - - P - 
Colombia No 1998-08    1998-08   1998-08 1998-08 AP No 
Costa Rica No No  2001-07     2001-07 2001-07 AP Yes 
Croatia No No  1994-08     1996-08 No P No 
Czech 
Republic No No    2005-08  1993-04 2002-08 No AL No 
Denmark 1990-08 1990-08  1990-08     1990-08 1990-08 AL No 
El Salvador No 2001-08           2001-08 No 2001-08 AP No 
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Table A.3 Qualitative Indicators (cont’d) 
Country 
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Estonia 1995-08 (L) 2003-08    1995-08   1995-08 No AL Yes 
Finland 1990-08 1990-08      1990-08 No No AL Yes 
France 1990-08 1990-08      1990-08 No 1990-08 AL Yes 
Georgia No 2006-07 1996-07      - - P - 
Germany No 1990-08   1992-08 1990-91   1990-08 1990-08 AL No 
Greece No 1994-07    1994-07   1994-07 No AP Yes 
Honduras No No  2002-08     No No AP No 
Hungary No No    1996-08  1990-95 1996-08 No AL No 
Iceland No No      1990-08 No No AL No 
India No No    1990-08   2002-08 No P 2003-08 
Indonesia No No  1990-08     1990-08 1990-08 AP Yes 
Ireland No 1990-07  1990-07     1990-07 No P Yes 
Italy 1994-08 (L) No    1994-08   1994-08 1994-08 P Yes 
Japan No 2001-07  2001-05  2006-07   2001-07 No AP Yes 
Kazakhstan No No 1997-08      - - P - 
Korea No No  2005-08     2005-08 2005-08 AP Yes 
Latvia No No  1994-08     1994-04 1994-08 AP 1996-08 
Lithuania No No 1991-97   1998-08   1998-08 No AP No 
Macedonia No No  2005-08     2005-08 No AP Yes 
Mexico No No   1990-00         1990-00 1990-00 P No 
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Table A.3 Qualitative Indicators (cont’d) 
Country 
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Netherlands No No      1990-08 1990-08 1990-08 P Yes 
Norway No 1996-08    1990-08   No No P Yes 
Pakistan No 1997-08 1997-08      - - P - 
Poland No No 1993-94   1995-08   1995-08 No P Yes 
Portugal No 1990-07      1990-07 1990-07 1990-07 P Yes 
Romania No 1998-08 1990-97  1998-08    1990-08 1990-08 AP 2007-08 
Serbia No 2002-08 2002-04 2005-08     2005-08 2005-08 AP No 
Slovakia No No    1996-08   2005-08 1996-08 AP Yes 
Slovenia No No  1992-07     2008-07 No P No 
South Africa No 1990-07   1990-07    1996-07 2003-07 P No 
Spain 1990-08 (L) 1990-08   1992-08 1990-91   No 1990-08 AP Yes 
Sweden 2000-01 1990-01    2001  1990-00 No No AL Yes 
Switzerland 1990-07 1990-07     1990-07  1990-07 1990-07 AP Yes 
Ukraine No No    1998-08   1998-08 1998-08 P No 
United 
Kingdom No 1990-08  1990-08     1990-08 No AP 1998-08 
United States 1990-01 No     1990-01  1990-01 No AP No 
Vietnam No 2002-08 2002-08           - - P - 
1 (L) = ability to set/change rates within a limit; 2 "-" = not applicable; 3 P = Prohibited; AP = Allowed with an approval; AL = Allowed 
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Table A.4 Sources for Qualitative Indicators by Country 
Country Country 
Albania (Conway et al., 2007; Shehu, 2006) India (Heredia-Ortíz and Rider, 2005; Purfield, 2004) 
Argentina (Reid, 2003; Webb and Dillinger, 1999) Indonesia (Alm and Indrawati, 2004; IMF, 2005) 
Armenia (Boex et al., 2005; Tumanyan, 2006) Ireland (Brownlow, 2004; Council of Europe, 1998) 
Australia (Koutsogeorgopoulou, 2007; Von Hagen et al., 2000) Italy (Council of Europe, 2008b; Von Hagen, et al., 2000) 
Austria (Council of Europe, 1999a; IMF, 2008) Japan (Aoki, 2008; Mochida, 2008) 
Azerbaijan  (Bayramov, 2006; Mikayilov, 2007) Kazakhstan (Leschenko and Troschke, 2006) 
Belarus (Kobasa et al., 2001; Krivorotko, 2006) Korea (Kook, 2001; Lee, 2005) 
Belgium (Council of Europe, 1997a, 2006a; OECD, 2009a) Latvia (Council of Europe, 2006c; Vanags and Vilka, 2000) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Glasser and Jokay, 2000; Lenić, 2006) Lithuania (Beksta and Petkeviciu, 2000; Council of Europe, 2006d) 
Brazil (Goldstein, 2003; Webb and Dillinger, 1999) Macedonia (Angelov, 2008; Nikolov, 2005) 
Bulgaria (Council of Europe, 1996a; Savov, 2006) Mexico (Hernández, et al., 2002; Hernández and Jarillo, 2008; Reid, 2003) 
Canada (Bird and Tassonyi, 2001; Shah, 1995) Netherlands (Council of Europe, 2008c) 
Chile (Letelier, 2010; OECD, 2009b) Norway (Borge, 2009; Council of Europe, 1997d) 
China (Era Dabla-Norris, 2005) Pakistan (Bahl et al., 2008) 
Colombia (Chaparro et al., 2005; Echavarría et al., 2000) Poland  (Kopańska, 2009; Kopańska et al., 2004; Nam and Parsche, 2001) 
Costa Rica (Hall et al., 2002) Portugal (Council of Europe, 2006e; OECD, 2008) 
Croatia (Alibegović, 2006; Bajo and Bronić, 2007) Romania (Ghinea et al., 2004; Nikolov, 2006) 
Czech Republic (Bryson, 2008; Ježek et al., 2004; Nam and Parsche, 2001) Serbia (Stipanović, 2006)  
Denmark (Council of Europe, 2008a; Milinković, 2008) Slovakia  (Bryson, 2008; Kling et al., 2004; Nam and Parsche, 2001) 
El Salvador(World Bank, 2004, 2010a) Slovenia (Ploštajner, 2008; Setnikar-Canka et al., 2000) 
Estonia (Jaansoo et al., 2004; Wehner et al., 2008) South Africa (Glasser et al., 1998; Liebig, et al., 2008) 
Finland (Council of Europe, 1997b, 2009) Spain (Laborda, et al., 2006; Vinuela, 2000) 
France (Council of Europe, 1997c; Dufrénot, et al., 2010) Sweden (Berggren and Tingvall, 2005; Von Hagen, et al., 2000) 
Georgia (Boex et al., 2005; Shergelashvili and Narmania, 2006) Switzerland (Dafflon, 1999; IMF, 2006b) 
Germany (Hepp and Von Hagen, 2009; Von Hagen, et al., 2000) Ukraine (CEU, 2004; Kuhn, 2004) 
Greece (Council of Europe, 2000; Hawkesworth et al., 2008) United Kingdom (Council of Europe, 1999b; Rutters, 2008) 
Honduras (Jametti and Joanis, 2010) United States (Laubach, 2005) 
Hungary (Balás and Hegedüs, 2004; Jokay, 2006; Nam and Parsche, 2001) Vietnam (Martinez-Vazquez, 2005) 
Iceland (Council of Europe, 2006b; IMF, 2010)   
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Table A.5 Descriptive Statistics: Failure and Duration 
  GG Primary Balance SNG Primary Balance 
  0% -3% 0% -3% 
  Failure 
Mean 0.201 0.067 0.239 0.081 
Standard Deviation 0.401 0.250 0.427 0.272 
Variance 0.161 0.063 0.182 0.074 
Skewness 1.494 3.466 1.223 3.083 
Kurtosis 3.233 13.016 2.496 10.503 
Number of failures 162 54 193 65 
Observations 807 807 807 807 
  Duration 
Mean 5.401 7.284 5.420 7.244 
Standard Deviation 4.561 5.009 4.749 5.089 
Variance 20.801 25.089 22.557 25.899 
Skewness 1.028 0.533 1.050 0.543 
Kurtosis 3.197 2.242 3.172 2.219 
Observations 807 807 807 807 
Min number of years of consolidation 1 1 1 1 
Max number of years of consolidation 19 19 19 19 
1 year 25.90% 13.14% 28.75% 14.50% 
2 years 10.78% 8.30% 9.79% 8.18% 
3 or more years 63.32% 78.56% 61.46% 77.32% 
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Table A.6. Factor changes in relative risk ratios of choosing particular sub-national borrowing 
regulation versus prohibiting sub-national borrowing (for one unit increase in independent 
variable)  
 Prohibited Administrative Cooperative Central Rule Self Rule 
Liquid 
Liabilities 
4.083 1.052 0.301* 0.058*** 0.448 
 (4.669) (0.584) (0.581) (0.530) (0.693) 
Financial 
Freedom 
1.136* 1.014 1.000 1.009 1.036* 
 (0.053) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.016) 
SNG Debt . 0.000*** 0.004** 0.114 6.879* 
 (.) (3.901) (2.124) (1.495) (2.089) 
GDP Per Capita 2.206 0.996 2.526*** 1.837*** 3.165*** 
 (1.068) (0.135) (0.157) (0.123) (0.201) 
SNG 
Expenditures 
2.377 7.161** 1.705*** 0.007 0.012 
 (8.780) (2.782) (0.898) (2.604) (4.509) 
SNG Own 
Revenues 
6.718** 6.677*** 0.280 2.896*** 6.726 
 (4.794) (1.727) (1.616) (1.425) (5.218) 
Tax Autonomy 0.000*** 0.145*** 0.397** 0.237*** 0.771 
 (3.989) (0.380) (0.323) (0.294) (0.564) 
Government 
Fractionalization 
. 1.255 3.135* 7.345*** 12.531** 
 (.) (0.553) (0.558) (0.495) (0.856) 
Bailout 0.920 1.431 0.397* 1.388 0.042*** 
 (2.440) (0.312) (0.365) (0.311) (0.616) 
Population 
Growth 
0.000 6.222** 1.040*** 0.000 6.892*** 
 (0.720) (3.527) (0.798) (8.212) (3.500) 
Pseudo R-sq.  0.431 
Chi2 1184.704 
P 0.000 
Coefficient represent factor changes in relative risk for unit increase in independent variable X: exp(b); SD(b) in 
parentheses; ***p<.01; *p<.05; *p<.10; The market-based regulations is the based category 
 
 
 
Table A.7. Log Likelihood and Information Criteria for Optional Distributions of the Baseline 
Hazard Function 
 GG Primary Balance SNG Primary Balance 
  Weibull Exponential Cox Weibull Exponential Cox 
Threshold = 0% 
Log Likelihood -482.88 -890.76 -4231.63 -567.51 -905.78 -4282.85 
AIC 1033.76 1847.53 8565.27 1203.02 1877.57 8665.70 
BIC 1193.29 2002.37 8804.57 1362.55 2032.40 8900.30 
Threshold = -3% 
Log Likelihood -247.20 -860.97 -3865.79 -296.97 -867.47 -3930.21 
AIC 562.40 1787.94 7831.57 661.94 1800.93 7960.43 
BIC 721.93 1942.78 8066.18 821.47 1955.77 8195.03 
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